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ABSTRACT 
 




The dissertation analyzes two interrelated issues, popular sovereignty and 
secularism, through the lens of the Turkish experience with democracy. Its objective 
is, first, to deconstruct Turkish secularism, laiklik, linked to the political theology of 
the homogeneous, sovereign nation and the attendant citizenship regime that only 
includes Muslim Turks. The dissertation, secondly, aims to reconstitute secularism 
and popular sovereignty differently in order to make room for pluralism, law, and 
ethics in the processes of collective will and identity formation, that is, to open up 
democracy to its others. The prevalent assumption in the literature that Turkish 
secularism is hostile to religion, aiming to eliminate Islam from the public sphere in 
a coercive manner is challenged through an analysis of religion textbooks used in 
public and military education from 1923 to 2010. This analysis suggests that 
secularism in Turkey does not simply entail the control of religion, but also the 
instrumentalization of Islam in securing political legitimacy, social integration, and 
sacrifice for the nation through the Islamic notion of martyrdom. The dissertation 
also questions the new, allegedly passive version of secularism defended by pro-
Islamic conservatives that combines the ontological sovereignty of God with the 
political sovereignty of the people understood in majoritarian terms. Both of these 
   
models, despite their different underlying premises, are authoritarian, thereby, cannot 
guarantee the freedom of conscience. As opposed to both of these models, the 
dissertation defends a strict wall of separation between religion and politics at the 
church-state level, rejecting symbolic, material or political recognition of religion by 
the state; and a more permeable wall of separation at the level of political 
interactions among citizens when they are engaged in public debate about coercive 
laws and policies. With respect to the related question of popular sovereignty, the 
dissertation takes issue with the political theological concept of the people as a 
unitary, homogenous subject endowed with a pre-political will (the early republican 
conception) as well as its seemingly more mundane version articulated in terms of the 
majority principle (the pro-Islamic conservative conception). The concept of “the 
people,” in its both nationalist and majoritarian versions, the dissertation suggests, is 
inherently linked to the Schmittian conception of the political as friend-enemy 
distinction which sacrifices constitutionalism and modern individual rights. Following 
the insights of Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida on the nature of democratic 
constitutional state, the dissertation defends a conception of “friendly living together 
among strangers” by means of positive law, based on a weak, internally differentiated 
conception of popular sovereignty. The dissertation, in other words, affirms the 
internal, albeit paradoxical, relationship between popular sovereignty and human 
rights.  
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PREFACE:  
The present study is a political theory dissertation that focuses on the single 
case study of Turkey. This is not the most orthodox way to frame a dissertation. 
Usually we either have comparative empirical studies or abstract political theory 
analyses. Of course, empirical studies are informed by normative ideals that often 
remain unarticulated in the background, and political theory is informed by actual 
cases. Yet, it seems that it is necessary to spell out the connection between empirical 
work and abstract theory in order to revise or redefine our theoretical framework as 
well as to offer better alternatives that can actually find meaningful expression in the 
real world. In other words, it is imperative to find out a kind of theory that not only 
identifies normative principles but also serves as a practical guide for reform. 
Political theory does and must inform new kinds of politics and vice versa.  
The Turkish case helps us to think through the conceptual and normative 
issues regarding a state that claims to be secular but nonetheless establishes or better 
instrumentalizes religion to its own advantage. My aim is to address what is at stake 
in a secular democratic state that can help us move beyond the false dilemma 
between the original caesaropapist state and the new pro-Islamic conservative 
alternative based on the politics of majoritarian control. Both of these alternatives are 
informed by, albeit for different reasons, a Schmittian political theology of the 
homogeneous nation state and the concept of the political as the friend-enemy 
distinction that sacrifices constitutionalism and modern individual rights. Based on 
the insights of Habermas and Derrida I offer a theory of secular democratic, 
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constitutional state informed by a kind of friendly living together among strangers by 
means of positive law that is compatible with a modern citizenship regime that grants 
everyone equal rights. When we approach the question of secularism, that is the 
separation of church and state, from the perspective of democratic constitutional 
state and its wealth of presuppositions like the equal moral, legal, civic, and political 
status of each and every one, we see that separation does not mean hostility toward 
religion. Rather, those who take religion seriously have good reasons to endorse a 
secular state that neither favors nor disfavors religion. 
The second reason why it is essential to analyze the Turkish case, which is 
related to the first point, is to criticize contemporary anthropologists like Talal Asad 
and Saba Mahmood who understand universal principles in general and secularism 
or secular democracy in particular as manifestations of a false universalism, a new 
way to colonize the East. Secularization, as I discuss it in this dissertation with (and 
against) Max Weber, has very much to do with the rationalization of Christianity and 
the Christian ethics of brotherliness. In other words, it has to do with questions that 
Christianity has posed to science and politics, which leads to the question of whether 
it is legitimate to transport it to non-Christian contexts like Turkey. However, what 
anthropologists fail to see is that concepts like secularization, the separation of 
church and state, or secular constitutional democracy appeal to a moral validity 
beyond their origins in the West. Ideas like equal moral, political, civic, and legal 
status of each and every one which, in turn, translate into our mutual rights and 
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responsibilities and provide a common basis of living together and of political 
reasoning cannot be easily dismissed as false universalism, as Talal Asad and his 
students suggest.  
Last but not least, the present study aims to contribute to the literature on 
Turkish politics, which is somewhat deficient when it comes to political theory. We 
do not find many studies on Turkish politics informed by a strong theoretical 
background. The secularization debate, for instance, is usually discussed in 
comparative politics or sociology. Political theory in general, on the other hand, is 
informed by Anglo-American or Continental examples. Therefore, the present study 
aims to fill this gap and to contribute not only to political theory but also to Turkish 
politics. Based on the conceptual and normative relation between popular 
sovereignty and human rights on the one hand, the free exercise of religion and the 
principle non-establishment on the other hand, I aim to make a strong case against 
the Turkish exclusionary citizenship regime as well as the establishment and the 
control of religion in order to open up democracy to its others and call for the 
abolishment of the Diyanet, public religious education as well as the lifting of the 
ban on headscarf. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
I. OBJECTIVES AND THESES 
The dissertation analyzes two interrelated issues, popular sovereignty and 
secularism, through the lens of the Turkish experience with democracy. Its objective 
is, first, to deconstruct Turkish secularism, laiklik, linked to a political theology of 
the homogeneous, sovereign nation and the attendant citizenship regime that includes 
only Muslim Turks. The dissertation, secondly, aims to reconstitute secularism and 
popular sovereignty differently in order to make room for pluralism, law, and ethics 
in the moments of collective will and identity formation, that is, to open up 
democracy to its others. Accordingly, the dissertation has two different but 
interrelated dimensions: the descriptive analysis of the meaning and practice of 
secularism in Turkey (I); the conceptual and normative analyses of secularism (II) 
and of popular sovereignty (III).  
The dissertation through an analysis of religion textbooks used in public and 
military education challenges the prevalent assumption in the literature that Turkish 
secularism is hostile to religion, aiming to eliminate Islam from the public sphere in 
a coercive manner. The analysis suggests that secularism in Turkey does not simply 
entail the control of religion, but also the instrumentalization of Islam in securing 
political legitimacy, social integration, and sacrifice for the nation through the 
Islamic notion of martyrdom. This model established by the early nation builders 
appears to be a version of caesaropapism that accords supreme authority to the state 
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over religious matters by virtue of its autonomous legitimacy. The dissertation also 
questions the new, allegedly passive version of secularism defended by pro-Islamic 
conservatives that combines the ontological sovereignty of God with the political 
sovereignty of the people understood in majoritarian terms as an appropriate 
substitute to the original caesaropapist model. Both of these models, despite their 
different underlying premises, are authoritarian, thereby, cannot guarantee the 
freedom of conscience. Nor can they secure room for heterogeneity, dissent, and 
difference.  
In contrast to the critics of the separationist laïcité model of secularism, the 
dissertation argues that laïcité, understood properly, is not an optional extra for 
democracy but its very condition of possibility. The dissertation defends a strict wall 
of separation between religion and politics at the church-state level, rejecting 
symbolic, material or political recognition of religion by the state; and a more 
permeable wall of separation at the level of political interactions among citizens 
when they are engaged in public debate about coercive laws and policies. The 
dissertation argues that only this republican model can truly protect the free-exercise 
of religion and allow room for the pursuit of public goals that cut across 
religious/secular divides. 
With respect to the related question of popular sovereignty, the dissertation 
takes issue with the political theological concept of the people as a unitary, 
homogenous subject endowed with a pre-political will (the early republican 
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conception) as well as its seemingly more mundane version articulated in terms of the 
majority principle (the pro-Islamic conservative conception). The concept of “the 
people,” in its both nationalist and majoritarian versions, the dissertation suggests, is 
inherently linked to the Schmittian conception of the political as friend-enemy 
distinction which sacrifices constitutionalism and modern individual rights. Following 
the insights of Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida on the nature of democratic 
constitutional state, the dissertation defends a conception of “friendly living together 
among strangers” by means of positive law, based on a weak, internally differentiated 
conception of popular sovereignty. The dissertation, in other words, affirms the 
internal, albeit paradoxical, relationship between popular sovereignty and human 
rights on the one hand, the rule of the people and the rule law on the other.  
II. TURKISH SECULARISM, LAIKLIK, IN PRACTICE 
The new Turkish republic – officially proclaimed on October 29, 1923 – 
shifted the locus of sovereignty from the sultan, who as the Caliph claimed to 
represent all Muslims in the world, to the nation.1 The perceived challenge before the 
nationalist elite was to construct a nation with a single will from a population not 
only that was predominantly peasant but whose majority also lacked a sense of 
                                                
1 Actually the principle of national sovereignty had found its first legal expression in Article 
1 of the interim constitution drawn by the Grand National Assembly in 1921. However, the 
meaning of the expression was rather ambiguous as the purpose of the assembly was to lead 
the resistance movement and to turn power back to the sultan after the achievement of its 
mandate. See Bülent Tanör, Osmanli-Türk Anayasal Gelismeleri : (1789-1980) (Istanbul: 
Yapi Kredi Kültür Sanat Yayincilik 2006)., 258. 
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national identity and interpreted religion in general and Islam in particular in 
different ways.2 A homogeneous, unitary national identity was seen to be necessary 
not only for breaking the loyalty of Ottoman subjects to the sultan who stood also as 
a religious leader for Muslims but also for transcending all their “religious” 
particularities.  
Although the 1924 Constitution attributed sovereignty to the nation “without 
reservation or condition” (Article 3), there remained a set of state institutions that 
derived their legitimacy from Islam. The nationalist leaders implemented a series of 
reforms to secularize political authority and to remove this duality to a certain 
extent.3 This process involved the abolition of the Caliphate and the office of Seyh-
ül-Islam with the simultaneous establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs 
(the Diyanet) attached to the office of the Prime Minister in 1924. In Toprak’s 
words, the personnel of Islam became “paid employees of the state.”4 In 1924, 
Sharia courts were abolished and their jurisdiction were transferred to the secular 
courts. In 1926 new secular codes of civil, criminal and commercial law were 
accepted, based respectively on the corresponding Swiss, Italian, and German codes. 
Religious schools were eliminated and a unified system of national education was 
                                                
2 Serif Mardin, Turkiye'de Din Ve Siyaset (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 1991)., 51-52. 
3 For a comprehensive list of secularizing reforms during the nation-building process, see 
Shaw Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern 
Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977)., 384-388 
4 Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey (Leiden: Brill, 1981). 
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established in 1924. Article 2 of the Constitution that declared Islam the religion of 
the state was removed in 1928.  
The secularizing reforms targeted not only the state but also the society and 
traditional Islamic practices and ways of life. In 1925, the dervish lodges (tekke), 
cells (zaviye), and religious tombs (türbe) were abolished along with religious titles.  
In 1926, the use of alcohol was made legal. In 1925, the wearing of the fez was 
banned and the hat was made the official headgear for men. The veil, on the other 
hand, was not officially banned. “The religious covering of women will not cause 
difficulty…This simple style [of headcovering] is not in conflict with the morals and 
manners of our society,” declared Atatürk.5 Yet, White asserts that the veil was 
strongly discouraged especially in the cities and “those covering their heads found no 
place in the banks, ministries, and schools of the new nation.”6 A series of reforms 
were implemented in order to establish gender equality between men and women. 
Polygamy was abolished and women were given extensive grounds to divorce their 
husbands. Women were also given the right to vote and be elected, first in 
municipalities and the village councils of elders (1933), then in national elections 
(1934).  
                                                
5 Quoted in Benjamin D. Bleiberg, "Unveiling the Real Issue: Evaluating the European Court 
of Human Rights' Decision to Enforce the Turkish Headscarf Ban in Leyla Sahin V. 
Turkey," Cornell Law Review 91(2006)., 135. 
6Jenny B. White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2002)., 35. Only in 1981 the veil became an object of legal 
regulation. For an history of veil regulation in Turkey see, Bleiberg, "Unveiling the Real 
Issue: Evaluating the European Court of Human Rights' Decision to Enforce the Turkish 
Headscarf Ban in Leyla Sahin V. Turkey.", 140-143.  
   
 
6 
The modernizing reforms implemented in the aftermath of the Independence 
War (1919-1923) are usually understood as showing the republican elite’s deliberate 
move away from Islam.7  What is ironic in Turkey is that the development of 
secularism went hand in hand with the making of a religiously homogeneous 
citizenry. During the resistance movement religion was invoked as the common 
denominator of the nation and being a Muslim was set as a precondition for 
nationality. In the Erzurum Congress the nationalists articulated the aim of the 
resistance as the defense of the historical and national rights of the Muslim people.8 
The idea of the Islamic nation was further emphasized in the Sivas Congress that 
defined the national borders as the territory where Turks and Kurds lived as Muslim 
brothers.9 The secularization of political authority in the aftermath of the War led 
some to conclude that the use of Islam was nothing more than a discursive tactic on 
                                                
7 See Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey. Feroz Ahmad, The Making of 
Modern Turkey, Making of the Middle East Series (London ; New York: Routledge, 1993). 
Ahmet T. Kuru, "Passive and Assertive Secularism: Historical Conditions, Ideological 
Struggles, and State Policies toward Religion," World Politics 59, no. 4 (2007). M. Hakan 
Yavuz and John L. Esposito, "Islam in Turkey: Retreat from the Secular Path," in Turkish 
Islam and the Secular State : The Gülen Movement, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. 
Esposito (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2003). Sabri M. Akural, "Kemalist 
Views on Social Change," in Atatu!Rk and the Modernization of Turkey, ed. Jacob M. Landau 
(Colorado: Westview Press, 1984)., 125-152.  
8 The congresses at Erzurum and Sivas headed by Mustafa Kemal unified scattered 
resistance groups into “Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia.” 
Erik Jan Zürcher, Savas, Devrim Ve Uluslasma: Turkiye Tarihinde Gecis Donemi (1908-
1928) (Istanbul: Bilgi Universitesi Yayinlari, 2005)., 231. 
9 Ibid., 236. 
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the part of the nationalists to mobilize the masses during the resistance movement.10 
However, as early nation building policies make clear, religion more than language 
or ethnicity is often perceived to be the criterion for defining who is included and 
who is excluded.11 An example is the compulsory population exchange with Greece, 
when Turkish-speaking Christians were sent to Greece and Muslims in Greece who 
did not speak a word of Turkish were brought in, a practice that approvingly cited by 
Carl Schmitt in his argument that democracy requires homogeneity and, if necessary, 
the elimination of heterogeneity.12 Similarly while Turkish-speaking Christians of 
Karaman were forced to emigrate, the immigration demands of Turkish-speaking 
Christians in Moldavia were denied.13 Apparently, for the nationalists, while 
Muslims whose experience and interpretation of religion in general and of Islam in 
particular showed great diversity14 could be assimilated into a new religion, non-
Muslims could definitely not.  
The citizenship rights of the remaining non-Muslims, who after the war made 
up less than 3 percent of the entire population, were reduced with the Memurin 
                                                
10 Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey. Ahmad, The Making of Modern 
Turkey. 
11 Tanil Bora, ""Ekalliyet Yilanlari...": Turk Milliyetciligi Ve Azinliklar," in Milliyetcilik, ed. 
Tanil Bora, Modern Turkiye'de Siyasi Dusunce (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2002). 
12 Foti Benlisoy, "Turk Milliyetciliginde Katedilmemis Bir Yol: "Hiristiyan Turkler"," ibid. 
Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 1st MIT Press pbk ed., Studies in 
Contemporary German Social Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988)., 9.  
13 Bora, ""Ekalliyet Yilanlari...": Turk Milliyetciligi Ve Azinliklar." 
14 Mardin, Turkiye'de Din Ve Siyaset., 51-52. 
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Kanunu (Law on Government Employees) in 1926 that made being Muslim a 
precondition for becoming a government employee, hence institutionalizing the 
dominance of one “religious” group over the state.15 With the introduction of the 
Varlık Vergisi (Capital Tax) in 1942, which aimed to confiscate the property and 
assets of non-Muslims, an attempt was made to bring the national economy also 
under the control of Muslim citizens. By 1955 the number of non-Muslims was 
reduced to 1.08 percent of the entire population.16 Also noteworthy is that during the 
early republican era Turkish nationalism as interpreted by the founders had an 
inclusive attitude toward “Muslims” from different “ethnic” groups. As Yeğen 
shows, for instance, Kurds were perceived as “future-Turks;” and those who were 
willing to be assimilated into Turkishness did not face the discriminatory citizenship 
practices that non-Muslims did. “For the Turkish state,” Yeğen suggests, 
“…Muslimhood has been the key to achieving Turkishness. Likewise, non-
Muslimhood was seen as ‘the natural’ obstacle to achieving Turkishness.”17 From 
this perspective, the use of “Islam” may have been more than a cunning tactic on the 
part of the nationalists to mobilize the masses. It testifies how far “Islam” was 
                                                
15 The citizenship policies in the early republican era that aim to reduce the rights of non-
Muslims is rather long. For an elaborate analysis see Ayhan Aktar, Varlik Vergisi Ve 
"Türklestirme" Politikalari (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2000). 
16 Ibid. 243. 
17 Mesut Yegen, "Turkish Nationalism and the Kurdish Question," Ethnic and Racial Studies 
30, no. 1 (2007)., 138. 
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embedded in the way Turkish nationality was imagined by the nationalists who 
founded modern Turkey.  
The elimination of “heterogeneous” elements from the nation explains only 
half of the nation-building process. It does not tell us the actual role Islam plays in 
the transformation of subjects into citizens through centralized education system. 
The dissertation makes a unique contribution to secularism debates in Turkey 
through a content analysis of religion textbooks used in civil and military education 
from 1923 to 2010. Given the fact that the Turkish state has continuously offered 
religious education in public schools, except for a brief period between 1939-1947, 
the content of standardized textbooks is a crucial site for understanding the role 
Islam plays in Turkish republican nationalism. The analysis, discussed at length in 
Chapter II, reveals that secularism in Turkey does not simply entail the control of 
religion (a well-known fact), but also the instrumentalization of Islam in securing 
political legitimacy, social integration, and sacrifice for the nation through the 
Islamic notion of martyrdom. Hence, the political theology underpinning Turkish 
“secular” republicanism.  
In the literature, the Turkish conception of secularism, laiklik, came to be 
regarded as assertive or hostile to religion, aiming to eliminate the influence of Islam 
from the public life in a coercive manner.18 The analysis of religion textbooks 
                                                
18 Alfred C. Stepan, Arguing Comparative Politics (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001). Ahmet T. Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United 
States, France, and Turkey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Hakan Yavuz, 
Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (NY: Oxford Univesity Press, 2003). There are 
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challenges these sweeping generalizations and reveals the complex ways in which 
the boundaries, between the political, the religious, and the scientific spheres are 
continuously re-negotiated and re-drawn in different periods. I distinguish between 
two forms of “secularism” that has been privileged by the standardized textbooks, 
nationalist secularism (1923-1980), and Islamic secularism (1980-present). 
Nationalist secularism rests on two interrelated assumptions: that of a monolithic 
nation [yekpare millet] with a single will, the common denominator of which is 
Islam. Textbooks give primacy to the political and the scientific, while 
instrumentalizing Islam by arguing that obedience to the sacred interests of the 
nation is a form of worship. What is outside of science is seen to be religiously 
wrong and politically illegitimate. Nationalist secularism appears to be a form of 
what Max Weber called caesaropapism, “a secular, caesaropapist ruler who exercises 
supreme authority in ecclesiastical matters by virtue of his autonomous 
                                                                                                                                     
exceptional studies that suggest the formation of secularism entailed the constructions of two 
Islams. On the one hand, the state constructed a particular Islam marked as archaic, 
backward, anti-modern, aiming to capture state power, which, in turn, justified the necessity 
of a secular state in the first place. On the other hand, the state also constructed an 
“enlightened” conception of Islam based on a particular interpretation of Sunni Islam. While 
this argument is true; in this studies the “enlightened” state Islam is represented as an 
unchanging phenomenon with a stable meaning. The dissertation traces the genealogy of 
state Islam and shows the ways in which it is reconstructed at different junctures. See 
Chapter II. On the two Islams, see Alev Çınar, "Subversion and Subjugation in the Public 
Sphere: Secularism and the Islamic Headscarf," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and 
Society 33, no. 4 (2008). Umit Cizre Sakallioglu, "Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State 
Interaction in Republican Turkey," International Journal of Middle East Studies 28, no. 2 
(1996). Andrew Davison, "Turkey, a "Secular" State? The Challenge of Description," South 
Atlantic Quarterly 102, no. 2-3 (2003); Kim Shively, "Taming Islam: Studying Religion in 
Secular Turkey," Antropological Quarterly 81, no. 3 (2008). 
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legitimacy.”19 The autonomous legitimacy of the charismatic ruler stems from his 
successful identification with the nation. In time, especially after the 1980 coup 
d’état, we see a transformation of this model in the opposite direction towards an 
Islamic conception of secularism. Textbooks begin to give primacy to the religious 
over all other spheres. What is outside of Islam is seen to be scientifically wrong and 
politically illegitimate. Textbooks begin refer to the Diyanet as the legitimate 
authority to interpret Islam and to the congruity between divine and positive law. 
What I call Islamic secularism finds its most concrete expression in the 
contemporary discourse of the Diyanet. The latter via its publications calls for the re-
codification of the entire legal and constitutional system according to the precepts of 
Islam. In sum, while nationalist secularism derives political legitimacy from the 
supreme will of the nation, Islamic secularism derives it from the ontological 
sovereignty of God on the one hand, and a majoritarian interpretation of political 
sovereignty of the people on the other hand.  
 
III. RE-THINKING LAIKLIK:  
 
 
A growing number of scholars from different disciplines and perspectives 
attack the French strict separation model of secularism, laïcité. In their view, this 
model is informed by the Enlightenment critique of religion that perceives religion as 
traditional, irrational, and pre-modern, thus, something to be forcibly removed from 
                                                
19 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, vol. 2 (New 
York,: Bedminster Press, 1968)., 1160 
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public life and relegated to the private sphere or better to the conscience. In other 
words, the separation thesis is simply a reflection of a contingent Euro-centric 
culture, i.e. a particularism masquerading as the universal. It can only accommodate 
Protestantized, cognitive forms of religions that conceive of the relationship between 
the individual and God as a private affair. Therefore, it is extremely intolerant 
towards those who perceive of religion not simply a private affair but constitutive of 
their social and political existence.20 Strict separationism, the critics suggest, is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for democracy.  
                                                
20 Talal Asad, "Trying to Understand French Secularism," in Political Theologies : Public 
Religions in a Post-Secular World, ed. Hent de Vries and Lawrence Eugene Sullivan (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2006). Veit-Michael Bader, Secularism or Democracy?: 
Associational Governance of Religious Diversity (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 
2007). Rajeev Bhargava, "Political Secularism," in The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Theory, ed. John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig, and Anne Phillips (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). José Casanova, "The Secular and Secularisms," Social Research 76, 
no. 4 (2009); Jürgen Habermas, "Religion in the Public Sphere: Cognitive Presuppositions 
for the "Public Use of Reason" by Religious and Secular Citizens," in Between Naturalism 
and Religion (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008); Charles Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape: 
Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2006); Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and 
Turkey. Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). T. N. Madan, "Secularism in Its Place," in 
Secularism and Its Critics, ed. Rajeev Bhargava (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1998). Ashis Nandy, "The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Toleration," 
in Secularism and Its Critics, ed. Rajeev Bhargava (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1998). Alfred Stepan, "The World's Religious Syetems and Democracy: Crafting the "Twin 
Tolerations"," in Arguing Comparative Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
Charles Taylor, "Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism," in The Power of 
Religion in the Public Sphere, ed. Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan Vanantwerpen (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2011). Nicholas Wolterstorff, "The Role of Religion in 
Decision and Discussion of Political Issues " in Religion in the Public Square: The Place of 
Religious Convictions in Political Debate (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997). 
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Starting from some version of this critique of separationism, scholars either 
call for the abandonment of the concept of secularism altogether21 or offer alternative 
forms of secularisms that would be more sensitive to religious demands. The latter 
group, as opposed to a single idealized model valid across different contexts, call for 
the necessity of thinking secularism in multiple forms both in theory and practice.22  
The claim that “Secularism, in the sense of state-religion separation, is 
neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for democracy,” is being accepted by a 
growing number of comparativists.23 They quickly refer to longstanding democracies 
like England or Denmark with established Churches to make the argument that 
democracy and separationism has no affinity. Yet, the existence of lucky cases does 
not by itself invalidate a normative principle. Furthermore, these countries face 
serious difficulties in incorporating their growing immigrant populations. Could it be 
the case that seemingly innocent symbolic recognition sends a strong political 
                                                
21 Madan, "Secularism in Its Place.", Nandy, "The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery 
of Religious Toleration." Talal Asad, "Introduction: Thinking About Secularism," in 
Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003). Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. 
Bader, Secularism or Democracy?: Associational Governance of Religious Diversity. 
22 Casanova, "The Secular and Secularisms."; José Casanova, "Religion, Politics and Gender 
Equality: Public Religions Revisited," UNRISD Programme on Gender and Development 
Paper Number 5(2009). Stepan, "The World's Religious Syetems and Democracy: Crafting 
the "Twin Tolerations"." Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United 
States, France, and Turkey; Taylor, "Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism." 
Bhargava, "Political Secularism." 
23 Stepan, "The World's Religious Syetems and Democracy: Crafting the "Twin 
Tolerations"." Ahmet Kuru, "A Research Note on Islam, Democracy, and Secularism," 
Insight Turkey 11, no. 4 (2009). Jonathan Fox, "Do Democracies Have Separation of 
Religion and State?," Canadian Journal of Political Science 40, no. 1 (2007). Casanova, 
"The Secular and Secularisms." 
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message to immigrants, that they are bound to be second-class citizens, that they 
cannot participate in the public sphere as free and equal citizens? A second way to 
dismiss the argument that democracy requires secularism is to refer to the unlucky 
case of Turkey. Yet, Turkey, as the preceding section aimed to show, does not seem 
to reflect the truth of the strict-separation model. Religion is very much established 
both symbolically and materially. Ahmet Kuru’s dismissal of the argument that 
democracy requires separation of state and religion is especially relevant for the 
purposes of this dissertation, since he offers an alternative model of secularism for 
Turkey, which, as I discuss below, is seriously flawed.  
Kuru based on his comparative analysis of state policies toward religion in 
the US, France, and Turkey, distinguishes two forms of secularism with reference to 
the public visibility of religion. By religion, Kuru refers to “a set of beliefs and 
practices that refer to a supernatural being, generally God. In this definition, neither 
atheism nor ideologies like Marxism are a religion.”24 Secularism is assertive if it 
removes religion from the public sphere (e.g. Turkey, France), and it is passive if it 
allows the visibility of religion (e.g. the US). Kuru also distinguishes between two 
forms of passive secularism with reference to the American experience: 
accommodationism  and separationism. Accommodationist passive secularism 
defines neutrality as state impartiality toward only monotheistic religions and calls 
                                                
24 Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and 
Turkey., 7 
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for the protection of religion from state intervention, “more than the reverse.”25 In 
other words, accommodationism is a form of “one-way protection” that protects 
religion from the state, but it opposes protecting the state against the interference of 
(monotheistic) religions unless the latter threaten the freedom of religion.26 The 
principle of non-establishment is seen as a secondary principle that becomes 
necessary only if the free exercise of religion is threatened. Accordingly, 
accommodationism ignores the equal civic status of the believers in nonmonotheistic 
religions as well as non-believers based on an interpretation of democracy in 
majoritarian terms. Separationist passive secularism, on the other hand, interprets 
state neutrality differently, arguing that the state must also be neutral toward 
nonmonotheists as well as atheists.27 Therefore, unlike accomodationists, 
separationists oppose strong state-religion entanglements like official monotheistic 
references as well as public funding of religious education on the grounds that such 
policies and official discourses amount to a monotheist establishment, thereby 
violating the establishment clause of the First Amendment.  
The discussion above suggests that there are three competing definitions of 
secularism in Kuru’s analysis —assertive, accommodationist, and separatist—rather 
                                                
25 Ibid. 55-56. 
26 I borrow the term “one-way protectionism” from Amy Gutmann. Amy Gutmann, 
"Religious Freedom and Civic Responsibility," Washington & Lee Law Review 56, no. 3 
(1999). 
27 Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and 
Turkey., 56 
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than two. Kuru tends to downplay separationism and to obscure its deep difference 
from accommodationism. Whereas the latter rests on a majoritarian conception of 
democracy that ignores citizens of nonmonotheistic religions as well as non-
believers, thereby leaning towards monotheist establishment; separationism takes 
into account the latter group seriously and leans towards non-establishment. 
Accommodationism, as suggested above, is a form of “one-way protection.” It gives 
priority to freedom of religion over freedom from religion as well as over freedom of 
choice.28 Therefore, the attempt to lump together separationism and 
accommodationism under one category seems to be dubious conceptually and 
normatively. In fact, whenever Kuru employs the term passive secularism over and 
against assertive secularism, he refers to accomodationism. It is this conception that 
he finds compatible with the “highly religious Turkish society.”29 It seems that the 
more “God-talk” there is in official state discourses, the better it is. This is why he 
idealizes the references to God and religion in official public discourses in the US 
(like the statement of “so help me God” in official oaths, the opening of the Congress 
with a prayer by a chaplain or the presence of the motto “In God We Trust” on 
American currency) and bemoans the fact that they are absent in Turkey and 
France.30  
                                                
28 Ibid. 47. 
29 Ibid. 200. 
30 Ibid. 9. 
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When it comes to the Turkish case, the meaning of passive secularism is 
further diluted. The kind of accommodationism preferred by the AKP goes beyond 
the symbolic establishment of monotheism in the US. Kuru tells us that the AKP 
wants to imitate the American model “in terms of its content—especially the absence 
of an ideological state and the emphasis on religious freedoms—not its structure.”31 
Just like the assertive secularists, the AKP has a “statist view on state-religion 
relations,” and wants to maintain the established status of the Diyanet as well as 
mandatory religious education in order “to avoid anarchy in Islamic communities,” 
that is, to control Islam.32 It seems that the struggle between assertive secularists and 
passive secularists in Turkey is not about the definition of secularism as Kuru 
suggests, but the correct definition of Islam. Last but not least, from a normative 
perspective, there is also the question of the compatibility of accommodationism, 
even in a symbolic sense without doctrinal establishment, with a democratic 
citizenship regime that emphasizes equal civic status of all citizens and their equal 
access to the public sphere regardless of their particular allegiances. Kuru is too 
quick to dismiss laïcité as an ideology, downplaying its moral foundations, which I 
will turn to later in the chapter.  
                                                
31 Ahmet T. Kuru, "Reinterpretation of Secularism in Turkey: The Case of the Justice and 
Development Party," in The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the Ak Parti, ed. 
Hakan Yavuz (Utah: The University of Utah Press, 2006).,143 
32 Ibid. 143-144. Kuru’s emphasis. 
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 The argument that the laïcité model of secularism is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for democracy is also defended on normative grounds, for instance, by 
Jose Casanova. Before discussing his critique of the separation thesis let me briefly 
refer to his previous approach to state-religion relations. In Public Religions in the 
Modern World, Casanova made two important analytical distinctions concerning the 
role of religion in the public sphere. First, he showed that what is usually considered 
to be a single theory of secularization in the literature is, in fact, made up of three 
different theses: secularization as the functional differentiation and emancipation of 
the secular spheres like the state, economy and science from religious institutions 
and norms and the associated process of specialization of religion in its own sphere; 
secularization as decline of religious beliefs and practices; and secularization as 
privatization. Through an analysis of the transformation of religion (or better 
Catholicism and Protestantism) in four different contexts (Spain, Poland, Brazil, and 
the United States) Casanova argued that in contrast to secularization as religious 
decline and privatization, secularization as differentiation constitutes the defensible 
core of the secularization theory.33 Second, he distinguished between three different 
types of public religion corresponding to the three main areas of a modern polity: 
state, political society, and civil society, arguing that only those public religions 
contained within the public sphere of civil society are compatible with modern 
universalistic principles. In other words, the study showed the normative 
                                                
33 José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1994)., 7.  
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interrelatedness of the principles of “free exercise” and “non-establishment” as 
incorporated in the First Amendment of the US constitution.34 “Established 
churches,” Casanova claimed, “are incompatible with modern differentiated states 
and that the fusion of the religious and political community is incompatible with the 
modern principle of citizenship.”35 In this earlier view, separation and 
disestablishment were seen as necessary to secure “the freedom of religion from the 
state, the freedom of the state from religion, and the freedom of the individual 
conscience from both state and organized religion.”36  
Since the publication of Public Religions in the Modern World in 1994 
Casanova’s position with respect to state-church relations has changed tremendously. 
He no longer holds separation and disestablishment to be necessary for democracy. 
Rather he sees his earlier position to be based on his own “Western Christian secular 
prejudices.”37 The more fruitful approach to state-religion relations starts from 
Alfred Stepan’s notion of “twin tolerations,” which demands “freedom for elected 
governments from religious groups” as well as “freedom for religious individuals 
and groups from government.”38 This approach allows us to think secularisms in 
                                                
34 Ibid. 56.  
35 Ibid. 213. Emphasis mine. 
36 Ibid. 57. Emphasis mine.  
37 Casanova Casanova, "Religion, Politics and Gender Equality: Public Religions 
Revisited.", 16 
38 Stepan, "The World's Religious Syetems and Democracy: Crafting the "Twin 
Tolerations"."216. Emphasis mine.  
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multiple forms, he suggests. Following Stepan, Casanova argues that the separation 
of religion from political society or the state is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
democratic politics. The necessary condition for democracy is the principle of free 
exercise of religion, which, in his view, is a “normative democratic principle in 
itself.”39 The principle of non-establishment, on the other hand, is “secondary 
instrumental condition, necessary only when religious establishments hinder the free 
exercise of religion.”40  
Earlier, when Casanova argued that deprivatization of religion is normatively 
justifiable, he based this argument on the freedom of individual conscience. The 
principle of freedom of conscience appealed to a moral validity independent of its 
particular historical origins in the Protestant Reformation or the modern scientific 
revolution. Furthermore he tied the freedom of individual conscience tightly to the 
right to privacy, which, in his view, was indispensable in modern democratic 
polities. The right to privacy, he explained, does not automatically translate into the 
liberal normative prescription of privatization, that is, the duty to privacy. Religion, 
he argued, “may enter the public sphere and assume a public form only if it accepts 
the inviolable right to privacy and the sanctity of the principle of freedom of 
conscience.”41 This proviso guaranteed the three interrelated freedoms mentioned 
                                                
39 Casanova, "The Secular and Secularisms.", 1062. 
40 Casanova, "Religion, Politics and Gender Equality: Public Religions Revisited.", 16. 
Casanova, "The Secular and Secularisms.", 1063. 
41 Casanova Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World., 57. 
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above: the freedom of religion from the state, the freedom of the state from religion, 
and the freedom of the individual conscience from both state and organized religion. 
The necessity of protecting these three freedoms was sine qua non for a modern 
citizenship regime that accords equal political status to each and every one. 
Casanova was suspicious, for good reasons, of those forms of public religions at the 
state level that create “a totalitarian participatory publicness that tends to destroy the 
very boundaries between the private and public spheres by infringing upon private 
rights (freedom of conscience being the most sacred of private rights) and destroying 
public liberties (freedom of speech being the constitutive principle of a modern 
public sphere).”42 This is why he wanted to contain religion in the public sphere of 
civil society. In the new argument that reduces the principle of non-establishment 
into a secondary instrumental condition, the principle of free exercise of religion is 
the ground. The internal relationship earlier established between public and private 
rights is now lost. With the shift from the dual emphasis on the freedom of individual 
conscience and freedom of speech to the monist emphasis on the free exercise of 
religion: the freedom of religion from the state is expanded, the freedom of the state 
from religion is seriously limited, the freedom of individual conscience from both 
organized religion and the state is entirely lost from the conceptual and normative 
                                                
42 Ibid. 219-220.  
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framework. As Phillips suggests, “rights [now] figure for Casanova primarily as the 
right to religious freedom and the rights of religious minorities.”43 
The ultimate paradox of the normative defenses of the multiple secularisms 
paradigm is that despite their claims that “one size doesn’t fit all,” they end up 
imposing one normative framework for all societies, a kind of multiculturalism and 
the attendant politics of ethical recognition. We can see this clearly in the work of 
Rajeev Bhargava and Charles Taylor.44 Rajeev Bhargava, another critic of 
separationism, calls for contextual secularism, which depends upon a “principled 
distance” between religion and the state. Bhargava distinguishes between three levels 
of interrelations between state and religion: ends, institutions, law and policy. 
Contextual secularism disconnects religion and the state at the first and second levels 
but connects them at the third level, that is, law and policy. Unlike strict 
separationism that prescribes a uniform civil code, principled distance allows the 
plurality of legal systems in areas of personal and family law. The state respects and 
supports all religions. According to Bhargava, in the absence of certain privileges 
and immunities in the form of community specific rights, minority religions will not 
be able to secure what the majority religion is able by virtue of its social dominance 
                                                
43 Anne Phillips, "Religion: Ally, Threat or Just Religion," UNRISD Programme on Gender 
and Development Paper Number 5(2009)., 45. Emphasis mine.   
44 Bhargava, "Political Secularism." Taylor, "Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of 
Secularism."; Charles Taylor, "Foreword. What Is Secularism?," in Secularism, Religion and 
Multicultural Citizenship, ed. Geoffrey Brahm Levey and Tariq Modood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009); Charles Taylor, "Modes of Secularism," in Secularism 
and Its Critics, ed. Rajeev Bhargava (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
   
 
23 
in the political community and they will run the risk of extinction. Similar to 
Bhargava, Charles Taylor too defends a form of contextual secularism that interprets 
state neutrality as inclusive and evenhanded treatment of all religions.45 I will discuss 
his model at length in Chapter VI.  
The normative defenses of the multiple secularism approach do not argue for 
a wholly religion-based polity. They ask for symbolic, material, and/or political 
recognition of religion(s) on an equal basis while protecting the confessional 
neutrality of the state. By political recognition they usually refer to the ceding of 
political authority to religious leaders in areas of personal and family law.46 As 
opposed to the idea of “multiple secularisms,” I will present a republican argument 
in favor of a strict wall of separation between religion and politics at the church-state 
level and a more permeable wall at the level of political interactions among citizens 
based on the insights of some contemporary continental political theorists that sought 
to re-think or deconstruct republicanism in order to make it more inclusive. The three 
figures relevant to my analysis are Jürgen Habermas, Jacques Derrida, and Cecile 
Laborde. Their theoretical and philosophical differences notwithstanding, what 
separates them from the defenders of the multiple secularisms paradigm, is their 
sensitivity to the otherness of the other. They emphatically deny that the key variable 
in the integration of citizens is religion or other ascriptive identities. The rights and 
                                                
45 Taylor, "Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism." 
46 Bhargava, "Political Secularism." Bader, Secularism or Democracy?: Associational 
Governance of Religious Diversity. 
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responsibilities that we owe one another do not stem from a prior agreement on a 
substantive vision of life as in the case of communitarian defenses of multiple 
secularisms. Rather, they are already implicit in the very experience of living 
together. An equal distribution of rights and responsibilities is possible or impossibly 
possible, to use Derrida’s terminology, only if everyone recognizes one another as 
free and equal. An elemental form of sociability or friendship is inscribed in the very 
notion of “living together,” which increases our responsibility for the other and 
originates the law or the Law of law. “I need his freedom in order to the address the 
other qua other,” Derrida says.47 This is why I must grant myself and up to the other 
the law.  
When we approach the question of secularism from the perspective of the 
democratic constitutional state, without being discouraged by the inevitable 
paradoxes that it evinces, and its wealth of presuppositions like the equal moral, legal, 
and civic status accorded to each and every one, we can think of a secular (not 
secularist) common basis of citizenship and of political reasoning. From this 
perspective, laïcité, that is, the separation of religion and politics both at the church-
state level and in political interactions among citizens is not an optional extra for 
democracy. Symbolic and material recognition runs against the republican emphasis 
on equal civic status and equal opportunity to participate in the public sphere. 
Establishment policies, even in symbolic forms, tend to give preference to religious 
                                                
47 Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship (London: Verso, 2005)., 174.  
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over secular citizens, thereby violate the neutrality of the public sphere.48 They are 
also problematic from the perspective of those citizens who are members of the 
recognized religion but fail to conform to the dominant interpretations of religious 
doctrines offered by the most powerful members of their religious community.49 
Strong politics of recognition, on the other hand, runs the risk of imprisoning the 
vulnerable members of recognized groups into the contingent life contexts into 
which they are born and socialized. This is especially the case for women. Amy 
Gutmann eloquently discusses this issue: “Why is there any problem for religious 
establishment from the perspective of those whose religious identification is being 
recognized by the state’s establishment of religion? When the state speaks in the 
name of a religion, it speaks in the name of a single, “state establishment” 
interpretation of religion,” thereby deforming and devaluing other interpretations that 
some find meaningful.50 This is why establishment policies are suspect from the 
perspective of a modern citizenship regime that accords equal moral, civic status to 
each and everyone.  
The charge that republican secularism cannot accommodate those for whom 
religion constitutes their social and political existence is overstated. It is true that 
                                                
48 Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)., 90.  Audi Robert Audi, Democratic Authority and 
the Separation of Church and State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011)., 44. 
Gutmann, "Religious Freedom and Civic Responsibility." 
49 Gutmann, "Religious Freedom and Civic Responsibility.", 915. 
50 Ibid. 916. 
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republican secularism is incompatible with community specific rights that cede 
political power to religious authorities, say, in areas of personal and family law. 
However, this does not mean that religious citizens cannot opt for religious 
arbitration concerning personal and family matters.51 Republican secularism can 
neither ban such religious arbitration councils, nor give them formal political 
authority.52 People can enter into relationships of “domination” at the sub-political 
level and subject themselves to any authority of their choosing.  
What republican secularism cannot accommodate is what Andras Sajo calls 
“strong religion,” that claims “the sacred should prevail over constitutional law, even 
in regard to the non-observant...[for] the existence of violations of religious 
prescriptions by third parties constitutes an obstacle to one’s own free exercise of 
religion.” Strong religion, Sajo suggests, “likes to claim that any departure from 
                                                
51 Derrida, in his last interview, goes as far as to suggest that both the word and the concept 
of “marriage” has no place in a secular constitution and should be replaced by “civil union.” 
“If I were a legislator, I would simply propose the abolition of both the word and the concept 
of "marriage" in the civil and secular code. "Marriage," religious, sacral, heterosexual value, 
with its procreative intent, for eternal fidelity, etc., is the State's concession to the Christian 
church, particularly in its monogamous dimension…In doing away with the concept and the 
word "marriage," this religious equivocation or hypocrisy, which has no place in a secular 
constitution, would be replaced by a contractual "civil union," a kind of generalized, 
improved, flexible pact between partners without limitation to gender or number. As for 
those who want to be untied in marriage in the traditional sense - for which by the way I 
have the utmost respect - they could do it before the religious authority of their 
choosing…Some people could enter into relationships in either one of these ways, some in 
both ways, and others could do so without regard to either civil law or religious tradition.” 
Jacques Derrida and Jean Birnbaum, Learning to Live Finally: The Last Interview (New 
York: Melville House Publishing, 2007). 
52 For a similar argument see Phillips, "Religion: Ally, Threat or Just Religion.", 47.  
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divine command imperils free exercise, because it forces the believer to live in an 
improper world.”53 
The refusal to accommodate the demands of strong religions does not make 
laïcité hostile to religion. On the contrary, one could argue that religious citizens 
who take their religion seriously but fail to conform to their groups’ ideal version of 
religiosity, have good reasons to reject strong state-religion entanglement. For 
instance, if in Turkey the sacred were to prevail over constitutional law, ironically 
non-Muslims would fare better than some Muslims. It is worth stressing at this point 
that in Turkey the state classifies citizens according to their religious identity. All 
identity cards that the state issues has a mandatory category indicating the holder’s 
religion. And politicians like to make the claim that the religion of 99% of the 
population of Turkey is Islam, as if everyone agrees on a single definition of Islam, 
downplaying the civic status of Alevites as well as non-religious citizens. The 
Diyanet, furthermore, claims that heresy (tekfir) and apostasy (irtidad) are grave sins 
punishable by death and denies recognizing Alevism as a form of Islam.54 Bilgen 
succinctly problematizes this issue by asking “What is at stake in depicting Turkey’s 
population one way or another on the basis of its inhabitants’ religious affiliation and 
infer political consequences?”:  
                                                
53 András Sajó, "Preliminaries to a Concept of Constitutional Secularism," International 
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54 Ilmihal Hayreddin Karaman, Ali Bardakoglu, and H. Yunus Apaydin, Ilmihal 1: Iman Ve 
Ibadetler (Ankara: Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi Yayinlari, 2006)., 179. 




Converting Turkey’s cryptically Sunni citizenship regime into a full fledged 
Muslim democracy…would only create a cultural despotism for the non- and 
irreligious persons and non-Sunni Muslims. Since Islam would tend to be 
‘inclusive’ towards its Muslim members, all the women and Alevites and 
homosexuals and feminists, agnostic and atheists with Muslim sounding 
names and with Muslim identity cards would be promptly ‘included’ within 
the Muslim way of life. These groups of individuals cannot have either a 
voice or an exit option in this situation. Islam does not allow either heresy or 
apostasy. Saying that you are no longer Muslim, that you converted, or you 
are experimenting with your way of life, or you are critically and 
philosophically engaging with Islam’s doctrine are simply out of the question 
according to the precepts of Islam to this day.55 
 
 The strict wall of separation between religion and politics at the state level 
becomes more permeable when it comes to the public use of reason, that is, the 
discursive exchange among citizens in the justification of public authority. Citizens 
when they engage in public debate about the justification of coercive laws and 
policies are under a moral duty to expand their horizons and take the perspective of 
the other. They are morally obliged to justify their reasons in terms of public political 
values. This is what Rawls meant by “the duty of civility.”56 This does not mean that 
religious citizens cannot enter into public debate out of religious concerns or to 
defend their religious rights. Nor does it mean that they cannot refer to their religious 
doctrines. Rather it means that they need to formulate their reasons in terms of public 
political values that any citizen can understand irrespective of her/his worldview. An 
example would be the case of a religious citizen who opposes homosexual marriage 
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with reference to the importance of family values, which can be understood and 
contested by religious and non religious citizens alike. Gutmann succinctly captures 
what Rawls meant by the public use of reason: “that revelation by itself cannot 
justify a coercive law because it cannot reasonably expect the public assent of 
citizens who have not experienced it and do not share the religious faith of those who 
take its dictates on faith. But the politically relevant content of revelation can be 
defended by publicly accessible arguments.”57  
 However, Rawls’ important insight has been misinterpreted by many, including 
Charles Taylor and Nicholas Wolterstorff.58 In their view, “one of the great merits of 
Rawls's discussion is that, under “comprehensive doctrines,” he includes not only 
religions but comprehensive philosophies.”59 They interpret this Rawlsian move as 
revoking all limits on citizen speech in the justification of constitutional essentials. 
By doing so they downplay the important distinction Rawls drew between public and 
non-public reasons. The relevant distinction for Rawls is not between religious and 
secular reasons but the one between public and non-public reasons. Public reasons, 
he thought, can be found in secular and religious worldviews alike. They are by 
definition secular in the sense that they appeal to public political values that are 
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intelligible to all citizens, but non-comprehensive.60 Public justification in terms of 
public political values, in Rawls’ view, is supposed to provide a common basis of 
public reasoning and strengthen the bond of civic friendship. Taylor and 
Wolterstorff, on the other hand, regard such a process of public justification as an 
intolerable imposition on citizen speech. To require religious citizens to give reasons 
that can be understood by all infringes on the free exercise of religion. Accordingly, 
we must learn to carry on in a politics without a common background foundation.  
The problem with this approach is that when every group speaks the language 
that is most meaningful to them, the very process of deliberation is reduced into a 
negotiated compromise between differing founding views. The strong contextualism 
of communitarianism cannot generate mutual trust and solidarity across communities 
and the corollary conception of citizenship. It is either there by a lucky happenstance 
or not. It is altogether unclear how such a system can prevent the numerous or the 
strongest from usurping state power and dictating its own set of constitutional 
essentials. The kind of democratic unity it can provide amounts to a modus vivendi at 
best, a Schmittian dictatorship at worst. It is precisely at this point that Habermas and 
Derrida move us a step further by conceiving of an elementary promise in the 
intersubjectivist thrust of language that opens democracy to the other. Habermas 
suggests: 
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There must be a common basis on which mutual understanding among alien 
cultures, belief systems, paradigms, and life-forms is possible-that is, a 
translation between different evaluative languages and not merely 
communication among members of the same language group relying on 
reciprocal observation of alien cultures. The languages and vocabularies in 
which we interpret our needs and communicate our feelings must be mutually 
permeable; they should not be so deeply rooted in monadically self-enclosed 
contexts that cannot be transcended from within that they imprison the 
subjects who have been born and socialized into them…This differentiation 
between a modern and a traditional understanding of the world is possible 
only if competing interpretations of the world are not utterly 
incommensurable, if we at least intuitively accept context-transcending 
assumptions concerning rationality that first make possible translations from 
one context into another.61  
 
To sum up, the kind of laïcité the dissertation aims to defend consists of a 
doctrine of strict institutional separation between the state and religion on the one 
hand, and a doctrine of conscience that prescribes moral (not legal) norms of conduct 
for citizens when they engage in public debate about coercive laws and policies, on 
the other hand. The institutional doctrine of separation erects a wall of separation 
between the state and religion and rejects the symbolic, material and political 
recognition of religion by the state. Critics of separationism interpret this as a serious 
infringement on the free exercise of religion. However, the abstentionist dimension 
of laïcité aims to protect the internal and lawful autonomy of religion as well. In 
other words, it protects the freedom of discussion and interpretation within each 
religion. It secures not only the freedom to say “no” to religion but also the freedom 
to say “yes.” In morally heterogeneous societies it is precisely the formal separation 
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of religious belonging and political status that can enable different identities and 
movements to reproduce themselves without being subjected to arbitrary power. 
However, in return, such movements and identity claims cannot override the other’s 
(internal or external) equal rights to co-existence. If and when they do, they deny the 
very principle to which they owe their existence in the first place. As Habermas 
suggest such movements contradict themselves: “Fundamentalist movements can be 
understood as an ironic attempt to give one’s own lifeworld ultrastability by 
restorative means. The irony lies in the way traditionalism misunderstands itself. In 
fact, it emerges from the vortex of social modernization and its apes a substance that 
has already disintegrated. As a reaction to the overwhelming push for modernization, 
it is itself a thoroughly modern movement of renewal.”62 
The dissertation argues that only this republican model can truly protect the 
free-exercise of religion and allow room for the pursuit of public goals that cut 
across religious divides. Only “fundamentalists,” i.e. those who aim to shape society 
in their own image, should find this proposal unacceptable. As Rawls argued, it is a 
“grave error to think that the separation of church and state is primarily for the 
protection of secular culture; of course it does protect that culture, but no more so 
than it protects all religions.”63 As suggested above, the strict separation model does 
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not necessarily require anyone to “emancipate” themselves from their traditions and 
to lead an autonomous life. Nor does it allow the state to interfere in a paternalistic 
fashion to “emancipate” women against their will by banning the headscarf.64 Based 
on these premises, the dissertation calls for the removal of the ban on the headscarf 
in public institutions.  
Laïcité, as a doctrine of conscience prescribing norms of conduct for citizens 
when they are engaged in public debate about coercive laws and policies, erects a 
more permeable wall between religion and politics. The dissertation emphasizes the 
relative autonomy of the political sphere of collective will and identity formation 
from comprehensive moral doctrines (religious or secular) for it does not oppose the 
question of “what is equally good for all?” to the question of “what is good for me or 
for my particular group?,” what Habermas calls moral and ethical discourses 
respectively.65 Political and ethical responsibilities take place only in the transaction 
between these universal and particular imperatives, an issue that will be discussed in 
Chapter IV. Collective will formation should neither be wholly blind to particularity, 
                                                
64 As Cesari suggests, the decision of the Stasi Commission “reveals an authoritarian 
conception of the law, henceforth charged with the protection of individual freedom—
including the protection of individual freedom against the individual’s will—and above all 
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nor should it dissolve universality in particularity.66 As Habermas suggests, “if the 
actors do not bring with them, and into their discourse, their individual life-histories, 
their identities, their needs and wants, their traditions, memberships, and so forth, 
practical discourse would at once be robbed of all content.”67 The incalculable 
singularity of anyone is not at odds with the equality of all citizens before the law, as 
Derrida tells us.68 The bond that binds citizens to one another is Janus faced: it is at 
once abstract/universal and concrete/particular. It is possible and desirable to 
envision solidarity among strangers that provides a common secular basis of 
citizenship and of political reasoning that all can share as free and equal citizens. The 
dissertation, drawing on the work of Derrida, develops a conception of friendship 
prior to all friendships, one that takes place between “not yet” and “already.” This 
friendship promises an unconditional welcome to the other. Yet, “what remains 
unconditional or absolute risks being nothing at all if conditions do not make of it 
                                                
66 The dissertation is critical of both liberal “benign neglect” and the multiculturalist “group 
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some thing.”69 This is why this elementary friendship proceeds in the direction of 
constitutional democracy. While it is neither juridical nor political, it is nonetheless 
the condition of the political and the juridical. Such a friendship is not dismissive of 
conflict, rather it provides a “ground” on which conflicts can take place. Unless 
consensus and friendship are brought back into the concept of democracy, we will 
remain entrapped in the Schmittian political theology where one party coerces the 
other under presumably secular/political imperatives. 
 
IV. RE-THINKING POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY:  
 
The second issue at hand involves the analysis of the principle of popular 
sovereignty understood as absolute, indivisible, and inalienable that extends 
citizenship rights only to “substantively equals,” severing democracy from the rule 
of law. This is, as is well known, Carl Schmitt’s model that requires national 
homogeneity as a necessary precondition of the democratic exercise of political 
authority. Hence, the so-called incompatibility of popular sovereignty with human 
rights. In Schmitt’s view, the philosophical ideas of the state are all secularized 
theological concepts. The omnipotent God becomes the omnipotent lawgiver.70 
Schmitt understands the friend (the self) component of democracy as a single unit 
prior to all law that realizes itself against a common enemy. War making or self-
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sacrifice is understood as a meaning making activity though which we arguably 
understand who we essentially are. This war model of the political locates enmity at 
the origin of sovereignty and extends friendship only to the self-same. Schmitt 
rejects even minimal ideals of basic human equality, dismissing all humanitarian 
discourses as ideological weapons of economic imperialism.71 
The normative issue concerns the relationship, or the lack thereof, between 
popular sovereignty and human rights. Hannah Arendt, in her reflections on the 
French revolution, criticizes precisely the aspects of popular sovereignty that Schmitt 
finds meaningful. She problematizes the significance of the loss of religious sanction 
on the political realm. Secularization, Arendt suggests, “inevitably posed the 
problem of how to found and constitute a new authority without which the secular 
realm, far from acquiring a new dignity of its own, would have lost even the 
derivative importance it had held under the auspices of the Church.”72 According to 
her, secularization took a higher tall on political authority than the religious one. The 
state and politics needed the sanction of religion more urgently than religion ever 
needed the sanction of the state. In her view, the French revolutionaries wrongly 
sought to compensate the sanction of religion through the deification of the people. 
By substituting one absolute with another they failed to separate religion from 
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politics.73 She associates this need for an absolute with permanent revolution. “The 
so-called will of a multitude,” Arendt claims, “is ever-changing by definition, and 
that a structure built on it as its foundation is built on quicksand. What saved the 
nation-state [France] from immediate collapse and ruin was the extraordinary ease 
with which the national will could be manipulated and imposed upon whenever 
someone was willing to take the burden or the glory of dictatorship upon himself.”74  
In Arendt’s view, “in the realm of human affairs sovereignty and tyranny are 
the same.”75  As Arato and Cohen suggest, Arendt understands sovereignty “as by 
definition absolute and linked irrevocably to an embodiment model of representation 
and thus locatable in one single political instance. It makes no difference whether 
sovereignty is asserted by the king, by a parliament, or in the name of the people.”76 
In all these cases, the exercise of sovereignty leads to the destruction of politics and 
the rule of law in Arendt’s view.  One answer, offered to Arendt by Jürgen 
Habermas, is the deliberative conception of democracy that presupposes the 
interdependence of popular sovereignty with human rights. In his view, the 
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relationship between nationalism and republicanism is temporary; and it is possible 
to re-think a radically democratic republic for contemporary complex societies where 
the people as a whole cannot be held together by a substantive consensus on values 
but only by a consensus for the legitimate enactment of law and the legitimate 
exercise of power. This is what Habermas means by the procedural conception of 
sovereignty.77  
Habermas formulates the interdependence of democracy and the rule of law 
in a circular fashion. He suggests that there can be no democratic self-government 
unless a system of right is in place, and there can be no system of rights unless it is 
democratically decided by the people themselves via reasoned deliberation. 
However, this circularity is not vicious or self-defeating. Rather it shows the co-
originality of popular sovereignty and human rights, democracy and the rule of law. 
Neither rights nor the discursive will of the people precede one another. In 
Habermas’ view, only the universals of language use precede democratic self-
government under law.78 It is on this basis he defends the internal connection 
between public and private rights. The rights that citizens enjoy in private are not 
external, primary or secondary to their public rights because the authors and the 
addresses of the law are one and the same. Habermas’ is a two-track model of 
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representative democracy. On the one hand, we have informal public sphere that 
Habermas perceives “as a network for communicating information and points of 
view,” founded on the dispersed associations of civil society that has the function of 
opinion-formation.79 Public opinions are formed in the stream of unrestricted 
communication among free and equal citizens. On the other hand we have the formal 
public sphere of conventional political institutions like the parliament that have the 
function of will-formation based on the input given by the informal public sphere. 
Public discourse mediates between the opinion-formation of all and the majoritarian 
will formation of the representatives.  
Accordingly, Habermas rejects Schmitt’s claim that the democratic exercise 
of popular sovereignty presupposes national homogeneity. Habermas makes an 
important distinction between national or collective self-realization and democratic 
self-legislation.80 In the former, the Schmittian model, citizens cannot enjoy rights 
unless they are part and parcel of the homogeneous nation. This form of integration 
finds expression “in the readiness to fight and in the spirit of self-sacrifice of military 
draftees who were mobilized against the “enemies of fatherland,”81 like in the 
Turkish case. The concept of self-legislation, on the other hand, involves all citizens 
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equally regardless of their particular affiliations. It means the equal participation in 
the process of decision-making and legislation. The validity of norms is linked to 
reasoned deliberation that demand openness to the input of others and a willingness 
to reach consensus on the norms that are meant to regulate our living-together. This 
model, according to Habermas, by extending the status of citizenship to the whole 
population provides the state with a new secular form of legitimation and guarantees 
the societal integration of an increasingly differentiated society.82  
With regards to the debates on popular sovereignty and human rights 
contemporary literature in political theory is mainly divided into two camps. On the 
one hand, we have the defenders of deliberative democracy à la Habermas who are 
deeply critical of Schmitt’s key theses like democracy requires a homogeneous 
demos; democratic friendship presupposes a common enemy; or the will of the 
nation exceeds the law. As discussed above, pace Schmitt, the deliberative model of 
democracy brings law, consensus, and heterogeneity back in, and pays equal tribute 
to both public and private liberties. On the other hand, we have the agonistic model 
of democracy, taking its cue from Schmitt’s above mentioned key theses, trying to 
bring back the notions of contestation, closure, decision into democratic theory and 
practice. In this view, the deliberative democracy misses not only the impossibility 
of reaching consensus on contentious issues, but also the integrative function that 
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adversariness play in the formation of truly democratic identities.83 The main 
defender of this thesis today is Chantal Mouffe.  
According to Mouffe, there is only a contingent, historical relationship 
between democracy and constitutionalism.84 In contrast to Habermas who argues for 
the universal validity of constitutional democracy, Mouffe interprets it as a 
phenomenon peculiar to Europe with no universal implications.85 She calls us to 
abandon the attempt to find politically neutral premises that would serve as the 
foundation for a democratic regime whose logic can be universalized. Nonetheless, 
she still clings on to something that she perceives to be universal: “the dimension of 
antagonism that is inherent in human relations.”86 What is necessary, in her view, is 
to transform enemies who have no common symbolic space into “friendly enemies” 
who are friends by virtue of sharing a common symbolic space but also enemies by 
virtue of their differing opinions on how this common space should be organized.87 
                                                
83 Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Routledge, 2005)., 31.  
84 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000)., 2-3.  
85 “I assert that our allegiance to democratic values and institutions is not based on their 
superior rationality and that liberal democratic principles can be defended only as being 
constitutive of our form of life….This is why I envisage the normative dimension inscribed 
in political institutions as being of an ethico-political nature, to indicate that it always refers 
to specific practices, depending on particular contexts, and that it is not the expression of a 
universal morality.” Mouffe, On the Political, 121. Emphasis mine. Elsewhere, she claims, 
“Liberal democratic principles can only be defended as being constitutive of our form of life, 
and we should not try to ground our commitment to them on something supposedly safer.” 
Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 66.  
86 Ibid. 101. Emphasis mine.  
87 Ibid. 13. 
   
 
42 
One of the many problems with this approach, which I will return in Chapter III, is 
the way in which it takes the “common symbolic space” for granted. The participants 
make an agreement on the principles of liberty and equality prior to all law.88 If 
antagonism is inherent in human relations, it is not clear how such an agreement can 
be achieved unless one party coerces the other and imposes the law.89  
The relationship between popular sovereignty and human rights is also at the 
center of Jacques Derrida’s understanding of democracy. In the literature, Derrida’s 
work is often located within the camp of agonistic democracy, and usually invoked 
to discredit Habermas’ conception of deliberative democracy.90 Studied closely, at 
least with respect to the issues that concern this dissertation, Derrida’s work seems to 
be much more closer to that of Habermas than it is to Mouffe’s or other defenders of 
agonistic democracy. Both Habermas and Derrida envision a notion of friendly 
living together by means of positive law. Their starting point is neither Kantian 
solitary individualism which defines moral reasoning as a conversation with oneself, 
nor the communitarian point of view which collapses morality in ethical life. On the 
contrary, their “intersubjective” approach to human relations enables them to divide 
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sovereignty and to locate a minimum of friendship at the origin of democracy.91 The 
responsibility to include the other stems from the very nature of this intersubjectivity 
that does not put autonomy and dependency into an antagonistic relationship. This is 
why both find an inextricable link between popular sovereignty and human rights.92 
The dissertation follows the path opened by Habermas and Derrida rather than 
Schmitt and Mouffe in rethinking the relationship between sovereignty, rights, and 
secularism.  
The kind of secular constitutional regime that the dissertation defends opens 
up new possibilities for re-thinking Turkey’s exclusionary citizenship regime. The 
project of creating national homogeneity from above has always been part and parcel 
of Turkish experience with democracy. The founding elite, the military, the 
judiciary, and ruling parties at different conjectures aimed to create a society in their 
own image, opening the door to authoritarianism at the expense of democracy, 
plurality and rights.93 The attitude of the ruling Justice and Development Party (the 
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AKP) that equates democracy with parliamentary majoritarianism is no exception to 
this trend.94 Empirical works on Turkey show that Turkish society is becoming more 
conservative and less tolerant of diversity.95 The AKP has failed to deliver its 
promise to democratize Turkey and open up the regime to its others like the Kurds 
and the Alevites.96 On the contrary, by reducing secularism to the expansion of 
religious freedoms at the expense of others, it created its own others like non-
religious individuals, non-Sunni Muslims, Kurds, gays, lesbians and the like. 
The AKP rule is also accompanied by the unprecedented transformation of 
the Diyanet, which will be discussed in Chapter II. The Diyanet (a constitutional 
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95 Ali Carkoglu and Ersin Kalaycioglu, The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Ali Carkoglu and Ersin Kayaycioglu, Turkiye'de Siyasetin 
Yeni Yuzu (Istanbul: Open Society Institute, 2006).; Binnaz Toprak, Turkiye'de Farkli 
Olmak: Din Ve Muhafazakarlık Ekseninde Otekilestirilenler (Istanbul: Open Society 
Institute, 2008).For an argument that rejects the rising tide of religious conservatism see 
Metin Heper, "Does Secularism Face a Serious Threat in Turkey?," Comparative Studies of 
South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 29, no. 3 (2009). 
96 For a recent analysis of the Kurdish issue from the perspective of solidarity see: Aysen 
Candas and Ayse Bugra, "Solidarity among Strangers: A Problem of Coexistence in 
Turkey," Constellations 17, no. 2 (2010). 
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authority directly attached to the office of the Prime Minister having the legal 
mandate to teach people the “true” Islam) through its educational activities openly 
challenges democratic constitutionalism and gender equality by reducing popular 
sovereignty to the Sunni majority’s right to impose the law. In order to put a stop to 
the rising tide of religious conservatism, it is necessary to develop another kind of 
secularism, one that is free from authoritarian control of religion, and one that 
includes everyone equally. Otherwise, Turkey will move, if it has not yet, from one 
authoritarian pole to the other. The dissertation hopes to contribute to these issues by 
emphasizing friendship, plurality and rights in the moments of collective will and 
identity formation. The task at hand involves an unconditional renunciation of a 
certain conception of sovereignty understood as absolute, indivisible, and 
inalienable. Once this political theology is displaced, it is possible to defend popular 
sovereignty as a divided, weak force and collective identity as an internally 
differentiated notion.  
 
V. THE STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION:  
Chapter II entails an empirical analysis of the meaning and practice of 
secularism in Turkey now and then. It is structured around Ahmet Kuru’s recent 
work on secularism that situates Turkey between the alternatives of the Kemalist 
secularism and pro-Islamic conservatism of the AKP, called assertive secularism and 
passive secularism respectively. Kuru defines Kemalist, assertive secularism as a 
comprehensive doctrine that excludes religion from the public sphere; and passive 
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secularism of the AKP as a neutral doctrine that allows public visibility of religion 
by reinforcing individual rights. Accordingly, he calls for a shift from assertive 
secularism to passive secularism à la AKP. The chapter rejects Kuru’s description of 
both assertive and passive secularism with empirical data and cautions against the 
celebration of religious conservatism as a path to more “secular” Turkey.  
The argument that Kemalist secularism entails a deliberate move away from 
religion is rejected through a content analysis of religion textbooks used in civil and 
military education since the inception of the Republic until today. The analysis 
focuses on the differentiation of the spheres of the political, religious, and scientific 
in standardized textbooks. It reveals the dynamic ways in which the relationship 
between these spheres are re-negotiated and re-drawn at different historical 
junctures. Three thresholds are identified, the founding moment 1923, the opening of 
the regime to multi-party politics 1947, and the 1980 military coup d’état. The 
analysis uncovers a linear move from political theology to theological politics in 
standardized textbooks, from what I call national secularism to Islamic secularism. 
The early republican political theology emphasizes the primacy of the political and 
the scientific over the religious while instrumentalizing religion to foster 
identification with the new regime. Theological politics begins to enter the textbooks 
with the opening of the regime to multi-party elections and finds its true meaning 
after the 1980 coup. It entails the primacy of the religious over the political and the 
scientific. Whereas in early republican period the political and the scientific are the 
ground, in time religion takes the center stage and becomes the dominant sphere. 
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Irrespective of these changing boundaries the underlying emphasis is that to obey 
political authorities and to sacrifice oneself are religious duties that grant citizens a 
room in heaven. While this model in all its variants is authoritarian as Kuru suggests, 
it is far from being hostile to religion as he claims.  
The argument that pro-Islamic passive secularism is neutral with respect to 
comprehensive doctrines and supportive of individual rights is also rejected with 
empirical data. The analysis focuses on the new discourse of the Diyanet developed 
and propagated during the AKP rule. The Diyanet calls for the re-codification of the 
entire legal and constitutional system and the re-organization of the whole society in 
accordance with the Islamic law, the interpretation of which is the prerogative of the 
Diyanet officials that claim to make a scientific interpretation of Islam. The 
alternative modernity defended by the Diyanet entails a deliberate move away from 
democratic constitutionalism and the regime of gender equality. This model is much 
more authoritarian than early republican nationalist secularism for giving religious 
authorities a special right to suspend secular constitutionalism indefinitely in the 
name of a higher law. It also entails a huge step back with respect to gender equality 
in Turkey where women won the right to vote as early as 1934. While early 
republican nationalist secularism can be re-thought in the name of democracy, 
Islamic secularism defended by the Diyanet should be dismissed entirely.  
Chapter III focuses on the secularization theses defended by Max Weber and 
Carl Schmitt in order to put the problems the early nation builders in Turkey faced in 
legitimizing their political authority and fostering social solidarity with the shift from 
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the Empire to the nation-state into a theoretical perspective. The section on Weber 
focuses on the tensions between the political and the religious spheres after the 
disintegration of the meaning giving unity of religious worldviews. While Weber 
affirms the legitimacy of the modern world in the growing autonomy of the value 
spheres like economy, science, and politics in general and of the individual in 
particular from the tutelage of religion in giving meaning to the world, he, also 
shows how the political domain emerges as a powerful substitute to religion in 
meaning-making. The political in a sense becomes the locus of a revived political 
theology giving meaning to life and death, creating a new form of community 
through collective war making against a common enemy. In this narrative, 
nationalism functions as a new mechanism of political legitimation and as one of 
social integration. The self-realization of the nation in its particularity via war 
making generates a brotherly, masculine community, threatening the autonomy of 
the individual as well as downplaying the “feminine” of the “sister.” 
The section on Carl Schmitt focuses on the primacy of the political as the 
friend-enemy distinction over all other spheres, the moral, economic, religious and 
the like. Schmitt’s work is especially useful for the purposes of this dissertation for 
the structure of the new nation-state model adopted by the early nation builders is 
very similar to his theological model of popular sovereignty and of democratic 
legitimacy that downplay constitutionalism and individual rights. The section is 
structured around two competing claims about the foundations of the friend-enemy 
distinction in Schmitt. First, it analyzes Heinrich Meier’s claim that the primacy of 
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the political rests on Schmitt’s faith in Catholicism. This claim is dismissed through 
an analysis of Schmitt’s writings on Catholicism that emphasizes an elemental form 
of friendship that nonetheless remains authoritarian. The figure of the enemy gains a 
central meaning in Schmitt’s thinking after his break with Catholicism. Secondly, 
Chantal Mouffe’s thesis that Schmitt is a thoroughly political thinker is also 
dismissed. The chapter discusses the theological basis of the friend enemy 
distinction, ignored by Mouffe, in the re-occupation of the metaphysical position of 
absolute God by the absolute nation. It argues that the so-called tension between 
popular sovereignty and human rights makes sense only in this theological paradigm 
that confuses collective self-affirmation with self-legislation under law.  
Chapter IV aims to build the theoretical foundations of a secular state as a 
substitute to the Turkish theological model. It takes issue with Talal Asad’s claim 
that secularism entails a hypersubstantive worldview that privileges a particular 
conception of the good life based on a misguided notion of sovereign human being, 
whose essence is constituted in terms of inalienable rights. The chapter unpacks the 
confused foundations of Asad’s critique informed on the one hand by Michel 
Foucault’s notion of genealogy, on the other hand by Alasdair MacIntyre’s notion of 
tradition based moral inquiry. Asad follows Foucault’s post-structuralism in 
revealing the power relations inherent in binary constructions like autonomy vs. 
heteronomy, individual vs. community, religious vs. secular; then with a 
communitarian turn à la MacIntyre reverses the hierarchy in favor of the previously 
marginalized term. Community replaces the individual, heteronomy replaces 
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autonomy, so on and so forth. At the end of this confusing analysis, Asad ends up 
celebrating the collective self-realization of religious communities at the expense of 
democracy, plurality, and individual rights. 
The chapter identifies a missing link in Asad’s critique of modernity, that is, 
democracy. In this narrative, modernity is simply about contractarian liberalism and 
possessive individualism. A serious engagement with the logic of democracy and its 
relationship to liberalism is nowhere to be found. The chapter then turns to the work 
of Jürgen Habermas, the quintessential theorist of constitutional democracy, and 
discusses the ways in which he re-thinks the binaries like autonomy and dependency, 
community and individual, popular sovereignty and human rights in a non-
oppositional fashion that moves us beyond Schmitt, Mouffe and Asad. The chapter 
closes with an analysis of Habermas’ differentiation of practical reason between 
moral discourses of self-legislation and ethical discourses of self-realization. While 
the chapter takes the critique of this distinction raised by Richard Bernstein and 
Thomas McCarthy seriously, it argues that despite its seemingly paradoxical nature, 
the distinction enables us to have an idea of “living together” beyond ego- or ethno-
centrism.  
Chapter V is mainly devoted to the work of Jacques Derrida with an objective 
to defend a theory of friendship beyond the Schmittian/Turkish model. It is 
structured around both the critics (Richard Wolin, Wendy Brown) and defenders 
(Chantal Mouffe, Bonnie Honig) of Derrida’ deconstructivist approach to modernity, 
arguing that what is meaningful in deconstruction regarding the secularization of the 
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political and of sovereignty is misinterpreted by both. While the critics fail to grasp 
the way in which Derrida moves us beyond Schmitt’s political theology, the 
defenders celebrate deconstruction for revealing the essentially adversarial nature of 
democratic politics. Dismissing these charges and praises, the chapter focuses on the 
way in which Derrida de-theologizes sovereignty by insisting on the impossibility of 
being one with oneself so that the very idea of “we” is destabilized. The 
incompleteness of every sovereignty (of the self or of the people) is what makes 
friendship possible and opens democracy unconditionally to anyone. In other words, 
what Derrida locates at the origin of sovereignty is not antagonism but friendship. 
Yet, this unconditional welcome can be made effective as long as it is conditioned, 
that is, as long as a system of law is made effective. Hence the aporetic relationship 
between popular sovereignty and human rights.  
Chapter V closes with a critical analysis of Habermas’ new conception of 
post-secular constitutional democracy that, unlike his previous analyses, regards 
secularism as a comprehensive worldview. Habermas now claims that religious 
traditions have a special power to articulate moral intuitions. While Habermas’ 
attempt to create a common ground where religious and non-religious citizens can 
learn from each other is worthy of respect, it is not clear why religion is given a 
privileged position in the creation of meaning and identity. The chapter suggests that 
the exemption of religious citizens from the obligation to provide reasons accessible 
to all seriously undermines the foundations of deliberative democracy and makes the 
moral point of view obsolete.  
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Chapter VI aims to reformulate the republican conception of laïcité. It 
analyzes the limits of Charles Taylor’s overlapping consensus mode of secularism as 
a substitute to laïcité. His proposal is dismissed on three grounds. First, the model is 
extremely weak in terms of providing a plausible conception of democratic 
citizenship and of solidarity. Second, the model by giving priority to spiritual 
families over individuals, imprisons the latter into the contingent life-contexts into 
which they are born and socialized. Third, by obscuring the Rawlsian distinction 
between public reasons and secular reasons in the public use of reason, Taylor’s 
model fails to provide a common basis of political reasoning that all can share as free 
and equal citizens. It reduces political deliberation into negotiated compromise that 
can be easily hijacked by the numerous or the strongest.  
Chapter VI, then, turns to Cecile Laborde’s critical republican model of 
laïcité.  
Following Laborde, the chapter argues that the separationist and abstentionist 
dimensions of the laïcité model, understood properly, do not entail hostility towards 
religion. On the contrary, they aim to protect the freedom of conscience as well as 
the equal civic status of all citizens, religious and non-religious. The chapter calls for 
a strict wall of separation between religion and politics at the church-state level, 
rejecting symbolic, material or political recognition of religion by the state; and a 
more permeable wall of separation at the level of political interactions among 
citizens when they are engaged in public debate about coercive laws and policies. 
The strict wall of separation at the state level, the chapter argues, does not justify the 
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ban on the headscarf in public institutions. By making a distinction between the 
religious symbols that the state itself installs in public institutions and those that are 
used personally by those who occupy public positions, and arguing that the latter are 
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CHAPTER II: SECULARISM AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN TURKEY:  
A recent work authored by Ahmet Kuru invites us to analyze secularism not 
as a monolithic concept with a standard meaning, but with multiple meanings and 
institutional constellations. He develops two different conceptions called passive and 
assertive secularism. In his words, “assertive secularism requires the state to play an 
“assertive” role to exclude religion from the public sphere and confine it to the 
private domain. Passive secularism demands that the state play a “passive” role by 
allowing the public visibility of religion.”97 Accordingly, he claims that “assertive 
secularism is a “comprehensive doctrine,” whereas passive secularism mainly 
prioritizes state neutrality toward such doctrines. In his description of Turkey as a 
from of assertive secularism, Kuru makes the following observation:  
 
The Turkish state policies toward religion are inconsistent, if not 
contradictory. On the one hand, the Turkish state pursues restrictive policies 
toward Islam. On the other hand, it provides Islamic instruction in public 
schools. Moreover, the state pays the salaries of the imams in mosques, who 
are all civil servants of the state’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) 
through the construction of maintenance of mosques have been funded by the 
people…These policies do not necessarily imply the Turkish state’s positive 
attitude toward Islam for four reasons. First, as previously mentioned, the 
main rationale behind these institutions is not to support Islam, but rather it is 
to take Islam under state control…Second, through these institutions, the 
state wants to create an “individualized” version of Islam, which stays within 
one’s conscience or behind the walls of private homes and mosques, with 
almost no impact on the public sphere. Third, the state confiscated the 
financial resources of the Islamic foundations in the founding period of the 
Republic and still controls these foundations…Last but not least, whenever 
                                                
97 Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and 
Turkey., 11. 
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Imam-Hatip schools, Qur’an courses, and even the Diyanet expand their 
impacts on society, the state intervenes to limit their capacity, despite the fact 
that these are also public institutions.98  
 
Within the context of contemporary Turkey Kuru associates assertive secularists 
with Kemalist groups, the judiciary, the military, and the Republican People’s Party 
(the CHP hereafter) and passive secularists with the Gulen movement initiated by 
Fethullah Gulen and the ruling Justice and Development Party (the AKP hereafter).99 
Kuru dismisses assertive secularism for being hostile to religion and “contradictory 
to the religious character of the majority of Turkish society.”100 He calls for a 
replacement of assertive secularism by passive secularism under the leadership of the 
AKP, which, in his view, interprets secularism as state neutrality based on individual 
freedoms.101 “This struggle [between assertive and passive secularists] will not end 
unless a shift from assertive to passive secularism occurs, or unless there is a decline 
of religiosity in Turkish society,” suggests Kuru.102 
                                                
98 Ibid. 166-167. Emphasis mine.  
99 On the Gulen movement, see Berna Turam, Between Islam and the State: The Politics of 
Engagement (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).  
100 Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and 
Turkey., 201. 
101 Ibid. 179. 
102 Ibid. 200. 
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This chapter challenges Kuru’s two arguments: (1) assertive, state secularism 
does not promote Islam; (2) passive secularism promotes individual rights and state 
neutrality with respect to religion. Let me address these issues in return. 
Kuru’s argument that the Turkish state in its policies on religious instruction 
does not seek to promote Islam is empirically wrong. The state through religious 
instruction does not simply control Islam (a well-know fact) but also 
instrumentalizes it for securing political legitimacy, societal integration and 
willingness to sacrifice for the nation through an interpretation of the Islamic 
conception of martyrdom. Religious education offered by the state is deeply 
proselytizing. This chapter traces a genealogy of state Islam based on the content 
analysis of the religion textbooks used in public and military education between 
1923 and 2010. My objective is to reveal the relationship among the political, 
religious, and scientific spheres established in these books. In all these books Islam is 
favored as the true religion of the Turkish nation and obedience to political 
authorities is interpreted as a form of worship. However, the relationship between the 
political, the religious, and the scientific is continuously re-negotiated and re-drawn. 
My research reveals three thresholds with respect to the organization of these 
spheres.  
During the first period (1923-1947), while the function of religion is to 
identify students with the new institutions and values of the Republic, we see two 
different conceptions of Islam employed in public and military education. In public 
education, we find a highly secularized conception of Islam from which all 
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“irrational” elements like revelation, miracle, hereafter are removed. Scientific and 
political imperatives define the boundaries of Islam. The emphasis is on salvation in 
this world through participation in republican institutions. In military education, on 
the other hand, we find another conception of Islam, one that is concerned with the 
salvation in the next world. Military service is defined as a religious duty and a form 
of worship, and the Islamic notion of martyrdom is defined as the highest honor that 
guarantees soldiers access to heaven.  
During the second period (1947-1980), the secularized Islam is removed from 
textbooks used in public education in favor of the one previously used in military 
education. Positive science no longer defines the boundaries of religion, rather the 
two are said to be in harmony. Notions like judgment day, resurrection, hereafter, 
and martyrdom are recurrently emphasized in order to forge a stronger relationship 
between citizens and the nation. Whether individuals are to be rewarded in heaven or 
burned eternally in hell is conditional on their participation in republican institutions 
and willingness to sacrifice themselves for the sacred values of the nation.  
During the third period (1980-present), the relationship forged between 
science, religion, and politics during the previous period is maintained. However, a 
new sphere, the legal, is introduced into the books. These textbooks are prepared 
after the 1980 military coup, and are concerned with the identification of students 
with the new constitution imposed by the military. Textbooks seek to achieve 
obedience to the new constitution by postulating a congruity between divine and 
positive law. A second novelty in these books is the introduction of the Diyanet into 
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the curriculum. A balance is sought between religious and political authorities 
whereby the latter organizes society and imposes the law according to the definition 
of true Islam interpreted by the former.  
It seems that the Turkish state suffers not from an excess of secularism as 
Kuru suggests, rather from a serious deficit of secularism. This brings us to Kuru’s 
second claim that passive secularists (the AKP) promote individual rights and state 
neutrality in issues concerning religion. In Turkey it is a common practice for ruling 
parties to recruit their own supporters into civil service positions and other public 
institutions.  Yet, empirical studies show that during the AKP rule, unlike in previous 
governments, the recruits have been mostly religious people who endorse and 
propagate religious mores that clash with individual rights and liberties, especially 
those of women.103 This chapter also analyzes the unprecedented transformation of 
                                                
103 Yesim Arat suggests that Turkey is confronted with a democratic paradox: the expansion 
of religious freedoms accompanied by threats to gender equality. She gives a list of cases 
where public officials recruited by the AKP use their offices to propagate traditional sex 
roles. For instance, she refers to a pamphlet distributed by the AKP affiliated Tuzla [a 
district in Istanbul] mayor calling men to beat their wives if necessary and women to be 
subservient to their husbands. Another example is the case of an imam who calls men to not 
let their wives work outside of the home on the grounds that otherwise women would be 
more likely to commit adultery. When a group of women tried to bring the imam before the 
court for defying the principle of equality in the constitution, the prosecutor simply 
dismissed the case by defending imam’s freedom of thought. Last but not least, Arat refers to 
documented cases where AKP recruited teachers pressure female students to cover their 
heads and pray. Yesim Arat, "Religion, Politics and Gender Equality in Turkey: Implications 
of a Democratic Paradox?," Third World Quarterly 31, no. 6 (2010). A study conducted by 
Binnaz Toprak along with three journalists based on in-depth interviews with 401 people 
from Anatolia also refers to the worrisome implications of AKP’s recruitment of religious 
people in municipalities who propagate religious mores using their office. The study draws a 
parallel between newly invented policies (like alcohol consumption bans, the de-facto 
closure of public institutions including hospitals during Friday prayer, and the celebration of 
the Prophets birthday in primary schools) and the growing intolerance of religious citizens 
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the Diyanet, a state institution directly linked to the office of the Prime Minister 
having the legal mandate to teach people true Islam. It specifically focuses on a 
publication of the Diyanet called Ilmihal (one of the authors of which is the previous 
president of the Diyanet, Ali Bardakoglu) concerning Islamic morality and politics 
prepared during the AKP rule. All the fetwas the Diyanet posts online today as a part 
of its educational activities are taken word by word from Ilmihal, therefore it can be 
taken as representing its discourse.  
As mentioned above, religion textbooks in the post-1980 period refer to the 
interdependence between divine and positive law on the one hand, religious and 
political authorities on the other. Ilmihal gives a radical substance to this 
interdependence undertheorized in textbooks. It finds God’s ontological sovereignty 
compatible with the political sovereignty of the people.104 What is meant by people’s 
sovereignty is not constitutional democracy for it finds democracy and Islam to be 
incompatible, but a form of Islamic republicanism where the religious sect in 
                                                                                                                                     
towards non-religious and non-Sunni citizens that often take the form of physical assault. 
The new “others” of Turkey, the study suggests, have either the option of adopting to the 
newly invented Islamic lifestyle or being physically assaulted in the public sphere and even 
in the privacy of their homes, denied jobs or services in public institutions, and condemned 
to failure in business life. Toprak, Turkiye'de Farkli Olmak: Din Ve Muhafazakarlık 
Ekseninde Otekilestirilenler. See also Nora Fisher Onar and Meltem Muftuler-Bac, "The 
Adultery and Headscarf Debates in Turkey: Fusing “Eu-Niversal” and “Alternative” 
Modernities?," Women's Studies International Forum 34, no. 5 (2011). Ayse Gunes Ayata 
and Fatma Tutuncu, "Party Politics of the Akp (2002-2007) and the Predicaments of Women 
at the Intersection of the Westernist, Islamist and Feminist Discourses in Turkey," British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 35, no. 3 (2008). 
104 Kuru himself briefly mentions this relationship as one aspect of passive secularism, 
without discussing what it actually means. Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward 
Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey., 177. 
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majority (Sunni Islam in this case) organizes itself according to Islamic precepts. 
Accordingly, it calls for the re-codification of the entire legal and constitutional 
system and the re-organization of the whole society in accordance with the Islamic 
law, the interpretation of which is the prerogative of the Diyanet that claims to make 
a scientific interpretation of Islam. The Islam privileged by the Diyanet seems to be 
the exact opposite of the secularized Islam taught in public education during the 
early republican era. Whereas in the latter science and political imperatives defines 
the boundaries of religion, the former gives primacy to religion in the definition of 
the boundaries of science and politics. What is outside of Islam is scientifically 
wrong and politically illegitimate.  
I argue that the term “nationalist secularism” captures better the original 
intents of the early republican nation-builders, the Kemalists, than “assertive 
secularism,” and the term “Islamic secularism” captures better the intents of pro-
Islamic conservatives than “passive secularism.” Nationalist secularism rests on two 
interrelated assumptions: that of a monolithic nation [yekpare millet] with a single 
will, the common denominator of which is Islam. Nationalist secularism appears to 
be a form of what Max Weber called caesaropapism, “a secular, caesaropapist ruler 
who exercises supreme authority in ecclesiastical matters by virtue of his 
autonomous legitimacy.”105 The autonomous legitimacy of the charismatic ruler 
stems from his successful identification with the nation. In time, especially after the 
                                                
105 Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology., 1160 
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1980 coup d’état, we see a transformation of this model in the opposite direction 
towards an Islamic conception of secularism. What I call Islamic secularism finds its 
most concrete expression in the contemporary discourse of the Diyanet. While 
nationalist secularism derives political legitimacy from the supreme will of the 
nation, Islamic secularism derives it from the ontological sovereignty of God on the 
one hand, and a majoritarian interpretation of political sovereignty of the people on 
the other hand. 
In what follows, I will discuss in detail the content of religion textbooks 
during the three periods in public and military education (II, III, IV) and then move 
on to the new discourse of the Diyanet (V).  
I. THE FIRST PERIOD OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION (1923-1947): 
The republican theory and practice give special emphasis to state regulated 
free and compulsory public education in the integration of a diverse population into 
the nations’ political, economic and cultural institutions.106 Republican civil and 
military institutions teach citizens basic principles of citizenship. The school 
curricula in most parts of the world reflect the values espoused by dominant groups 
in a given period, hence making the content of standardized textbooks a crucial site 
for investigation. Moreover, the preparation of textbooks is a deeply political activity 
and a site of contestation wherein different groups aim to instill their particular 
                                                
106 Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976). Carl F. Kaestle, Pillars of the Republic: 
Common Schools and American Society, 1780-1860 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983). 
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values on future generations. As such textbooks do not simply convey knowledge but 
“notions of time, space, and agency that a society aims to instill in its students.”107 
“National textbooks,” a study suggests, “are representative of officially selected, 
organized, and transmitted knowledge.” In that sense, “they are indispensable to the 
explication of public representations of national collectivities and identities.”108 
Turkey is no exception to this global trend of making national collectivities 
via education. In Turkey the state is directly involved in the production of the 
textbooks used in public education, which is considered to be the main site where the 
proper Turk must be cultivated.109 Unlike in France where in 1881 religion courses 
were removed from public schools, no such attempt is made in Turkey except for a 
brief period between 1939-1947.110 Since the inception of the Republic religious 
education is considered to be one of the main vehicles through which national 
identity is fostered and conceptions of the secular and the religious are disseminated 
and reinforced. The textbooks as they reveal the kind of religious knowledge 
sanctioned and legitimated by the state are a crucial site for investigating the 
                                                
107Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal and Hanna Schissler, "Introduction: Teaching Beyond the 
National Narrative," in The Nation Europe and the World: Textbooks and Curricula in 
Transition, ed. Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal and Hanna Schissler (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2005)., 7. 
108 Ibid. 14. 
109 Even if textbooks are prepared and published by private companies with the permission 
of the Board of Education, there is not any substantive variation across textbooks due to the 
very detailed nature of the curriculum imposed from above. 
110 Vol. 2 Paul Monroe, New York: , A Cyclopedia of Education, vol. 2 (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1911)., 657. 
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relationship between religion and politics. There are only few studies that focus on 
the content of religion textbooks and none of which covers all religion textbooks 
used in education throughout Turkish educational history. The present work is 
unique in this regard.111 
An analysis of the politics of education during the single-party period reveals 
that the Kemalist reforms did not constitute simply a break with religion.112 Nor was 
their ethos anti-religious; but rather the reforms reflect the anxiety of the nationalists 
to rationalize and nationalize Islam to make it subservient to political and economic 
goals.113 The nationalists influenced by the French experience with nation-building 
were convinced that national education, in its both civil and military variants, was 
the primary means to discipline the scattered Ottoman communities into what they 
considered to be the ideal Turkish nation. They envisioned the creation of a 
monolithic nation within political borders through centralized education, which had 
                                                
111 For a content analysis of religion textbooks between 1997 and 2008 see Buket Turkmen, 
"A Transformed Kemalist Islam or a New Islamic Civic Morality? A Study of “Religious 
Culture and Morality” Textbooks in the Turkish High School Curricula," Comparative 
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 29, no. 3 (2009). For a similar content 
analysis in the post-1980 period see Sam Kaplan, The Pedagogical State: Education and the 
Politics of National Culture in Post-1980 Turkey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2006). 
112 For early republican policies see Yesim Bayar, "The Dynamic Nature of Educational 
Policies and Turkish Nation Building: Where Does Religion Fit In?," Comparative Studies 
of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 29, no. 3 (2009). 
113 As Alev Cinar suggests, “the formation of the nation-state involved a creation of a 
secular-national public sphere where, contrary to the common understanding that secularism 
excludes religion, religious practice, knowledges, and activity were monitored a given a 
specific public presence.” Alev Cinar, Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, 
Places, and Time (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).,17. 
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the purpose of assimilating all “foreign” elements. In a 1924 speech before the 
Teachers Association (Muallimler Cemiyeti), the Prime-Minister Inonu explains the 
political and economic goals of national education:  
There is a Turk in these lands who has the Turkish essence. However, this 
nation is not yet the monolithic nation [yekpare millet] we want. If this 
generation dedicates its entire life to working with consciousness and with 
the guidance of science and experience, the political Turkish nation can 
become the culturally, intellectually, and socially complete and mature 
Turkish nation. All foreign cultures must melt in this monolithic nation. 
There cannot be any separate civilizations in a national bloc…If we are going 
to live, we will live as a monolithic national bloc. This is the overall aim of 
the system we call National Education [Milli Terbiye]. 114 
 
Even though there was a consensus among the state elite and the intellectuals about 
the relationship between education and modernization at the time, the issue of the 
essence of education, that is, whether it should be national (milli) or religious (dini), 
was seriously debated. It is interesting to note that the terms of the debate was not set 
between secular and religious education but between national and religious 
education. In fact, what is meant by national education does not seem to be a 
complete break with religion but the nationalization and rationalization of Islam 
through a series of reforms. The prime-minister Inonu justifies the educational 
reforms along the following lines: “The reforms are all-powerful and supreme [kadir 
ve kahir]…We are of the opinion that what we do has nothing to do with 
irreligiousness. Let’s walk the path that we followed for ten years with determination 
and success. Ten years from now the entire world, those who object to us now, and 
                                                
114Osman Ergin, Turk Maarif Tarihi, vol. 5 (Istanbul: Eser Matbaasi, 1977)., 1652. 
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those who are concerned about our path for religious reasons will see that the real, 
the most pristine, and the truest kind of Islam is manifested in us…Woe to those 
nations that lock themselves in the iron wheel of the past.” 115 
The educational reforms during the single-party period included the 
promulgation of the Law for the Unity of Education in 1924, which abolished the 
Ottoman religious schools (medrese) and established vocational schools (Imam 
Hatip) along with a theology department at Istanbul University for the education of 
religious officials;116 the establishment of the Diyanet (1924) to enlighten the people 
about Islam; the use of Turkish as the official medium in national education; the 
adoption of Latin alphabet (1928); the removal of Arabic and Persian from school 
curriculum (1928); and the preparation of new religion textbooks. Also noteworthy is 
the attempt to turkify Islam with the translation of the Koran, and the recital of the 
call for prayer (ezan) in Turkish instead of Arabic. The turkification of the Koran and 
the ezan, have been usually considered as examples of the anti-religious ethos of the 
                                                
115 Recai Dogan, "Cumhuriyetin Ilk Yillarinda Tevhid-I Tedrisat Cercevesinde Din Egitim-
Ogretimi Ve Yapilan Tartismalar," in Cumhuriyet'in 75. Yılında Turkiye'de Din Egitimi Ve 
Ogretimi Ilmi Toplantisi: Izmir, 4-6 Aralık 1998: Tebligler, ed. Fahri Unan and Yucel 
Hacaloglu (Ankara: Turk Yurdu Yayinlari, 1999).,245-246. Emphasis mine.  
116 The number of vocational schools opened by the state in 1923 is twenty-nine. As these 
schools were not considered high-school level, the graduates were not able to apply to the 
theology department at Istanbul University. With the removal of Arabic and Persian, from 
high-school curriculum, the number of applicants to the theology department, which required 
these two languages as prerequisites, was reduced to a great extent. Furthermore, as the 
graduates were not given teaching positions, the only institution where they could pursue a 
career was the Diyanet, which did not recognize their diploma and offered them only 
minimum wage. As a consequence all vocational schools and the theology department were 
left without students and were closed down by 1931. After 1947 vocational schools all 
around the country were reopened. Ibid. 265-278. 
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Kemalist modernization project.117 However, a deeper analysis of these reforms tells 
a different story. Atatürk was personally involved in the translation process of the 
Koran and the ezan. Not only did he single-handedly decide the final Turkish form of 
the ezan, but also he personally inspected and then rejected Cemil Said’s translation 
of the Koran from French.118 During the translation process he emphasized the need 
of the Turks for a Turkish Koran to understand what true Islam was all about. In a 
conversation with Hafiz Riza Sayman Atatürk explained the goal of the translation as 
such: “The Turk is running after the Koran but he does not understand what it says, 
what it contains, and he worships without knowledge. My goal is to make the Turk 
understand what the book he is running after contains. Yes, I, too, know that the 
human being cannot be without religion. However, the religion of the Turk is nature. 
I am telling you this because you are enlightened.”119 
                                                
117Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey., 41-42. For an exception to this view 
see Alev Cinar who argues “by having the ezan chanted in Turkish, the secular state no only 
brought under control Islam, which had gained a unique presence through sound, but also 
submitted it to nationalist discourse…Therefore, the institutionalization of secular involved 
not exclusion, but a tightly controlled inclusion of Islam in the public sphere.” Cinar, 
Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time., 17.  
118 Meanwhile, Mehmet Akif, the author of the Turkish national anthem, was preparing 
another translation in Ankara. However, the debates around the performance of the namaz in 
Turkish at the time led him to drop the project, as he did not wish his translation to be used 
for such purposes. In 1926 the parliament commissioned the Diyanet for the translation, 
which was finalized twelve years later by Muhammed Hamdi. Kamil Kaya, Sosyolojik 
Acidan Turkiye’de Din-Devlet Iliskileri Ve Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi (Istanbul: Birlesik 
Dagitim, 1998)., 163. 
119 Ergin, Turk Maarif Tarihi., 1950. 
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The attitude of the state towards religious education has not been uniform 
throughout the republican history. Until the promulgation of the 1982 constitution, 
which made religious education compulsory (Article 24), there has not been any 
legal or constitutional provision about religious education in public schools, and the 
question of religious education is left to the will of the parliament. Apart from a brief 
period between 1939 and 1947, the state has continuously offered religious education 
in public lay schools. The gradual phasing out of religious education in public 
schools during the single-party period is considered to be another proof of the 
hostility of the nationalists towards religion, but no attention is paid to the content of 
religion textbooks used in the education of the very first students of the republic.120  
The religion textbooks used in elementary education are called The Religion 
Book of the Republic’s Child (Cumhuriyet Cocugunun Din Kitabi), which were used 
in urban schools until 1933 and in rural schools until 1939.121 These textbooks, as we 
will see, reflect an interesting but often inconsistent definition of a desacralized 
world in which revelation is set aside in favor of universal causal laws in the search 
for ultimate truths. From this it does not follow that God or religious salvation lose 
their practical meaning in this world but rather that the quest for religious salvation 
leads to the rationalization of the pattern of life for attaining religious sanctification. 
                                                
120 In my research, I have not came across any study on religious education and its content 
during the early republican period.  
121 According to the 1924 national curriculum, religion is offered for two hours per week 
from second through sixth grade. The 1926 curriculum reduced religious instruction to one 
hour per week from third to fifth grade.  
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Similar to Weberian understanding of inner-worldly asceticism, where “the principle 
of loyal fulfillment of obligations within the framework of the world” is considered 
to be “the sole method of proving religious merit”, the religious virtuoso proves 
himself through action and active participation in the rational institutions of this 
world.122 Accordingly, the ethical value of an action, political or economic, is 
measured by it success. Hence economic power in the form of wealth and political 
power in the form of domination are indices of religious merit and as such they are 
morally sanctioned. Accordingly capitalism and political nationalism are intertwined 
with a new interpretation of Islam. Religion and God serve to justify the nationalist 
ideology, which reduces the political to monopoly over violence and territory, and 
extends responsibility only to those who are similar with regard to religion, 
language, history, and race. Accordingly, early republicanism teaches that worldly 
salvation is achieved through unconditional obedience to the nation-state and 
participation in its institutions. What the early republican textbook perceives as 
harmful to the interests of the nation is not religion itself but what Weber calls “the 
flight of the religious believer from the world,” which requires complete 
emancipation from all ties of the world and the orientation of the individual’s 
attention to otherworldly goals. This is reflected in the 1926 curriculum: “It is 
necessary to inculcate students with the ideas that to direct one’s attention solely to 
the otherworld and to identify belief with poverty, resignation, and sloth have no 
                                                
122 Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion, trans. Ephraim Fischoff (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1993)., 168. Emphasis mine. 
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place in true religion, and that it is demanded and welcome by religion for Muslims 
to live prosperously and happily in this world, and to become rich and make their 
country developed.”123 
The systematization of religion and the conduct of life for the purpose of 
exerting influence upon economic and political behavior has practical consequences 
in the sphere of worship. The textbooks command minimizing the time spent in 
performing religious rituals to secure participation within the institutions of this 
world and to increase economic productivity. The motto of the textbooks is that the 
nation cannot be saved through prayer and continuous worship but through 
industriousness and involvement in worldly institutions. Religion in the pre-
Republican period is considered to be a major deviation from the true essence of 
Islam, a period in which people neglected their worldly duties and spent all their time 
with worshipping God.124 From the perspective of these textbooks, the pre-
Republican believer appears not to be worshipping God or fulfilling his commands 
but rather to be “free riding” and thinking exclusively about his own profit.  To 
secure participation in and identification with the institutions of the Republic we see 
the attempt to remove religious practices like namaz and oruc (fasting) from what is 
considered to be true Islam and from the daily lives of individuals. The Islam of the 
                                                
123 Cited in Dogan, "Cumhuriyetin Ilk Yillarinda Tevhid-I Tedrisat Cercevesinde Din 
Egitim-Ogretimi Ve Yapilan Tartismalar.", 272. Emphasis mine. 
124 Muallim Abdulbaki, Cumhuriyet Cocugunun Din Dersleri: Ataturk Donemi Ders Kitabi 
(Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari, 2005)., 65. 
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early nationalists commands the individual to perform the namaz and fast only after 
all worldly duties to the nation are accomplished. The fourth-grade textbook suggests 
that we can interfere in people’s performance of religious practices when they 
neglect their worldly duties.125 “The highest kind of worship to Allah,” commands 
the third-grade textbook, “is to love him, to be a good person, to be useful to our 
nation, our country, and our government, and then to all mankind. We cannot be 
useful to anyone solely through prayer and fasting.”126 To further emphasize the non-
compulsory nature of religious practices, the fourth-grade textbook claims that 
“those who believe that the Prophet had continually performed the namaz, fasted, 
and prayed are mistaken. He did perform the namaz and fast but not always.”127  
The fifth-grade textbook explains Turks’ rationalized understanding of 
religion that commands participation in worldly institution and above all the defense 
of the nation: “The Turk has completely awakened and threw away all those 
nonsensical ideas and their believers; adapted to civilization, stepped into the 
civilized world. He accepted and founded the civilized regime that is the Republic. 
The Turk understood that Allah does not accept prayer alone. He trusted in his own 
power, which is, in fact, Allah’s, and took up arms.”128 
                                                
125 Ibid. 48. 
126 Ibid. 41. 
127 Ibid. 74. 
128 Ibid. 99. 
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A strong emphasis is put on the notion of an inner God who lives in the 
hearts of the faithful. What the teachers are supposed to instill in the minds of the 
students is the existence of a creator God who commands them to love their national 
duties. Hence, the primary purpose of this God, who has access to the mind of the 
individual, is to oversee whether the actions of individuals conform to his will, which 
is nothing more or less than the “true” will of the nation.  
The conception of inner God has also the purpose of circumscribing the 
power of those religious groups that derive their authority from their knowledge of 
the holy texts. The role of religious scholars is limited to teaching religion to those 
who do not know it. The textbooks emphasize that no one can mediate between God 
and the individual: “Allah is in our hearts, he sees and hears us. We with our simple 
minds cannot know the Almighty Allah truly. But we do know without doubt that 
there is no need for hodjas or imams to approach him; they are merely scholars of 
religion, teaching religion to those who don’t know it.”129 
What the textbooks seek to achieve is the conformity of religion to science 
and logic, to remove what Weber calls “the sacrifice of the intellect.”130 “Our 
religion,” claimed Atatürk in 1923, “is the most reasonable and the most natural 
religion. And that is why it is the last religion. For a religion to be natural it needs to 
conform to reason, technology, science, and logic. Our religion conforms to all this 
                                                
129 Ibid. 38. 
130 Max Weber, "Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions," in From Max 
Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958)., 352. 
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completely.” In 1928 the new faculty of divinity in the University of Istanbul formed 
a committee to reform and modernize Islam and to make proposals to the Ministry of 
Education. As the chairman of the committee, Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, suggested: 
“In the Turkish democracy, religion should also manifest the vitality and progress 
which it needs…It is almost impossible with the modern views of society, to expect 
such a reform, however much the ground may be ready for it, from the workings of 
mystic and irrational elements. Religious life, like moral and economic life, must be 
reformed on scientific lines, that it may be in harmony with other institutions.”131  
Simply put, Islam became an object of scientific inquiry, something to be 
interpreted by “a state that considers itself to be founded on principles not grounded 
in a “religious” regime of power and knowledge.”132 The fact that the reform project 
took place in the University of Istanbul rather than in the Diyanet can be considered 
as a reflection of the new connection between religion and science and the marginal 
role played by the latter in the formation of the new Islam. In fact, the reformers had 
proposed the preparation of the sermons (hutbe) by philosophers of religion educated 
in the new department of theology. Furthermore, the Diyanet at the time does not 
seem to be an institution having the capacity to carry out such a radical reform 
project. In 1926 Rifat Borekci, the president of the Diyanet at the time, had 
                                                
131 Cited in Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, New York,: Oxford 
University Press, 1968)., 414. Emphasis mine.  
132 Brian Silverstein, "Islam and Modernity in Turkey: Power, Tradition and Historicity in 
the European Provinces of the Muslim World," Antropological Quarterly 76, no. 3 (2003). 
512. 
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suspended an imam from his post for two weeks for leading the namaz in Turkish 
whereas the reformers in the University of Istanbul had proposed the performance of 
religious services and the recitation of the call for prayer (ezan) in Turkish, which 
came into effect in 1931, lasting until 1950.  
The subordination of religion to science was not easy to achieve since Islam 
as a “religion of the book” is based on prophetic revelation, which positive science 
does not have room for. In the textbooks used in religious education between 1927 
and 1931, the conflict between revelatory religion and positive science has been 
resolved, at least in theory, by: 1) removing all mediating agents, like angels, 
between Allah and mankind; 2) reducing the prophet to the status of an ordinary 
human being; 3) removing all miraculous events from the history of religion, 
including revelation (vahiy); 4) silencing all discussion about afterlife. The fifth-
grade textbook claims: “There is nothing in Islam that does not conform to reason. In 
Islam there is no room for a prophet as in Christianity where it is not clear whether 
he is Allah or a human being, or for irrational strange tales, angels with golden 
wings, speaking thousands of languages. In Islam the prophet is a human being, just 
like any other. Our sacred book Koran is the words of Allah that are born into the 
heart of our prophet…Whatever science tells us is correct. Things that do not 
conform to science and reason are lies that have no place in religion.”133 
                                                
133Abdulbaki, Cumhuriyet Cocugunun Din Dersleri: Ataturk Donemi Ders Kitabi., 84. A 
similar attempt to rationalize Islamic revelation is found in the high-school history textbook 
at the time: “All concepts outside and above the nature are lies fabricated by 
men…Muhammad did not appear suddenly, calling himself God’s messenger. He came up 
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The third-grade curriculum orders teachers not to talk about miracles or 
supernatural tales in the classroom.134 The students are not supposed to be bothered 
with unnecessary details that do not concern them. The textbooks from third to fifth-
grade make no reference to angels or any other supernatural beings mediating 
between Allah and the mankind. The universe is explained as the creation of Allah 
who is considered to be living in the hearts of the believers. In none of the books is 
there reference to the sovereignty of Allah over the world. In fact, it seems that Allah 
after having created the universe had left it to its own devices, resolving, in a sense, 
the tension between science and religion. The prophet Muhammad, on the other 
hand, is explained as the person who taught Islam to the world. The Islamic notion of 
vahiy (revelation) is nowhere mentioned. Although in one section, quoted above, 
Koran is said to be the words of Allah, born into the heart of the prophet, which 
seems to suggest a moment of revelation, throughout all books Muhammad is 
defined as a teacher and as an ordinary human being simply introducing the idea of 
civilization to the world. The desacralization of Muhammad, next to helping prove 
the conformity of religion to science and reason, serves also the purpose of the 
sacralization of the Ghazi, Mustafa Kemal, and the values he espoused. An analogy 
                                                                                                                                     
with the ideas of revelation and inspiration after withdrawing himself to a deserted place to 
contemplate for years and years about how to reform the very bad and primitive morals and 
traditions of Arabs.” Ergin, Turk Maarif Tarihi., 1702, 1673. 
134 Abdulbaki, Cumhuriyet Cocugunun Din Dersleri: Ataturk Donemi Ders Kitabi., 13. 
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is drawn between the prophet and the Ghazi.135 Both are considered to be teachers 
aiming to save the mankind from the ills of ignorance and bigotry. Both are 
identified with the values of modern civilization. Just like the prophet has helped his 
followers awaken and form a government of their own, the Ghazi helped Turks gain 
their independence, teaches the third-grade textbook. Furthermore, the reforms of the 
new republic are justified with a reference to the prophet’s understanding of 
civilization. If he had lived today, says the fourth-grade textbook, he would have 
made his ummah wear the hat.136 
The early republican textbook Islam with its emphasis on an inner God who 
commands the performance of Islamic practices like namaz and fasting only after all 
worldly duties to the nation are fulfilled can be considered a form of privatized 
religion as long as one does not reduce privatization to depoliticization. In fact, early 
republican Islam is introduced to guarantee political legitimacy and societal 
integration. What pushes religion and God to individual conscience does not seem to 
be a concern to remove religion from the public sphere, nor an attempt to separate it 
from the political. But rather the new understanding of science, which would raise 
the nation, according to the founding elite, to the level of contemporary civilization.  
I have dwelled at length on The Religion Books of the Republic’s Child to 
show the republican interest in forming religious subjects obedient to the nation-
                                                
135 Ibid. 36-37. 
136 Ibid. 68. 
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state. They are unique in showing that secularism within the context of modernizing 
nation-state cannot be adequately understood with a narrow focus on legal texts that 
formally derive their legitimacy from the will of the nation, like the Constitution. 
Textbooks used in centralized education, as they reflect the ideals of the founding 
elite, have the benefit of showing the role attributed to religion by the founders in 
securing identification with the new institutions of the republic and with the values 
of the nation.  
Even if the textbooks used in the early republican era are useful to understand 
the conceptual foundations of secularism in Turkey and the negotiation of the 
boundaries of value spheres, the radically rationalized conception of Islam used in 
these books do not adequately reflect the relationship woven between this world and 
the next in the republican discourse, that continues to inform Turkish nationalism up 
to this day. The textbooks, as they aim to solve the conflict between scientific reason 
and religion, do not make any reference to a life beyond this world for which the 
conduct in worldly life would serve as preliminary sanctification. Perhaps the only 
reference to the next world can be derived from the title, Ghazi, attributed in these 
books and in general to Mustafa Kemal, which in Islam refers to those who fight for 
the cause of Allah and who will be rewarded in the next world. Beyond that there is 
no reference to rewards or punishments in the next world. However, when we look at 
military education during the single party period (1923-1950) and public education 
after 1947, we find another understanding of Islam, developed primarily by the 
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Diyanet, that has the primary purpose of instilling the hope of salvation in the next 
world in the minds of the citizen-soldiers through the notion of martyrdom.  
Military Education:  
As Eugen Weber states, in his famous work, Peasants into Frenchmen, the 
army is “an agency for emigration, acculturation, and in the final analysis, 
civilization, an agency as potent in its way as the schools.”137 The Turkish military 
did play a dominant, if not exclusive, role in disciplining the new political subjects of 
the republic.138 In the aftermath of the Independence War, the lack of means of 
communication to link the new citizens to the new state coupled with low rates of 
literacy and schooling constituted major obstacles in disseminating the principles 
legitimating the new regime to the population at large.139 With the introduction of 
mandatory military service for males in 1927, millions of male citizens came into 
contact, for the first time, with the state through the military institution.140 The 
                                                
137Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914., 302. 
On the role of the army in education see also David B. Ralston, The Army of the Republic: 
The Place of the Military in the Political Evolution of France, 1871-1914 (Massachusetts: 
The MIT Press, 1967). Barry R. Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," 
in Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security, ed. Sean M. Lynn-Jones 
and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995). 
138 For an elaborate account of the relationship between military service and education see: 
Ayse Gül Altinay, The Myth of the Military-Nation : Militarism, Gender, and Education in 
Turkey, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
139 Serdar Sen, Cumhuriyet Kulturunun Olusum Surecinde Bir Ideolojik Aygit Olarak Silahli 
Kuvvetler Ve Modernizm (Istanbul: Sarmal Yayinevi, 1996)., 35. 
140 In fact, as Altınay suggests, with the introduction of compulsory military service, “every 
single citizen of the new nation-state would be connected to the military either directly (by 
serving in it) or indirectly (by sending their sons, husbands, brothers, lovers, friends).” 
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military, in other words, became a school endowed with the productive task of 
forming the will to obey by fostering national identity.141 Therefore, the arguments 
that regard the military as the self-appointed guardian of the constitution and trace its 
politicization to the 1960 coup d’état by focusing exclusively on its coercive actions 
should be reconsidered in the light of the military’s historical duty, handed down by 
the framers, in “civilizing” the masses into the new nation. The military did not 
suddenly appoint itself as the guardian of the regime when the National Unity 
Committee overthrew the government on May 27, 1960. Since the early 1920s the 
military has been regarded as the main institution to address the legitimation crisis of 
the new regime by inculcating the founding principles into the whole social body.142 
Therefore, we should cease to consider the Turkish military merely as a coercive 
institution and take into account its extensive role in the making of disciplined 
                                                                                                                                     
Altinay, The Myth of the Military-Nation : Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey., 
70. 
141 The classes taught in the military during the early years of the republic included, literacy, 
mathematics, geometry, modern means of agriculture, the founding principles of the new 
state, history, and religion. See Sen, Cumhuriyet Kulturunun Olusum Surecinde Bir Ideolojik 
Aygit Olarak Silahli Kuvvetler Ve Modernizm., 43.  
142 For the majority who participated in the Independence War, the national struggle was a 
means to restore the sultanate and caliphate back to power. Even after the proclamation of 
the republic, there was a strong opposition within the assembly against Mustafa Kemal and 
even the military was divided on the issue of the regime. With the legislation that required 
the officers in the assembly to resign their military posts in 1924 and with the introduction of 
the Law for the Maintenance of Order in 1925, which gave the government absolute powers 
for four years, the regime’s opponents were silenced or put to death by extraordinary courts 
called ‘Independence Tribunals.’ It was during this period that the most radical reforms have 
been implemented. See Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey. p. 52-71; Erik Jan Zürcher, 
Turkey : A Modern History, Reprinted with corrections. ed. (London ; New York: I.B. Tauris 
: [Distributed by St. Martin's Press], 1998)., 173-183. 
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individuals. In fact, though Mustafa Kemal Atatürk placed special emphasis on 
keeping the military in the barracks,143 his dream was to turn the barracks into sites 
where obedient individuals would be created through disciplinary practices.  
According to Atatürk, the goal of national education was to make future 
generations loyal to the state and to prepare them to fight the enemies of the nation. 
Being a soldier, Atatürk had a militaristic view about national education, describing 
teachers as an army teaching students why they should kill and get killed.144 In his 
speeches Atatürk often referred to the military not only as the guardian of the 
country and the regime but also as an educational institution par excellence: “I have 
no doubt that extra attention and effort will be devoted to make the military – the 
grand national school of discipline – a grand school that would also educate staff 
that would be most useful in our economic, cultural, and social wars.”145 In what 
follows I attempt to unpack the relationship between the religious and the political by 
referring to Askere Din Kitabi (The Religion Book for the Soldier) – prepared by the 
Diyanet during Atatürk’s presidency, following the demand of the Chief of the 
General Staff, Fevzi Çakmak, in 1925, and distributed to the barracks by the General 
Staff.  
                                                
143 Mustafa Kemal was aware that the most serious challenge to his leadership could come 
from the ranks of the military. Therefore, soon after the proclamation of the republic, a law 
passed in the TGNA on December 19, 1923 required the members of the assembly to quit 
their military posts. Bülent Tanör, Osmanli-Türk Anayasal Gelismeleri : (1789-1980), 334.  
144 Taha Parla, Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynaklari, vol. 3 (Istanbul: Iletisim 
Yayinlari, 1991)., 307. 
145 Cited in ibid., 171. Emphasis mine.  
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Fevzi Çakmak, a close companion of Atatürk, was concerned that soldiers 
were “ignorant” about religion, and commissioned Ahmet Hamdi Akseki write a 
book that would stimulate soldiers’ religious feelings.146 The content of this book 
merits attention given that it has been regularly republished throughout the 
republican era and it is still one of the main textbooks used in military schools.147 
The book reflects the republican concern to secure participation in worldly 
institutions but with a new understanding of time and space that extends beyond the 
present world and a new conception of eschatology. Akseki in his introduction 
suggest that “the book does not intend to make its readers abandon the world by 
making them think solely what is beyond the grave.” “Perhaps,” adds Akseki, “it will 
attach them to their world, nation, and home as much as to their lord.”148 
Participation in worldly institutions is characterized as a way to achieve salvation in 
both worlds.  
The book recurrently represents Islam as the religion of the Turkish nation; 
military service as a religious duty and a form of worship; and martyrdom as the 
                                                
146 Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, Askere Din Kitabi (Ankara: Ayyildiz Matbaasi, 1980)., 3. Even 
though there is no direct evidence showing Atatürk’s role in the preparation of this book, his 
reaction to the Islamic postulates about military service at the time is interesting. In a 
gathering with military inspectors at the Dolmabahçe Palace, Atatürk asks Hafiz Saadettin 
Kaynak to cite some verses from the Koran for his guests. After Kaynak’s citation of the 
Koranic verses regarding war, the virtues of military service, and the high rank of 
martyrdom, Atatürk makes the following remark: “Look at all these teaching in the Koran! 
We were completely unaware of all this.” Ergin, Turk Maarif Tarihi., 1956. 
147 The seventh and most recent edition of the book is that of 2002. The one that I am 
referring to in this text is the fourth edition, published in 1980.  
148Akseki, Askere Din Kitabi., 4. 
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highest status that guarantees access to heaven. Islam is also given a hegemonic 
status as the last religion that revokes the commands of all other religions. It 
essentializes the connection between military service, Islam, and the Turkish nation, 
despite the presence of non-Muslims among Turkish citizens.149 A special emphasis 
is put on Islamic identity as a precondition for participation in political community. 
Common good, moreover, is defined as the survival of the Islamic/Turkish nation, 
while civic virtue is reduced to the willingness to sacrifice oneself for its 
achievement. In terms of such a republican discourse, not surprisingly, the rights and 
privileges of citizenship are to be enjoyed in the hereafter. Not only does religious 
homogeneity represented as the common denominator of the nation justify its claim 
to sovereign power, but it also sanctions self-sacrifice for the interests of the nation 
as a form of worship.  From this it does not follow that the citizen-soldier is called to 
sacrifice himself for Islam or Allah. While military service is crowned with religious 
legitimacy, ultimate sovereignty rests with the nation-state, the sole entity that is 
worthy of the ultimate sacrifice of life.  
 
“Every nation has a religion…but the most truthful one on earth is Islam.”150 
 
                                                
149 For an analysis of the idea of the Turkish soldier as “the pious defender of the nation” in 
primary school curriculum, see Sam Kaplan, "Din-U Devlet All over Again? The Politics of 
Military Secularism and Religious Militarism in Turkey Following the 1980 Coup," 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 34, no. 1 (2002).  
150 Akseki, Askere Din Kitabi., 14. 
   
 
82 
“Islam revokes the commands of other religions…Thank God we are Turkish 
and Muslim.”151 
 
“Islam has also a sixth pillar, which is jihad, military service…This is a 
different duty than prayer, fasting, hajj, and zakat. Unless this duty is 
fulfilled, the others cannot be properly performed.”152 
 
“A deserting soldier cannot avoid death by fleeing…Since by deserting he is 
also rebelling against God and the prophet, the last place of such people is 
hell.”153 
 
“The status of martyrdom is just below that of the prophet…Martyr is a 
soldier who dies on duty in defending the homeland from enemy assault for 
the sake of Allah.”154 
 
“The martyr gave up his life, but received heaven from Allah.”155 
 
With this book Akseki also intends to introduce an Islamic economic ethic to the 
soldiers through eschatological fear. He aims to balance worldly and otherworldly 
goals by arguing that what secures salvation in the otherworld are not simply namaz 
and fasting but also economic activity and accumulation of wealth. “Don’t refrain 
from working,” commands the book, “make money and get rich.”156 Becoming 
materially rich is sanctioned as one Allah’s commands to the extent of characterizing 
                                                
151 Ibid. 15. 
152 Ibid. 151. 
153 Ibid. 284. 
154 Ibid. 322. 
155 Ibid. 322. 
156 Ibid. 80. 
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economic activity as a form of jihad, securing salvation in both worlds.157 Not only 
being poor is stigmatized – “the poor is only a burden on others” – and characterized 
as leading to doom in both worlds but also the poor is recommended not to envy the 
rich.158 With this injunction securing economic equality is put outside of state’s 
responsibility and the believer is suggested to blame himself for his material 
depravity and not to rebel against political authorities.  
The content of this book, furthermore, challenges the prevalent assumption 
that the Turkish republic denies any role for “religion” in the formation of the polity 
or aims to remove “religion” from the public sphere. In fact, a particular conception 
of Islam as the “natural” religion of the Turkish nation comes to occupy the center 
stage of the public sphere. An example of the public nature of religion is made 
evident in martyr funerals where the nation is often reproduced as an ethnically and 
religiously homogeneous entity. Martyr funerals are regular public events in Turkey 
and as such perhaps provide the single most important venue for “the people” to 
exist, to use Schmittian terminology, as a political entity showing the capacity to 
distinguish friend and enemy. This is not to argue that what is acclaimed in funerals 
represents the identical will of the people or that acclamation is the “natural form of 
the direct expression of a people’s will” as Schmitt had claimed, but still martyr 
                                                
157 Ibid. 80, 97. 
158 Ibid. 97. 
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funerals in bringing private citizens into contact with the representatives of the state 
including the military need to be considered as a form of public space.159  
If a martyr funeral takes place after a major battle between Turkish soldiers 
and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), it is customary for the president and the 
prime minister, along with the high echelons of the military, including the Chief of 
the General Staff, to participate in the farewell of soldiers. Thousands of citizens fill 
the streets chanting: “Martyrs don’t die, the country cannot be divided.”160 The 
Imam, a state employee who performs the religious ceremony, offers a theological 
explanation to this clichéd slogan: “Martyrs do not die because they continue to live 
next to Allah until the final day of judgment when they will be sent to heaven.” 
Whether in such events the divine text is interpreted correctly or not is beyond the 
concern of this study. What I want to emphasize is the fact that it is the state that 
confers a religious status to deceased soldiers, hence exercising a theological 
function. This also seems to be endorsed by the military officers in silence, who 
often hold the front line while praying in their uniforms.161 In martyr funerals 
religion is allowed to enter the public sphere, enabling the imagination of the nation 
                                                
159 Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 
2008)., 132. 
160 In Turkish: “Sehitler olmez, vatan bolunmez.”  
161 In 2010, the Chief of General Staff at the time, İlker Başbuğ, when answering the 
allegations of a coup plan against religious reactionism made an interesting remark: “The 
army that storms by yelling Allah’s name cannot put bombs in mosques.” "Darbe 
Iddalarindan Hicap Duyuyorum," Yeni Safak, 01/25/2010. 
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as a homogeneous community of believers. Far from being banished from the public 
sphere, Islam as the religion of the nation in martyr funerals occupies its center stage.  
 
II. THE SECOND PERIOD OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION (1947-1980):  
The founding Republican People’s Party’s (the CHP) 1945 decision to hold 
multi-party elections constitutes the second-major threshold of Turkish politics as 
well as of religious education. During this period, a new party called the Democrat 
Party was formed from the ranks of the CHP, claiming to represent the devout 
periphery and challenging the founding party’s interpretation of secularism.162 Given 
the DP’s electoral success in the 1945 elections—which it could not translate into 
political power as votes were cast openly and counted in private—the CHP resorted 
once more to religion to secure obedience before leaving the office. In late 1946 the 
issue of religious education is brought back to the agenda of the parliament. The 
introduction of religion classes to standard curriculum to secure obedience and to 
counter the threat of communism is suggested by two representatives.163 Against the 
strong reaction of the prime minister at the time, Recep Peker, arguing that to offer 
religious education is to eliminate one poison with another, the parliament dominated 
                                                
162 On the Democrat Party, religion and secularism, see Binnaz Toprak, "The State, Politics 
and Religion in Turkey," in State, Democracy, and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, ed. 
Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1988); Kemal Karpat, "Military 
Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey before and after 1980," in State, 
Democracy, and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin: 
W. de Gruyter, 1988). 
163 Istar B. Tarhanli, Musluman Toplum, “Laik” Devlet: Turkiye’de Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi 
(Istanbul: Afa Yayincilik, 1993).,24 
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by the CHP decides to introduce elective religion classes into public education in 
fourth and fifth grades.164  
The duty to prepare the curriculum is given to the Diyanet. Ahmet Hamdi 
Akseki, the author of The Religion Book for the Soldier, prepares two books, which 
have been a blueprint for textbooks until the 1980s.165  In fact this is the second time 
the Diyanet directly participates in the preparation of textbooks since the publication 
of The Religion Book for the Soldier. The content of these new textbooks and the 
kind of religion defined in them are sharply different than the ones used in public 
education in the 1920s and 1930s. While we do not see the concern to make Islam 
conform to positive science through the removal of supernatural phenomena, Islam is 
still considered to be reasonable and understandable through the use of reason.166 
The introduction of the scientifically irrational to religion has implications on both 
the scientific and political spheres, which I will discuss respectively. 
In the new textbooks positive science no longer defines the limits of reason. 
Allah, rather than leaving the universe to its own devices, now is explained as 
interfering with the laws of nature at will. The existence of invisible beings, such as 
angels, is justified by the existence of soul and mind regardless of their invisibility. 
                                                
164 Ibid. 24. Rasit Kucuk and Mustafa Ocal, Turk Milli Egitiminde Din Kulturu Ve Ahlak 
Bilgisi Dersleri (Istanbul: Islam Medeniyeti Vakfi, 1993).,18. 
165 Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, Ogretmen Ve Ogrencilere Yardimci Aciklamali Din Dersleri: 
Birinci Kitap (Ankara: Hilal Kirtasiye Kitabevi, 1949); Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, Ogretmen Ve 
Ogrencilere Yardimci Aciklamali Din Dersleri: Ikinci Kitap (Ankara: Hilal Kirtasiye 
Kitabevi, 1949). 
166 Din Dersleri 2,  (Istanbul: Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1962)., 20. 
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Therefore, wide room is left for the worldly presence of extraordinary events. Islam 
is defined as a revelatory religion, the content of which has been revealed to 
Muhammad through the mediation Gabriel.167 Though Muhammad is still defined as 
an ordinary human being he is now attributed magical capabilities like dreaming the 
future168 and rainmaking.169 Furthermore, his birth is associated with extraordinary 
events like the illumination of the world before the sunrise,170 the extinguishing of 
Zoroastrian fires, and the tumbling down of the icons.171 According to the new state 
Islam, reason and revelation are not contradictory but co-original and mutually 
reinforcing, which, in turn, sacralizes science and sanctions rational search for truth 
as a form of salvation. However, not any scientist can achieve salvation but only 
those who do not accept any contradiction between science and Islam.172 As it will 
be discussed, this is an early form of the post-1980 conception of religious 
aristocracy that claims to exercise authority by virtue of its access to scientific 
knowledge about holy texts.  
                                                
167Din Dersleri: Birinci Kitap,  (Ankara: Milii Egitim Basimevi, 1949)., 27; Din Dersleri 2., 
26. 
168 Din Dersleri: Birinci Kitap., 27 
169 Ibid. 24. 
170 Ibid. 23. 
171 Din Dersleri 2., 25. 
172 Ahmet Gurtas and Mustafa Uzunpostalci, Orta Ve Dengi Okullar Icin Din Bilgisi I 
(Istanbul: Irfan Yayinevi, 1976)., 54-57. 
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On the political side, the irrational strengthens the sacred connection between 
the individual and the nation-state. This is achieved mainly though the introduction 
of notions, like the judgment day, resurrection, and hereafter (ahiret) into the 
curriculum.173 Conduct in this life is considered to have far reaching consequences 
on the fate of the individual not only in this world but also in the next. In addition to 
the argument that obedience to the state is a religious duty, fear of judgment day and 
hereafter is instilled in the minds of the students. Belief in God, according to Akseki, 
is what tames the evil nature of human beings by putting them under the surveillance 
of God who sees without being seen, reminding Foucault’s panopticon: “To believe 
that every evil thought, every evil action, and every sin will eventually harm the 
human being and that Allah sees and knows what no one else sees and that He will 
punish everyone accordingly is a powerful police that prevents the human from 
committing those evil deeds that police officers can neither see nor access. What will 
protect the human from committing sin the most is such a spiritual police. How good 
is it for us to have such a guardian within us?”174  
There is still concern about the flight of the believer from the world, as this 
understanding of salvation seeks to exert influence on political and economic 
behavior. Whether the individual is to be rewarded in heaven or burned eternally in 
                                                
173 Ibrahim Begen, Turk Gencinin Din Dersleri Ii (Istanbul: Cagaloglu Yayinevi, 1962); 
Akseki, Ogretmen Ve Ogrencilere Yardimci Aciklamali Din Dersleri: Ikinci Kitap., 93. 
Sadullah Sari, Din Kulturu Ve Ahlah Bilgisi 9 (Ankara: Milli Egitim Bakanligi, 2009)., 3-21. 
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hell is conditional on his/her obedience to the will of Allah, who commands 
unconditional obedience the state and active participation in the economy. However, 
Islamic practices like namaz and fasting are considered to be unconditional duties, 
perhaps because of their potential in disciplining the body and the mind. The 
students are strongly recommended to work as if they will never die, and to think 
about the afterlife as if they will die the next day.175 
In the post-1947 period, the discussion on martyrdom, which continues to be 
a part of the curriculum uninterrupted up to 2010s, too is introduced into the 
curriculum to further justify violence and to instill the will to kill and hope of 
salvation.176 Religion textbooks in this period offer a utilitarian economy of sacrifice 
that regards life as a form of tax that can be collected by the state in times of crises. 
The rewards waiting the soldier who takes lives without questioning the order is 
explained through a dialogue between Allah and a recently martyred soldier in the 
sixth-grade textbook: 
Allah: How do you find this new rank you attained? 
Martyred soldier: O God! It is the finest and most fortunate rank.  
Allah: Tell me if you have any other wishes.  
                                                
175 Din Dersleri: Birinci Kitap., 46. 
176 Akseki, Ogretmen Ve Ogrencilere Yardimci Aciklamali Din Dersleri: Ikinci Kitap., 93-
97. Ibrahim Olgun, Din Dersleri I: Ortaokullar Ve Dengi Okullar Icin (Ankara: Guven 
Matbaasi, 1962)., 67. Halit Aksan and S. Rona, Ortaokullarda Din Dersleri I (Ankara: Ercan 
Matbaasi, 1957)., 50-51. Uzeyir Gunduz, Ilkogretim Din Kulturu Ve Ahlak Bilgisi 5. Sinif 
(Istanbul: Gendas, 2000)., 113. Ibrahim Begen, Turk Gencinin Din Dersleri I (Istanbul: 
Cagaloglu Yayinevi, 1962)., 55-57. Ilhami Sazak, Din Kulturu Ve Ahlak Bilgisi 2 (Ankara: 
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Martyred soldier: O God! What can I say?! Thanks to martyrdom I have 
attained so many blessings! I wish you to send me back to the world again 
and let me be a martyr ten more times for your sake.177 
 
Soldiers do not need to question the morality of their actions because “to kill 
enemies for the sake of the homeland is never wrong. On the contrary it is an 
honorable action because there is nothing more natural than extinguishing those who 
want to take away lives and freedoms,” claims the sixth-grade textbook.178 In this 
quest for salvation friendship and the right to life are extended only to those who 
share the same language, religion, history, culture, and ideals.179  
 
III. THE THIRD PERIOD OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION (1980-2010):  
Another wave of political turmoil swept across Turkey during the end of the 
1970s. New power loci emerged to challenge the monopoly of the center over 
politics. In addition to leftist activists, Kurdish nationalists and Islamists began to 
occupy the political stage. Starting in 1978 martial law was imposed to quell 
escalating violence in the streets until September 12, 1980 when the military carried 
out its third and final direct coup, suspending the parliament and democratic politics. 
During the three-years long state of emergency, the National Security Committee 
undertook one of the most sweeping regime changes since the 1920s, including a 
                                                
177 Gurtas and Uzunpostalci, Orta Ve Dengi Okullar Icin Din Bilgisi I., 79-80. 
178 Ahmet Okutan, Orta 1 Din Dersleri (Istanbul: Arif Bolat Kitabevi, 1958)., 66. 
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new constitution that left wide room for the intervention of the military in daily 
politics. 180 The objective was to re-organize state and society to make the military 
the sole guardian of the new regime. The new constitutional and legal order imposed 
by the military reflects a new combination of religion with secularism, the so-called 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. This is a new era in the politics of religion in Turkey 
where the coercion of the people into Islam and Islamic morality is now a 
constitutional commandment. Article 24 reads: “Education and instruction in 
religion, and ethics shall be conducted under State supervision and control. 
Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the 
curricula of primary and secondary schools.”181  
Also noteworthy is the fundamental change in the institutional position of the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Diyanet. The constitution now attributes to the 
Diyanet, which has the legal mandate “to enlighten the public about their religion,” 
                                                
180On June 29, 1981, the National Security Committee promulgated a law for the formation 
of a constituent assembly consisting of military and civilian chambers. Every single member 
of the civilian chamber was directly appointed by the NSC and the latter enjoyed absolute 
power to amend and reject the constitutional draft prepared by the former. Furthermore, the 
law organizing the constitutional referendum did not even specify what would happen if the 
constitution was voted down in the referendum. Yet, Kenan Evren, the leader of the coup 
and soon-to-be the next president, made explicit that a negative outcome of the referendum 
would show the satisfaction of the people with the military regime so they would stay in. 
Moreover, abstaining from voting had very high costs, such as a TL 2500 fine, being 
disenfranchised in the national and municipal elections for the following five years. In 
addition any kind of propaganda concerning the new constitution was outlawed. Ergun 
Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics : Challenges to Democratic Consolidation 
(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).58; William M. Hale, Turkish Politics and 
the Military (London ; New York: Routledge, 1994).257 ; Toprak, "The State, Politics and 
Religion in Turkey."126 
181 http://www.constitution.org/cons/turkey/part2.htm Emphasis mine.   
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the objective to secure national solidarity and unification in its activities (Article 
136). What is interesting to note is the institutional autonomy the military sought to 
carve out for the Diyanet through the new Political Parties Law. Article 89 of the 
Law gives the Constitutional Court the right to close down any political party that 
challenges the Diyanet’s position within the state structure, which indirectly brings 
the Diyanet under the protection of Article 4, which puts the secular character of the 
state beyond constitutional amendment.182 This is the beginning of a new conception 
of state secularism explained and justified from the perspective of religion, leading to 
major revisions in religion textbooks.  
The new textbooks prepared after the coup reflects the anxiety of military 
leaders to completely Islamize national identity and consciousness. According to the 
1982 curriculum the objective of religious education is “to reinforce Atatürkism, 
National Unity and Solidarity, and love for humankind from the point of view of 
religion and morality and to breed morally good and virtuous human beings.”183 For 
the first time in the republican history the state claims the right to enforce Islam as 
the source of public morality and national solidarity. 
The new curriculum introduces two new chapters to fifth and eighth grade 
textbooks, called  “Atatürk’s Views on Our Religion and Secularism” and “Islam and 
                                                
182 In 1993 the constitutional Court closed down the “Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi” on the 
basis of Article 89 for proposing to abolish the Diyanet in its party program. However, four 
years later the Court refused to review the closure case of the “Demokratik Barış Hareketi 
Partisi,” which had the same objective of removing the Diyanet from the state structure, on 
the basis of Law on Political Parties. Full reports of these two cases can be accessed through 
the website of the Constitutional Court: www.anayasa.gov.tr 
183 Ismail Kaplan, Turkiye'de Milli Egitim (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2002)., 369. 
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Secularism” respectively, where secularism is depicted as the path to true religiosity. 
This idea itself is not unheard of in the republican history. In various occasions the 
founding fathers justified secularism along similar lines. “Secularism [laiklik] is by 
no means irreligiousness [dinsizlik]. In fact, it secures the development of true 
religiosity by enabling the struggle against fake religiosity and superstitions,” 
claimed Atatürk. What is noteworthy about these new chapters on secularism is the 
new relationship drawn between divine and positive law, reflecting the anxiety of the 
military leaders to impose their will on future generations and to secure obedience. 
The eight-grade textbooks claims: “Laws are fundamental and unchangeable rules 
made by the people for their own comfort and peace. They are the outcome of 
numerous experiences. Furthermore, Almighty Allah has helped the humankind in 
this area as well and declared the principles that would guide humans and make them 
live in peace and comfort in the books he sent through prophets. By utilizing these 
principles human beings made their own laws…Therefore, to obey the law is a 
religious as well as a national duty.184 
This is a totally new interpretation of law and legality in religious education. 
Earlier textbooks explain and justify obedience as a religious duty as well. However, 
the duty to obey in earlier textbooks is not based on the congruity between positive 
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and divine law. Turks, in the post-1980 religion textbooks, on the other hand, are 
entrusted by God with the divine mission to implement true Islam and to civilize the 
rest of the Muslim world. The problem of the correct interpretation of the Islamic 
law is solved by the declaration of the Turks as a nation chosen by God. “The 
unifying and integrating character of Islam had been partially overshadowed by some 
wrong policies applied during the era of the Umayyads,” suggets the eight-grade 
textbook. “There had been rivalry between Islamic states. It is at this point that 
Almighty Allah intervened by commissioning the Turkish nation to serve and duly 
protect Islam for centuries and to spread it to people’s hearts.”185 The 
characterization of Turks as chosen people, not surprisingly, leads to the creation of a 
hierarchy between those who believe in God and those who do not. Accordingly, the 
status of those who do not believe in Islam and worship true God is reduced to the 
level of animals and they are described as the most dangerous enemies of the nation, 
who must be dealt with outside of legality. The eight-grade textbook teaches: “The 
dignity of the human being can only be developed and protected with the fulfilment 
of certain conditions. Otherwise, this dignity given to humans by birth will decline 
and be completely wiped out, which is when they become the most dangerous 
beings...The human who does not recognize Him, love Him, and fear Him may 
commit all kinds of sin and evil deeds...The fundamental characteristic that separates 
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humans from animals is their belief in their creator Almighty Allah and their worship 
to Him.”186  
 “What is radically new” about post-1980 textbooks, Sam Kaplan claims, is the 
depiction of “the Turkish soldier as pious defender of the nation.”187 As we have 
seen Islamic notions like jihad and martyrdom have been part and parcel of 
republican education since the very first days of the republic. In other words, in 
contrast to what Kaplan claims, the chapters on the relationship between 
otherworldly salvation and national defense found in the post-1980 religion 
textbooks are not a novelty; they are perfectly in line with the teachings of earlier 
textbooks. What is radically new is the theologization of law and popular 
sovereignty. Religion is no longer a matter of conscience confined to the private 
sphere, but it now has political claims and demands. Turks have the right to 
sovereign authority because they believe in true God and live according to His law, 
suggest religion textbooks in the post-1980 period. Hence secularism in these books 
does not amount to the separation of religion and state, nor to the subordination of 
religion to state, but to the creation of a politically irresponsible religious aristocracy 
within the state with the mandate to impose and protect true Islam. It is, in fact, in 
                                                
186 Ozdemir and Arslan, Ortaokullar Icin Din Kulturu Ve Ahlak Bilgisi Ii., 51. It is not only 
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the post-1980 religion textbooks that the Diyanet becomes part of the curriculum for 
the first time, which is explained and justified from the perspective of Islamic 
understanding of secularism. According to the textbooks, secularism, that is, the 
separation of religious and worldly authorities, is normatively internal to Islam, 
which denies the legitimacy of a sacred priestly class [ruhbanlik] independent from 
political power, mediating between God and the mankind.188 The absence of a 
priestly class separate from the political organization in Islam is what requires the 
state to train religious officials, provide religious services, and to protect Islam 
against superstitions and religious bigotry. Secularism, according to this definition, 
means the separation as well as the interdependence of religious and political 
authorities under the same roof. While the former interprets true Islam, the latter 
organizes society and imposes the law accordingly.  
IV. THE DIYANET DURING THE AKP RULE: 
 The 1980 coup d’état constitutes the third major turning point in the politics 
of religion in Turkey. The state structure as well as the ideal citizen cultivated in 
public education through mandatory religion classes is in a complete communion 
with God and Islam. Studies on Turkish secularism disproportionately focus on 
political parties that frequently face exclusion from democratic politics on the 
grounds of conspiring to establish a Sharia based state, and consider the Diyanet as a 
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tool of the secular bureaucracy to control and circumscribe Islam.189 However, a 
deeper analysis of the Diyanet reveals a much more complex picture. In fact, far 
from being a tool of secular bureaucracy, the Diyanet today is the only constitutional 
authority that can afford to suggest the illegitimacy of democracy and democratic 
constitutionalism in Muslim majority societies like Turkey without being subjected 
to legal action. 
 Since its establishment in 1924 the legal jurisdiction of the Diyanet has been 
limited to answering questions related to faith and worship only and it could not 
answer questions related to marriage, divorce, commercial life, interest, insurance, 
and the like. However, after 1980 coup, in accordance with the new institutional 
position of Islam, the Diyanet started to issue fetwas regarding all questions, 
regardless of their subject, including those that are related to basic political rights 
and freedoms.190 By then the representatives of the Diyanet started to make public 
statements about the need to re-codify the entire legal system in accordance with the 
fundamental principles of Islam. In a 2004 national newspaper interview, Mehmet 
Nuri Yilmaz, the president of the Diyanet at the time, emphasizes the necessity of the 
legal system to conform to Islam in a Muslim majority country like Turkey: “It is 
necessary to inspect, in a scientific and detailed manner, the entire Turkish legal 
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system to discern which laws contradict the Islamic law and for what reasons...It will 
be understood that the amendment of all laws that contradict the things that we hold 
sacred does not harm neither the republican principles nor modernization process, 
nor fundamental rights and freedoms.”191  
 In the same interview, Yilmaz declares the incompatibility of Islam and 
democracy due to the latter’s emphasis on the people at the expense of religious 
scholars in the formation of political will and its tendency to tolerate what religion 
forbids. In 2006, the Diyanet under the Prime-Ministry of Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
publishes a two volume set (1200 pages total), called Ilmihal (Knowledge on 
Behavior), on Islamic morality and law, delineating the alternative modernization 
that it deems to be normatively superior to the existing. The set is written by three 
theology professors, one of whom is the president of the Diyanet at the time, Ali 
Bardakoglu. All the fetwas the Diyanet posts online today as a part of its educational 
activities are taken from this two-volume set, hence it is crucial to analyze its content 
in detail to understand Diyanet’s discourse on religion and society in early during the 
AKP rule. Moreover, the analysis of this modernization project is an especially 
pressing issue as the Diyanet strives to become the final intellectual authority in 
answering all questions about Islam not only in Turkey but in the entire world, and to 
make its alternative a blueprint for all Muslim-majority societies.192  
                                                
191 Cited in Omer Ulucay, Tartismali Kurum Diyanet (Adana: Gozde Yayinevi, 1998)., 159.  
192 www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/tanitim/rapor_ms2007.pdf   
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 Ilmihal is a complete moral guide as well as a political manifesto for Muslim 
majority societies describing the ways to achieve worldly and otherworldly salvation. 
In this quest the authors recommend the criminalization of what is considered to be 
sin from the perspective of Islam, including the public use of alcoholic beverages, 
the marriage of Muslim women with non-Muslim men, and adultery.193 The domain 
of social relationships is understood to be a realm of temptations that leads the 
individual towards sin. Punishment itself, the authors warn, is not the aim of Islamic 
law but the prevention of crimes/sins through the creation of an environment that 
would reduce the temptation of committing sin. The making of such an environment 
has far-reaching consequences for the conduct of life. In effect it amounts to nothing 
less than the total segregation of sexes. For instance, in fighting adultery, the authors 
recommend the implementation a strict code of moral conduct between sexes ranging 
from the covering of the entire female body except the face, hands, and feet, to the 
forbidding of men and women outside of the marriage bond from staying alone 
together in the same room without supervision.194 Moreover, adultery is considered 
                                                
193 Karaman, Bardakoglu, and Apaydin, Ilmihal 1: Iman Ve Ibadetler., 185, 188, 217. 
194 Ibid. 130. Other prohibitions include unnecessary talk between men and women in public; 
sexually enticing behavior including gaze and any kind of physical conduct; the traveling of 
women alone in the absence of appropriate male company, and the like. The Islamic 
requirement of covering oneself, Ilmihal explains, has the objective of protecting the 
individual’s spiritual life, natural disposition, honor, and public morality by keeping a 
balance in inter-gender and interpersonal relationships and by establishing a kind of sexual 
and family life that is worthy of human dignity. The different rules that apply to men and 
women in covering the body is justified by the natural differences in the creation of the two 
sexes. It is further argued that for women to rebel against such discriminatory practices is a 
blasphemy that favors an inferior kind of equality, that is, human equality, over our true 
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to be such a grave sin and offence to public morality that it is listed among the three 
cases where the state can suspend the right to life of a Muslim without impunity 
whenever such behavior threatens the preservation of public order and moral 
values.195 Once this code of conduct is disseminated in society through public 
education and schooling, punishment must be imposed by the state without 
forgiveness and mercy to protect the sanctity of family, the foundation of Islamic 
morality, according to Ilmihal.  
 What the Diyanet’s alternative modernization project borrows from Western 
modernity is the principle of popular sovereignty as the criterion of political 
legitimacy and the primacy given to science in the search for truth and in the 
production of homogenizing knowledge. These two principles are, in fact, 
interrelated and paradoxically serve the purpose of shifting the locus of sovereignty 
from the people to the ulema. Popular sovereignty is understood as the right of the 
numerical majority to impose its moral imprint onto society. According to Ilmihal, 
religion is not a matter of conscience and God entrusts Muslims with the 
responsibility to enforce the divine law and to transform the world in accordance 
                                                                                                                                     
equality in the eyes of Allah. Men and women, being of different species, have different 
duties to attain God’s grace, claims Ilmihal. Ibid. 71. 
195 Ibid. 179. According to Ilmihal, adultery is a grave sin that leads to the mixing of breeds, 
abolishment of family and society’s spiritual and moral values. Ilmihal distinguishes 
between adultery committed by married and single men and women based on the teachings 
of Mohammad. The commanded punishment for married people is stoning by death, for 
singles a year long exile. Ibid.129. 
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with divine ideals.196 However, God is not the only source of political legitimacy. 
The other source is a majoritarian interpretation of popular sovereignty. God is 
sovereign in the metaphysical and ontological sense but not in the political.197 The 
responsibility of decision-making belongs to the people and Sharia has purpose of 
limiting political authority, which is exercised in the name of the people and not 
Allah.198 Since the majority of Turkish citizens are Sunni Muslims, the argument 
goes, popular as well as divine sovereignty requires them to seek salvation 
collectively by organizing themselves according to the moral as well as legal dogmas 
of Sunni Islam. With one stroke Ilmihal calls for the disenfranchisement of all 
atheists, agnostics, non-Muslims, as well as non-Sunni Muslims like the Alevis: “It is 
wrong to consider religion simply as a matter between the individual and God. The 
commands and prohibitions of religion for the conduct of life are binding and have 
consequences not only in this world and but also in hereafter. Therefore, it is 
inevitable for those who share the same faith to organize themselves socially 
according to the dictates of their faith.”199 
 According to Ilmihal, legislative activity can only be carried out in conformity 
with the fundamental principles of the holy texts, the true interpretation of which can 
                                                
196 Hayreddin Karaman, Ali Bardakoglu, and H. Yunus Apaydin, Ilmihal 2: Islam Ve Toplum 
(Ankara: Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi Yayinlari, 2006)., 297 
197 Karaman, Bardakoglu, and Apaydin, Ilmihal 1: Iman Ve Ibadetler., 303.  
198 Ibid. 288, 291. 
199 Karaman, Bardakoglu, and Apaydin, Ilmihal 2: Islam Ve Toplum., 307. 
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only be made by scientists, that is, the theologians of the Diyanet.200 However, the 
authors claim that ijtihad does not amount to lawmaking but to the discovery of 
already existing laws and the codification of Islamic norms in a new way and that 
political authority cannot interfere with this reasoning process (ijtihad) of the ulema, 
that is, civil society.201 This is what Ilmihal means by the separation of religious and 
political authorities. According to this interpretation, the basic organs of the state—
legislative, executive, judiciary—serve the purpose of protecting public security and 
Islam, the interpretation of which is the prerogative of Islamic intellectuals. The 
authors find the question of the compatibility of Islam with democracy pointless, as 
what matters to them is what kind of state and society Islam commands, which is, in 
fact, an Islamic republic under the guidance of a politically irresponsible religious 
aristocracy.202  
The political function of the Diyanet is rendered neutral or power-free by 
putting religion into the domain of the secular, that of scientific knowledge. The 
Diyanet’s claim to have access to so-called authentic knowledge is what enables it to 
disqualify certain other sources of knowledge as inferior or non-knowledge. The 
Diyanet claims that no scientific discovery or development contradicts the essence of 
Koran.203 Science’s recognition of the miracle is not irrational because “the events 
                                                
200 Karaman, Bardakoglu, and Apaydin, Ilmihal 1: Iman Ve Ibadetler., 297. 
201 Ibid. 292-293. 
202 Ibid. 302. 
203 http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/basiliyayin/weboku.asp?sayfa=31&yid=33 
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occurring in the surroundings of human being all the time,” which constitute the 
domain of science, such as “the creation of the beings and their death when the time 
comes, and continuity of life” are miracles.204 In a complete reversal of the early 
republican claim that what is not scientific is outside of religion, the Diyanet claims 
that what is outside of religion is not scientific. This argument, by subordinating 
science to religion, simultaneously sacralizes science and puts strict limits on it. In 
other words, the subordination of science to religious knowledge not only a priori 
renders any kind of knowledge that contradicts the presuppositions of what is 
deemed to be true religion unscientific or non-knowledge; but it also turns science 
into a means for achieving salvation in this world and the next. What is further 
problematic is that the Diyanet claims monopoly on religious knowledge with 
reference to its legal mandate to “enlighten the public about their religion”.205 The 
necessity of new interpretations of the holy texts due to the developments in science 
and technology leads to new issues and problems in understanding religion, declares 
the Diyanet on its website. However, “the open discussion of these problems, which 
should be solved through scientific methods, not only hamper reaching sound soluti-
ons but also results in mental confusion and offends the religious sentiments of our 
nation.”206  
                                                
204 http://diyanet7.diyanet.gov.tr/english/sorular.asp?id=27 
205 Article 1 of Law 663 “About the Presidency of Religious Affairs, its Establishment and 
Obligations.”  
206 http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/english/Duyuru.asp?id=129  
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 “Thanks” to the militarized conception of martyrdom, until the 1980s state 
Islam recognized only the authority of the military to dispense otherworldly 
salvation—an advantage that helped the making of the military as the charismatic 
guardian of society and the constitution. Obedience, therefore, has been the divine 
right of the army and its political allies. The alternative state structure offered in 
Ilmihal aims to transfer these two functions—dispensing salvation and guarding the 
constitution—from the army to the ulema. The duty to warn political authorities 
belongs to scientists and Islamic scholars, claims Ilmihal.207 Furthermore, a martyr is 
not defined with reference to homeland, nation or the state as in the religion 
textbooks. On the contrary, Ilmihal defines a martyr as the person who dies while 
fighting for the sake of Allah alone. The removal of nation and the state from the 
definitions of martyrdom and just war further legitimizes the authority of the ulemas 
to guard the constitution and dispense salvation by virtue of their exclusive access to 
the divine will.  
 Even though the alternative modernity of the Diyanet is still based on the 
republican duality of God and the people as mutually reinforcing sources of 
legitimate violence; the new duality entails a shift from political theology to 
theological politics, from what I call nationalist secularism to Islamic secularism. As 
we have seen, in the pre-1980 period state Islam commanded unconditional 
obedience to the nation-state and promised salvation but never recognized the right 
                                                
207 Karaman, Bardakoglu, and Apaydin, Ilmihal 2: Islam Ve Toplum., 552 
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of a special class, not even the military, to suspend democracy indefinitely and 
dictate the law. From this it does not follow that democracy in any decade of the pre-
1980 period was fully consolidated. Nor should one ignore the military’s frequent 
seizure of constituent power since the 1960s and its heavy-hand in national politics. 
However, one must recognize the fact that neither the single-party dictatorship nor 
the military interventions denied the legitimacy of democratic politics in principle.208  
Ilmihal, on the other hand, commands obedience only if those who wield political 
power do not violate Allah’s commands and Mohammad’s teachings. Otherwise, 
Muslims have a right to resist and do what religious aristocracy—the true 
interpreters of Koran and Sunna—tells them to do.209 At the moment, the Diyanet 
functions only as an educative institution with no coercive power. While Ilmihal's 
radical proposals have not yet made their way to the public curriculum, some of 
these proposals have made the AKP’s agenda, like the refusal to grant or renew 
alcohol licenses to bars and restaurants, and the criminalization of adultery, 
(although the latter was a failed attempt). Religion has always been a tool of political 
groups and actors to reinforce their power position. However, state Islam until the 
1980s has never denied the legitimacy of democratic politics in the name of a higher 
                                                
208 See, Andrew Mango, "Ataturk: Founding Father, Realist, and Visionary," in Political 
Leaders and Democracy in Turkey, ed. Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı (New York: Lexington 
Books, 2002).. On the military see, “” George Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkey in 
the 1980s: Guardians or Decision-Makers?," in State, Democracy, and the Military: Turkey 
in the 1980s, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1988). 
209 Karaman, Bardakoglu, and Apaydin, Ilmihal 2: Islam Ve Toplum., 294-295 
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law.210 In that sense, Ilmihal is a unique piece of work that further complicates the 
politics of religion in Turkey.   

















                                                
210 The 1982 constitution, while authoritarian in its making and content, grants no legislative 
privilege to any individual or group other than the democratically elected representatives of 
the people (Article 6). Furthermore, none of the prerogatives of the military entrenched in 
the constitution are beyond revision.  
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CHAPTER III: WEBER AND SCHMITT: THE POLITICS OF SALVATION 
In the previous chapter, I have analyzed the meaning and practice of 
secularism in Turkey from an historical perspective. I have focused on the ways in 
which the political, religious and scientific spheres are differentiated from one 
another in standardized religion textbooks used in civil and public education as well 
as in the discourse of the Diyanet. In this chapter, I focus on the secularization theses 
defended by Max Weber and Carl Schmitt respectively in order to put into a 
theoretical perspective the problems the early nation builders in Turkey faced in 
legitimizing their political authority and fostering social solidarity with the shift from 
the Empire to the nation-state. The section on Weber focuses on the tensions 
between religion, politics, and science after the disintegration of the meaning giving 
unity of religious worldviews. While Weber affirms the legitimacy of the modern 
world in the growing autonomy of the value spheres like economy, science, and 
politics in general and of the individual in particular from the tutelage of religion in 
giving meaning to the world, he, also shows how the political domain emerges as a 
powerful substitute to religion in meaning-making. The political in a sense becomes 
the locus of a revived political theology giving meaning to life and death, creating a 
new form of community through collective war making against a common enemy. In 
this narrative, nationalism functions as a new mechanism of political legitimation 
and as one of social integration. The self-realization of the nation in its particularity 
via war making generates a brotherly, masculine community, threatening the 
autonomy of the individual as well as downplaying the “feminine” of the “sister.” 
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The section on Schmitt focuses on the primacy of the political as the friend-
enemy distinction over all other spheres, the moral, economic, religious and the like. 
Schmitt’s work is especially useful for the purposes of this dissertation for the 
structure of the new nation-state model adopted by the early nation builders is very 
similar to his theological model of popular sovereignty and of democratic legitimacy 
in terms of the friend-enemy distinction that downplay constitutionalism and 
individual rights. Two competing claims in the literature about the foundations of the 
friend-enemy distinction are analyzed and dismissed: (1) Heinrich Meier’s claim that 
the primacy of the political rests on Schmitt’s faith in revelation (i.e. original sin). (2) 
Chantal Mouffe’s claim that Schmitt is a thoroughly political thinker teaching us 
what is really at stake in democratic politics, that is, the we/they discrimination 
arguably showing the inherent tension between popular sovereignty and human 
rights. My intention in focusing on Meier and Mouffe has two purposes. First, Meier 
is too quick in discarding Schmitt’s political theory in its totality as a form of 
Catholicism, ignoring the ways in which how his concepts like popular sovereignty 
and political legitimacy in terms of friend-enemy distinction find expression in 
different contexts and continue to motivate political movements. In other words, I 
would like to draw attention to the fact that Schmitt’s normative framework could 
and does work without reference to the Catholic dogma of original sin. Second, 
Meier obscures the ways in which we can re-think popular sovereignty in general 
and the concept of the political in particular. This is why I turn to Chantal Mouffe 
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and analyze her reformulated version of Schmitt’s key theses. I argue that while 
Meier ignores the role the principle of popular sovereignty plays in Schmitt’s 
distinction between friend and enemy, Mouffe downplays the political theology 
underlying this principle. Schmitt understands the political as an existential sphere 
where a particular nation realizes itself against a common enemy. I argue that the so-
called tension between popular sovereignty and human rights makes sense only in 
this theological paradigm that confuses collective self-realization with self-
legislation under law.  
 
I. WEBER, PROTESTANTISM AND THE DISENCHENTMENT OF THE 
WORLD:  
In this section my aim is to discuss the ways in which the political becomes 
the locus of political theology after disintegration of the meaning-giving unity of 
religious and metaphysical worldviews. I argue that even if the theory of 
differentiation constitutes a theory of secularization that is still meaningful today,211 
Weber’s reading remains theological to a certain extent insofar as he approaches the 
meaning of the political from the perspective of the core question of salvation 
religions, that is, the theodicy of suffering and dying. I argue that there is no need to 
keep Weber’s theological baggage in order to defend the differentiation thesis as 
secularization. Once we remove the traces of the theodicy of death and suffering 
                                                
211 Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World. See also my discussion in Chapter I.  
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from the definition of the political sphere, the road is open to re-think the 
relationship between politics and ethics in a new (secular) manner. In what follows, 
I, first, discuss the role the Protestant ethic plays Weber’s narrative of the 
disenchantment of the world as well as in the alleged loss of meaning in the modern 
age. Second, I discuss the meaning Weber attributes to scientific rationality in 
making death a meaningless event. Third, I turn to the ways in which the political 
sphere re-enchants the world and provides an antidote to the meaninglessness of the 
world by playing the theological function of dispensing salvation.  
Weber traces the origins of Occidental rationalism to the religious 
rationalization of the image of the world and the systematization of life’s realities in 
order to come to grips with the unequal distribution of suffering that is perceived to 
be unjust. Salvation religions provide an explanation to the fact of suffering common 
to all believers and promise deliver salvation to their adherents. Weber categorizes 
religions of salvation into two polar ideal-types called asceticism and mysticism, 
both having an inner-worldly, and an other-worldly version.212 His sociology of 
religion is mainly interested in the ways in which these different paths to salvation 
affect practical behavior in the domain of social relationships through psychological 
sanctions.213 Once a religion seeks to achieve a systematic and practical 
                                                
212 Weber also discusses ritualism as a fifth path to salvation, which lies outside of the 
concerns of this chapter. Therefore, I will not be dealing with ritualist salvation here. For 
Weber’s discussion see: Weber, The Sociology of Religion., 151-152.  
213 Ibid., 149. In this chapter I discuss these two polar types not in their pure forms (ideal-
types) but in relation to Christianity, leaving aside other world-religions, as Weber’s writings 
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rationalization of life’s realities, however, it is challenged by the problem of 
theodicy, that is, “the absolute paradox of a perfect god’s creation of a permanently 
imperfect world.”214 This is where the distinction between inner-worldly asceticism 
and other-worldly mysticism comes to the fore leading to a sharp diversion in the 
ways through which salvation is sought. Even though both types devalues the world 
as a realm of temptations, inner-worldly asceticism aims to control everyday living, 
thus, commands participation in worldly institutions, while other-worldly mysticism 
demands a flight from the world and its institutions.215 
Weber finds the archetype of Christian mysticism in the ethical teachings of 
Jesus that he characterizes as an “absolute indifference to all the affairs of the 
mundane world.”216 This principled rejection of the world and its institutions stems 
from the way in which Jesus answers the problem of theodicy, that is, how the 
injustice and the imperfection of the world may be reconciled with an ethical and all-
powerful conception of god. The theodicy problem, in other words, aims to 
rationalize the brute fact that death catches good men as well as evil ones, hence, to 
provide believers with psychological motives to deal with the imperfections of the 
                                                                                                                                     
on politics and science is interested in the way Christianity, above all Puritan asceticism, has 
influenced Occidental rationalism. 
214 Ibid. 179. 
215 The contrast is tempered if the mystic “does not draw the conclusion that he should not 
flee the world, but like the inner-worldly asceticist, remain in the orders of the world (inner-
worldly mysticism).” Weber, "Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions.", 
326. 
216 Weber, The Sociology of Religion., 271. 
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world as well as with death that falls upon all earthly beings. Jesus solves this 
problem by pointing an immediate future in this world when the Kingdom of God 
would end all hate and anxiety and assure just and retributive equalization. Once the 
Second Coming is no longer perceived to be immediate, however, the emphasis 
shifts to the hope of salvation in the world beyond.217 The more life on earth is 
regarded to be a provisional form of existence the more the attention of the believer 
is oriented to otherworldly goals and values.   
What is decisive in this case is Jesus’ affirmation of God as a benevolent 
father who surrounds his children with superhuman love and of the meaning of the 
world as unity beyond all empirical knowledge. The conflict of the religious 
conception of the world as an ethically meaningful cosmos created by a god of love 
with the world’s imperfect realities leads the believer to devalue the world and 
makes him indifferent to its concerns. Consequently, all worldly goods, all worldly 
possessions are considered to be obstacles that the believer must free himself in his 
quest for salvation. 218  
The problem with Christian dualism for Weber is that it aims to secure god’s 
omnipotence and omniscience without sacrificing divine love. This is, Weber 
suggests, is inconsistent, for consistency requires the renunciation of either 
                                                
217 Ibid. 149. 
218 What is meant by “Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesars” (Matthew 22:21), 
according to Weber, is not “a positive recognition of the obligation to pay taxes, but rather 
the reverse: an absolute indifference to the affairs of the mundane world.” Hence, the 
believer minimizes all worldly activities. Ibid. 231. 
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sovereignty or divine love and benevolence due to the brute fact that good men 
suffer as well as evil ones. According to Weber, even though eschatological hope has 
played an essential role in the conceptualization of notions like heaven, hell, and the 
judgment day, which achieved universal importance for world religions, it did not or 
could not provide a rationally satisfactory answer to the problem of theodicy. In fact, 
Weber does not list eschatological hope among the pure types of theodicy. The main 
reason why Christian dualism remains unsatisfactory, Weber suggests, is “the 
difficulty of reconciling the punishment of human errors with the conception of an 
ethical and at the same time all-powerful creator of the world, who is ultimately 
responsible for these human actions himself.”219  
Among the three pure types of theodicy— Zoroastrian dualism, Indian 
doctrine of karma, and the predestination decree of deus abscondidus—only 
predestination which denies divine benevolence provides a systematically 
conceptualized treatment of the world’s imperfections without abandoning the 
conception of an absolutely sovereign god.220 Predestination has a unique place in 
Weber’s writings. Not only does Weber attribute Calvin’s conception of 
predestination a key role in the rise of modern capitalism and Occidental rationalism 
                                                
219 Ibid. 142. Emphasis mine.  
220 Ibid. 144-146. Zoroastrian dualism puts the god of goodness into a relationship with the 
autonomous powers of darkness hence renounces the absolute sovereignty of god. To the 
doctrine of karma, on the other hand, a sovereign god’s interference with the universal 
mechanism of retribution is utterly unthinkable. In fact, both Zoroastrian dualism and karma 
only deal with the problem of the world’s imperfections. 
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due to the ascetic work ethic that it has led to but also he often describes it for being 
magnificently or uniquely consistent.221 The consistency of predestination lies in its 
appeal to an absolutely transcendent god that is put beyond all the ethical claims of 
his creatures. The deus absconditus of the Old Testament, the “arbitrary despot,” 
dethrones the heavenly father of the New Testament who foresees and provides for 
his children. “An unimaginably great ethical chasm” is conceived between “the 
transcendental god and the human being”.222 Not only is it impossible for humans to 
understand the meaning of the world but also it is a sin to question his imperfect 
creation. Calvinist asceticism, in other words, completely renounces moral reasoning 
outside of divine revelation, which is fragmentary in its content, and puts strict limits 
on rational thought: “To apply earthly standards of justice to His sovereign decrees is 
meaningless and an insult to His Majesty, since He and He alone is free, i.e. is 
subject to no law. His decrees can only be understood by or even known to us in so 
far as it has been His pleasure to reveal them. We can only hold to these fragments of 
eternal truth. Everything else, including the meaning of our individual destiny, is 
hidden in dark mystery which it would be both impossible to pierce and 
presumptuous to question.”223 
                                                
221 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons 
(Mineola: Dover Publications, INC., 2003)., 104, 128, 137. 
222 Weber, The Sociology of Religion., 142. 
223 Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism., 103-104.    
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In the midst of this dark mystery Calvinism manages to find a meaning for 
creation. Men are created to glorify the majesty of god and to that extent only a small 
portion of them is destined to eternal life and grace, the rest is damned. Since god 
has determined everything before the creation, god’s grace is “as impossible for 
those to whom He has granted it to lose as it is unattainable for those to whom He 
has denied it.”224 The absolutely transcendental god’s decree from eternity has one 
immense implication for the ascetic: the world he lives in is disenchanted. For there 
is not only “no magical means of attaining the grace of God for those to whom God 
had decided to deny it, but no means whatsoever.”225 Not only is magic eliminated 
but also all intermediaries between god and man including priests, the Church and 
even Jesus Christ. The ascetic man is left all alone. Only his conscience can help him 
“for the chosen one can understand the word of God only in his own heart.”226  
The logical outcome of the doctrine of predestination is, of course, fatalism. 
However, the idea of justification solves this problem. The idea suggests that even if 
the believer cannot bring about his own salvation by any means, he can attain the 
certainty of his salvation by acting in a manner pleasing to god. Since all 
intermediaries between god and man are removed and magic is deemed to be a sin, 
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the only remaining means to achieve certitudo salutis is the world and its concrete 
orders: 
From the point of view of the basic values of asceticism, the world as a whole 
continues to constitute a massa perditionis…The world abides in the lowly 
state appropriate to its status as a created thing. Therefore, any sensuous 
surrender to the world’s goods may imperil concentration upon and 
possession of the ultimate good of salvation, and may be symptom of 
unholiness of spirit and impossibility of rebirth. Nevertheless, the world as a 
creation of god, whose power comes to expression in it despite its 
creatureliness, provides the only medium through which one’s unique 
religious charisma may prove itself by means of rational ethical conduct, so 
that one may become and remain certain of one’s own state of grace.227 
 
In contrast to the mystic who flees the world to become a vessel of the holy spirit, for 
the ascetic the orders of the world becomes a vocation that he, as an instrument of 
god, must fulfill rationally. Since the world remains a vessel of sin, the ascetic gains 
assurance of his salvation by overcoming the temptations of the state of nature, by 
bringing his actions “under constant self-control with a careful consideration of their 
ethical consequences”.228 He is not like the mystic who acts in a manner pleasing to 
god and leaves the outcome to god, for he can only be sure of having god’s grace as 
long as he can bring his total pattern of life under methodical control. The ascetic, in 
other words, must become a personality by acting upon his constant motives and 
repressing his emotions.229 His responsibility is to participate rationally in the 
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various rational orders of the world for “the certainty of salvation always 
demonstrates itself in rational action, integrated as to meaning, end, and means, and 
governed by principles and rules.”230 His purpose, in other words, is to master the 
world or better to transform the world in accordance with god’s will, which he can 
only achieve by devoting himself to his ‘calling.’ To that extent he should abide by 
the worldly laws of his calling be it in economy, politics, or science but without 
deifying the creaturely values of these spheres.231 If he is a politician he must 
suppress and punish sin but not enjoy secular power. If he is a business entrepreneur 
he must accumulate wealth but not enjoy the fruits of his labor. The various spheres 
of life are not ends but only means to help the ascetic to discipline and organize the 
whole pattern of his life. If he becomes successful in his calling such success is 
considered to be “a special sign of divine blessing upon the ascetic and his 
activity”.232  
However, once the world is disenchanted, that is, all the intermediaries 
between men and God are removed, a reversal occurs and the spirit leaves the world. 
Weber formulates rationalization as a paradox. The more religious orientations are 
sublimated, the more tensions arise between the rational claim and reality. “For the 
rationalization and the conscious sublimation of man’s relations to the various 
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spheres of values, external and internal, as well as religious and secular,” claims 
Weber, “have then pressed towards making conscious the internal and lawful 
autonomy of the individual spheres; thereby letting them drift into those tensions 
which remain hidden to the originally naïve relation to the world.”233 Accumulation 
of wealth is no longer a means to psychologically secure salvation, politics no longer 
a means to impose god’s will, and science no longer the path to the true God. The 
various value spheres begin to form their own logic and demand autonomy from the 
religious worldview in which they were originally embedded. Furthermore, not only 
do various spheres of life claim their own lawful autonomy but also each of them 
claim to be the ultimate ground for all others. The various values spheres, claims 
Weber, is in an irreconcilable conflict with each other. They all offer competing 
images of the world: “Today the routines of everyday life challenge religion. Many 
old gods ascend from their graves; they are disenchanted and hence take the form of 
impersonal forces. They strive to gain power over our lives and again they resume 
their eternal struggle with one another. What is hard for modern man, and especially 
for the younger generation, is to measure up to workaday existence. The ubiquitous 
chase for 'experience' stems from this weakness; for it is weakness not to be able to 
countenance the stern seriousness of our fateful times.”234  
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Weber’s modern hero who can meet the demands of the day is essentially a 
tragic being. He (for Weber only talks about men) first creates an image of the world. 
In fact, he does not create that image, but simply borrows from the available ones, all 
of which are equally dogmatic. He is in a quite tragic situation for he is in the midst 
of a war over which he has no power. Therefore, he, in an act of faith, must side with 
one of the warring gods, which are religion, politics, economy, science, sex, and art,. 
This means that he chooses his vocation, his destiny. He “shall set to work and meet 
the ‘demands of the day,’ in human relations as well as in our vocation. This, 
however, is plain and simple, if each finds and obeys the demon who holds the fibers 




                                                
235 Ibid.156. According to Weber the university should mold this heroic personality. “What 
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I. DISENCHANTMENT AND THE AUTONOMY OF SCIENCE: 
Weber provides his most systematic treatment of the tensions between 
salvation religion and the various value spheres in an essay called “Religious 
Rejections of the World and Their Directions.”236 In this essay, which is considered 
to be one of the most important works of Weber, he focuses on the differentiation of 
value spheres—the economic, the political, the esthetic, the erotic, and the 
intellectual—from religion. It is important to note at the beginning that Weber is not 
talking about any religion but a particular conception of salvation religion that 
preaches world-denying love and universal brotherliness epitomized by the moral 
teachings of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount like ‘love the enemy,’ ‘resist no evil’ 
and ‘turn the other cheek.’  
Weber’s classification of the value spheres has led to a continuous debate in 
the literature.237 For the purposes of this thesis we can distinguish the religious, the 
political, the esthetic and the erotic from the intellectual and economic spheres. The 
former generates different forms of salvation, the latter not only lacks such a 
capacity but also devalues conduct aimed at salvation, thereby bringing forth the 
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meaninglessness of the modern world in its most acute form. Religion provides 
otherworldly salvation from the ethical irrationality of the world, politics from the 
meaninglessness of life by making death a consecrated event. The esthetic and erotic 
spheres, on the other hand, provide inner-worldly salvation from “the routines of 
everyday life, and especially from the increasing pressures of theoretical and 
practical rationalism,” yet failing to make death meaningful.238 
The world is modern to the extent that there are more than one worldview 
competing for hegemony but they are limited to six. Not only that but also all of 
them provide an exclusive view of the world at the expense of other. To the extent 
that the modern individual is born into a war, he does not have a choice but to make 
a decisive choice. Not only that but also he must make this decision within his 
conscience. It seems that the individual is not in a position to impose a meaning on 
the world, but simply chooses which God to obey. Weber implies that even if both 
the ethic of brotherliness and the Protestant ethic are lost in the long run, the 
metaphysical need for salvation from the ethical irrationality of the world remained 
intact. Even if the value spheres becoming autonomous suggest that they are free to 
follow their own logics independent of a religious worldview, Weber’s narrative 
show that the modern world, nonetheless, remains peculiarly theological. As Turner 
suggests: “Weber is not arguing that “modernity signifies the inability of a 
universalist, Christian ethics to ‘hold the world together’, and that the result is a 
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modern pluralist culture in which different cultural practices follow their own 
immanent logics…But the idea is that there is a conflict between spheres of validity 
implies…that the ‘grand narrative’ of brotherly love gives way not to series of local 
narratives, but to a plurality of alternative grand narratives which attempt to provide 
answers to the same absolutist questions raised by theology.”239  
The theodicy of suffering and dying is a recurrent theme in Weber’s analysis 
of modernization. Weber’s quasi-theological reading of Occidental rationalization 
becomes more explicit in his reading of the rise of scientific rationality. Even though 
the scientific worldview by turning the world into a causal mechanism renders the 
ethical postulate “that the world is a God-ordained, and somehow meaningfully and 
ethically oriented cosmos,”240 meaningless, hence, constituting a new round of 
sublimation in Occidental rationalism; it continues to pose the problem of the 
meaning of the world, which, in turn feeds the alleged need for a new conception of 
salvation.  
The increasing rationality, in other words, does not destroy the alleged need 
for a theodicy of suffering and dying, but it continues to play an essential role in 
man’s relation to the world and to himself. Weber associates the problem of the 
meaninglessness of the modern society to the increasing impossibility of answering 
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the problem of theodicy in a consistent manner. “At all times and in all places,” 
claims Weber, “the need for salvation—consciously cultivated as the substance of 
religiosity—has resulted from the endeavor of a systematic and practical 
rationalization of life’s realities.”241 Weber seems to presume that humans, at all 
times and in all places, yearn for salvation given the “brute fact that suffering 
exists.”242 This metaphysical assumption that Weber carries to modernity from the 
pre-modern age has important consequences in his diagnosis of the growing 
differentiation of the value spheres, especially science and politics.  
In Science as a Vocation, Weber questions the meaning of science after the 
collapse of the religious-metaphysical unity of Christianity: “What stand should one 
take? Has 'progress' as such a recognizable meaning that goes beyond the technical, 
so that to serve it is a meaningful vocation? The question must be raised. But this is 
no longer merely the question of man's calling for science, hence, the problem of 
what science as a vocation means to its devoted disciples. To raise this question is to 
ask for the vocation of science within the total life of humanity. What is the value of 
science?”243  
The quotation marks around progress are, of course, not accidental. Weber is 
extremely critical of the emphasis of the nineteenth century evolutionism on progress 
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and evolution “when they play an implicitly normative role in empirical sciences.”244 
Habermas traces evolutionism to the eighteenth century philosophy of history of 
Condorcet who privileges sciences in answering normative questions. “All errors in 
politics and morals,” claims Condorcet, “are based on philosophical errors and these 
in turn are connected with scientific errors. There is not a religious system nor a 
supernatural extravagance that is not founded on ignorance of the laws of nature.”245 
As Schluchter suggests, for Weber “Science which interprets itself monistically is 
not the antithesis of religion—it is itself a religion. It not only proceeds from the 
conviction that scientific rationality in the disenchanted world is the only possible 
form of rational world interpretation, but also presupposes that it can decipher the 
objective meaning of the world.”246  
Science, argues Weber, is chained to the course of progress that runs ad 
infinitum. This is to say that what is accomplished in science will be outdated. “This 
is the fate to which science is subjected; it is the very meaning of scientific work,” 
claims Weber.247 To Weber the very infinity of scientific progress compared to the 
finitude of human life incapacitates science in answering the meaning of the world. 
                                                
244 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and Rationalization of Society., 
154. 
245 Cited in Ibid. 147. 
246 Wolfgang Schluchter, "The Paradox of Rationalization: On the Relations of Ethics and 
World," in Max Weber's Vision of History, ed. Guenther Roth; Wolfgang Schluchter 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979)., 50-51. 
247 Weber, "Science as a Vocation.", 138. Weber’s emphasis.  
   
 
125 
Habermas argues that Weber takes up “the rationality theme in a scientific context 
that had already discharged the mortgages from philosophy of history and the 
nineteenth-century evolutionism encumbered by it.”248 However, the manner in 
which Weber deals with the question of the meaning of science seems to be 
encumbered by the core questions of salvation religions, that is the meaning of the 
world, and, hence, of life and death. Weber approaches the question of the meaning 
of science from the perspective of the theodicy of death by comparing the infinity of 
scientific progress (that he takes to be a fact but fails to substantiate) to the finitude 
of human life. Death is the limiting fact that governs not just meaning but 
meaningful action.  
Abraham, or some peasant of the past, died 'old and satiated with life' 
because he stood in the organic cycle of life; because his life, in terms of its 
meaning and on the eve of his days, had given to him what life had to offer; 
because for him there remained no puzzles he might wish to solve; and 
therefore he could have had 'enough' of life. Whereas civilized man, placed in 
the midst of the continuous enrichment of culture by ideas, knowledge, and 
problems, may become 'tired of life' but not 'satiated with life.' He catches 
only the most minute part of what the life of the spirit brings forth ever anew, 
and what he seizes is always something provisional and not definitive, and 
therefore death for him is a meaningless occurrence. And because death is 
meaningless, civilized life as such is meaningless; by its very 
'progressiveness' it gives death the imprint of meaninglessness.249 
 
As Bellah suggests, “One point worth noting is that the intellectual sphere, like the 
economic sphere, but unlike the political, aesthetic and erotic spheres, offers no 
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alternative form of secular salvation.”250 And just like all other spheres, except for 
the political, science by itself cannot solve the problem of the theodicy of death, that 
death catches good and bad ones. This is to suggest that science cannot solve the 
problem of meaning after the Christian unity had collapsed. He rules out science as a 
way to true art, true being, true nature, to true happiness, or to true ‘God.’ He means 
that science cannot teach anything about the ultimate meaning of the world. In fact, 
“if these natural sciences lead to anything in this way, they are apt to make the belief 
that there is such a thing as the ‘meaning’ of the universe die out at its very roots.”251 
This is, of course, not the last word of Weber on the question of meaning-making in 
the modern world. He presumes that meaning can be found as long as the individual 
passionately devotes himself to his ‘calling’ without critical reflection. Just like the 
soldier who faces death in the battlefield in the name of something higher than 
himself, the man of vocation, whether in science or politics, who perishes in his 
calling experiences a consecrated meaning of death.252 This is to say that human life 
is meaningful as long as it is oriented towards sublime values that are worth dying 
for.  
What is not clear is why meaningful activity in the world is essentially tied to 
or limited by the theodicy of suffering and dying. In sociological writings on 
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religion, he shows that this is the way in which salvation religions measures the 
meaning or value of an action in the world. In his quest for meaning in the modern 
world, Weber approaches the question with terms and questions that belong to the 
pre-modern age. He presupposes that the need for salvation is a timeless as well as 
an inherently human need.253 Yet, he never considers whether the very question of 
the ultimate meaning of the world or the need for salvation is contingent arising in a 
specific time and place.254 With respect to the political sphere, the alleged need to be 
saved from the ethical irrationality of the world has peculiar (Schmittian, if you will) 
consequences.  
 
III. DISENCHANTMENT AND THE AUTONOMY OF POLITICS: 
The brotherly ethic of salvation religions comes into a sharp tension with the 
political sphere with respect to two issues: the elimination of brotherly love from the 
affairs of the state and the deployment of violence in the face of internal and external 
enemies. The Protestant ethic with its particularism of grace breaks down the 
universal brotherhood of Christianity and leads to the differentiation of politics and 
ethics, just like in the economic sphere. However, Weber attributes this revolutionary 
role not to Calvinism or Puritanism as in the economic sphere (for they perceive 
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violence as a necessary means to impose God’s will on the wicked), but to 
Lutheranism that accepts the autonomy of the secular authority in state matters.255  
When the political sphere is set free from its bondage to religion, the state 
derives its meaning from within. In other words, it becomes the source of its own 
legitimation. The pragmatism of violence, rather than ethics, comes to define the 
inner logic of the political sphere. “The state’s absolute end,” claims Weber, “is to 
safeguard (or to change) the external and internal distribution of power; ultimately, 
this end must seem meaningless to any universalist religion of salvation.”256 This is 
why, claims Weber, the modern state is less accessible to substantive moralization 
than the patriarchal orders of the past. Weber’s famous definition of the state as a 
“human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force within a given territory” also makes sense in this context.257  
Weber ties the legitimacy of the constitutional state to the belief in legality, 
i.e. formally correct procedures in the creation and application of law. However, as 
Habermas rightly suggests: “It remains unclear how the belief in legality is supposed 
to summon up the force of legitimation if legality means only conformity with an 
actually existing legal order, and if this order, as arbitrarily enacted law, is not in turn 
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open to practical-moral justification. The belief in legality can produce legitimacy 
only if we already presuppose the legitimacy of the legal order that lays down what 
is legal. There is no way out of this circle.”258 The criterion of success does not 
provide a way out of this circle either. Within the sphere of politics such a criterion is 
bound to legitimize the right of the strongest. Within the course of the differentiation 
of the political sphere from other value spheres, the more the state follows its laws, 
that is, the more the use of violence is held to be intrinsic to politics, the right of the 
strongest runs the risk of becoming a value in its own right. Might, in other words, 
makes right. In fact, Weber attributes the duty and the obligation to determine the 
global distribution of power as well as the future course of the world to great military 
states without compunction. Only they have the right to thrust their hands “into the 
spokes of the wheel of history.”259 Nations that are ‘small’ “in numbers and in terms 
of power,” on the other hand, have the duty to obey. 
Furthermore, in “Religious Rejections” Weber ties the definition of the state 
as monopoly on physical violence to a highly questionable conception of enemy (that 
Schmitt will take to its logical conclusion) who must be faced only with naked 
violence. “It is absolutely essential for every political association to appeal to the 
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naked violence of coercive means in the face of outsiders as well as in the face of 
internal enemies,” claims Weber.260 It is worth mentioning that this conception of the 
political that implicitly calls for friend-enemy distinction is different than the 
conception of the political found in “Politics as a Vocation.” There Weber defines 
the political primarily as the role power plays in decision-making.261 The concept of 
the enemy who must be killed is nowhere to be found. Pace Schmitt, however, 
Weber does not formulate the conception of the enemy as the one who is 
existentially different, the alien.  The enemy, in other words, is not the one who 
threatens the psychological borders of the state, that is, the so-called substantive 
equality. Rather the enemy is the one who threatens the physical borders of the state.  
“Religious Rejections of the World” reflects Weber’s growing concern about 
what he considers to be the fatal consequences of the anti-political position that 
preaches world-denying love for the enemy for the national interests of Germany.262 
Weber is suspicious about the use or abuse of universal ethical values in legitimizing 
the use of violence for he considers that political values are always particularistic. 
Yet, he does not completely divorce politics and ethics either, rather he prioritizes 
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particular political values over universal ethical values. As Schluchter suggests, 
Weber’s neo-Kantian value theory is not simply based on the heterogeneity of “is” 
and “ought,” but also calls for the enlargement of the “ought” to include non-
universal values. 263  It is in this framework that Weber develops what might be 
called the heroic ethics of politics that is born in the extraordinary moment.  
Once the political sphere is completely rationalized, claims Weber, the 
tension between salvation religion and politics becomes even more principled. The 
political sphere generates not only a new moral community defying the primacy of 
the religious bond but also a competing conception of salvation. Pace other cultural 
spheres like economy and science that are based on unbrotherliness and purposive-
rational action, the political sphere has the power to generate a moral community in 
the extraordinary moment based on love and sacrifice. Hence the return of the sacred 
in the form nationalism and the primacy of the political in making the modern 
disenchanted world meaningful: “[W]ar creates a pathos and a sentiment of 
community. War thereby makes for an unconditionally devoted and sacrificial 
among the combatants and releases an active mass compassion and love for those 
who are in need. And, as a mass phenomenon, these feelings break down all the 
naturally given the barriers of association.”264 
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World War I plays a crucial role within Weber’s narrative of the processes of 
Occidental rationalism and the emergence of the political as the primal sphere where 
the theodicy of suffering and dying finds a new meaning. It is noteworthy that in the 
first version of “Religious Rejections” that is written before the War, Weber 
associates the rationalization of the political sphere in the direction of the national 
state with an apolitical emotionalism that takes the shape of either an acosmistic 
ethic of absolute goodness or the non-religious emotionalism of eroticism.265 “An 
increased tendency toward flight into the irrationalities of apolitical emotionalism,” 
claims Weber, “is one of the actual consequences of the rationalization of 
coercion…whenever the exercise of power has developed in the direction of a 
national ‘state’.”266 This section is not found in the last version that is, according to 
Schluchter’s research, written in 1920.267 There we find the emergence of a new 
moral as well as political consciousness out of the experience of mass killing and 
mass sacrifice. “The community of the army standing the field today feels itself—as 
in the times of the war lords ‘following’—to be a community unto death, and the 
greatest of its kind,” argues Weber.268  
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The moral consciousness that emerges from war-making is a unique 
challenge to religious ethics insofar as it takes pride in this world in a Machiavellian 
manner. It does not devalue the world as in mysticism or asceticism. Nonetheless, it 
solves the theodicy of suffering and death in a peculiar manner. The kind of moral 
consciousness that emerges in the battlefield derives its value from the meaning 
attached to death: 
War does to the warrior which, in its concrete meaning, is unique: it makes 
him experience a consecrated meaning of death which is characteristic only 
of death in war…Death on the field of battle differs from death that is only 
man’s common lot. Since death is a fate that comes to everyone, nobody can 
say why it comes precisely to him and why it comes just when it does. As the 
values of culture increasingly unfold and are sublimated to immeasurable 
heights, such ordinary death marks an end where only a beginning seems to 
make sense. Death on the field of battle differs from this merely unavoidable 
dying in that in war, and in this massiveness only in war, the individual can 
believe that he knows he is dying ‘for’ something…Only those who perish ‘in 
their callings’ are in the same situation as the soldier who faces death on the 
battlefield.269  
 
As Bellah suggests, “What is implicit here and becomes explicit in the treatment of 
the aesthetic and erotic spheres is that not only does death in battle compete with 
brotherly religion in solving the meaning of death, it is one of the few points in our 
modern disenchanted world where any meaning at all can be found.”270 Weber’s 
appraisal of collective meaning-making through war-making and mass sacrifice 
stands in a sharp contrast to the pessimistic account of solitary individualism and 
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unbrotherliness that he associates with Occidental rationalism. One could argue that 
the brotherliness of the World War I and the rise of nationalism as a new salvation 
religion constitute the last round of sublimations in Weber’s narrative of 
modernization that will inform Schmitt’s conception of the political as friend-enemy 
distinction. It is striking that the two leading commentators on Weber’s theory of 
modernization, Habermas and Schluchter, do not mention this last round of 
sublimation.271 Paradoxically the disenchanted world ends up re-enchanting the 
world, threatening one of the core values of modernity, that is, individual autonomy. 
The unique solution of the heroic ethics of politics to the theodicy of death is what 
leads to the emergence of the political as the primal sphere, completely autonomous 
from all universal values. “This location of death within a series of meaningful and 
consecrated events ultimately lies at the base of all endeavors to support the 
autonomous dignity of the polity resting on force,” claims Weber.272  
World War I leads to the emergence of the nation and of a new 
consciousness. Pace world religions that devalue the world, nationalism orients the 
individual to the ‘sublime’ values of this world. “The very extraordinary quality of 
brotherliness of war, and of death in war, is shared with sacred charisma and the 
experience of the communion with God, and this fact raises the competition between 
the brotherliness of religion and of the warrior community to its extreme height.” 
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This last phase in Weber’s narrative of modernization is at once consistent and 
inconsistent with his theory of modernization. It is inconsistent in two senses. First, it 
prioritizes the extraordinary at the expense of legality, suggesting a full-blown 
charismatic rationality. It is true that Weber’s previous writings always emphasize 
the role charisma can play as an antidote to the bureaucratic petrification with which 
he associates the modern society. Yet, his conception of modern charismatic 
leadership is not dictatorship.273 Second, the community unto death is hardly a 
community that values individual autonomy. Nor is it one that leaves room for the 
‘feminine’ or the ‘sister.’ The so-called love and compassion that this brotherly, 
masculine community generates could only lead to the glorification of cultural 
distinctiveness, from which the demand for homogeneity and conformity would 
naturally ensue.  
Nonetheless, the sublimation of the political sphere to the primal sphere is 
also equally consistent with Weber’s narrative of Occidental rationalism insofar as it 
addresses an allegedly timeless human need, that is, the need for salvation. A 
conception of the political as the primal sphere whose moral function is to make 
death a meaningful event seems extremely pre-modern. It can hardly be deemed 
secular. In fact, this conception of the state is deeply theological insofar as it re-
occupies the position of the Church in dispensing salvation. “Weber still owes us a 
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demonstration that a moral consciousness guided by principles can survive only in a 
religious context. He would have to explain why embedding a principled ethic in a 
salvation religion is indispensable for the preservation of moral consciousness,” 
claims Habermas.274 The explanation can be found in Weber’s metaphysical 
understanding of the human condition. Weber continues to hold onto absolutist 
questions, while he could have dropped them entirely from his theoretical approach 
and simply show that such questions are still motivating people and political 
movements. Yet, there is no conceptual necessity to keep Weber’s theological 
questions as well as his nationalist fervor in the background in order to argue for a 
pluralist world the seeds of which lie in the differentiation thesis.275  
IV. CARL SCHMITT AND THE PRIMACY OF THE POLITICAL 
Carl Schmitt is probably the most controversial figure in political theory 
today. I cannot possibly address all interpretations of Schmitt, friendly or critical.276 
That would require another dissertation, or two. For the purposes of my research, I 
limit my discussion to two contradictory interpretations regarding the nature of the 
political in Schmitt’s thinking: Heinrich Meier and Chantal Mouffe. Whereas in 
                                                
274 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and Rationalization of Society., 
229. 
275 Habermas’ theory of communicative action is based on a reconstruction of Weber’s 
understanding of Occidental rationality on a universal level. See, Ibid.  
276 For survey articles on the literature on Schmitt, see Peter Caldwell, "Controversies over 
Carl Schmitt: A Review of Recent Literature," The Journal of Modern History 77, no. 2 
(2005). William E. Scheuerman, "Survey Article: Emergency Powers and the Rule of Law 
after 9/11*," Journal of Political Philosophy 14, no. 1 (2006). John P. McCormick, "Political 
Theory and Political Theology: The Second Wave of Carl Schmitt in English," Political 
Theory 26, no. 6 (1998). 
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Meier’s opinion, Schmitt’s affirmation of the primacy of the political hinges on the 
recognition of God’s sovereignty on Schmitt’s part; for Mouffe it hinges on the 
recognition of popular sovereignty. Both of these readings are one-sided. While 
Meier ignores the central role democracy as popular sovereignty plays in Schmitt’s 
thinking, Mouffe downplays the theological elements (like will, omnipotence, 
infallibility, creation ex nihilio) that nonetheless continue to inform its logic.  
According to Heinrich Meier, Schmitt is essentially a Catholic theologian.277 
In his view, it is a grave error to consider Schmitt as a defender of the autonomy or 
the primacy of the political.278 Rather, the center of Schmitt’s understanding of the 
political as the friend enemy distinction hinges on his faith in revelation. The 
doctrine of original sin is the key to understand why Schmitt privileges enmity over 
friendship, Meier claims. It is the sinfulness of the world and of men is what makes 
the political the destiny.  
                                                
277 I am not the first to criticize Meier’s reading of Schmitt. I agree with other critics that 
focusing too much on Schmitt’s Catholic background, risks missing the radical breaks that 
take place in his thinking, and his political intentions like how to preserve the unity of the 
state unaided by the sanction of the Church. My contribution to this literature consists in the 
discussion of the moral foundations of Schmitt’s thought during his Catholic phase, which is 
usually ignored in the literature. McCormick’s reading of Schmitt is an exception in this 
regard. However, my reading differs from his in that I do not find an argument regarding the 
centrality of the friend-enemy distinction for politics in Roman Catholicism and Political 
Form. McCormick, "Political Theory and Political Theology: The Second Wave of Carl 
Schmitt in English." For other critiques of Meier’s reading of Schmitt see: William E. 
Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End of Law (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
1999)., 228-249. Andrew Norris, "Carl Schmitt's Political Metaphysics: On the 
Secularization of 'the Outermost Sphere'," Theory and Event 4, no. 1 (2000).  
278 Heinrich Meier, The Lesson of Carl Schmitt: Four Chapters on the Distinction between 
Political Theology and Political Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1998)., 75. 
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The doctrine of original sin names the guarantor who insures the 
unavoidability of a radical Either-Or until the end of time: I will put enmity 
between thy seed and her seed. The belief in the truth of Genesis 3:15 is the 
foundation on which Schmitt’s political theology is erected. The doctrine of 
original sin is concerned with the opposition between good and evil, God and 
Satan, obedience and disobedience. At the same time, it confronts man 
himself with an ultimate Either-Or. The decision, the absolute credo or non-
credo that it requires, thereby becomes the paradigm of the “demanding 
moral decision” as such.  
 
Meier deduces the claim that enmity has its deepest foundation in original sin 
through an arduous comparison of the three different versions of The Concept of the 
Political that, according to him, takes place behind a hidden-dialogue between 
Schmitt and Leo Strauss, the steps of which I cannot trace here. My reading 
contradicts Meier’s. I suggest that the figure of the enemy has not always been part 
and parcel of Schmitt’s vocabulary. In his writings on Catholicism, Schmitt refers to 
an elemental form of friendship (that nonetheless remains hierarchical) and an 
openness to alterity at the origin of all human relations. It is once Schmitt accepts the 
disenchantment thesis and turns his back to the Church for legitimacy and solidarity, 
the political becomes a sphere of enmity and combat between the self and the other. 
It is once Schmitt takes up the question of popular sovereignty, the friend enemy 
distinction, in other words, makes its appearance. The political is affirmed as an 
antidote to the said loss of meaning. In this movement, we see the state replacing the 
church in dispensing meaning and salvation.  
Chantal Mouffe, on the other hand, celebrates Schmitt for understanding the 
real nature of democratic politics, that is, in her view, the we/they discrimination. 
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She does not find concepts like the enemy, enmity, conflict, fighting as remnants of a 
political theology that we need to displace. On the contrary, she finds what she calls 
“the politics of consensus” à la Habermas as a dangerous instrument of 
depoliticization that risks jeopardizing the future of democracy. Democratic 
identities, in her view, cannot be formed without drawing a strong opposition 
between “us” and “them.” This said democratic necessity generates a tension with 
the liberal emphasis on human rights. If the problem with Meier is his dismissal of 
popular sovereignty, the problem with Mouffe is her uncritical acceptance. Mouffe 
conveniently ignores the theological logic of sovereignty affirmed by Schmitt.  
Like Schmitt, Mouffe interprets the meaning of popular sovereignty as the 
collective self-affirmation or self-realization of a homogeneous group of people. We 
are led to assume that the joint exercise of popular sovereignty is about collective 
self-identification of the people with an idealized version of itself. This is why she 
locates the war model of the political at the heart of democracy. As I will discuss 
below, this model is necessarily theological in presupposing a pre-political will prior 
to all law. Pace Mouffe, I suggest the said incompatibility of democracy and 
constitutionalism is the feature of those theories that equate popular sovereignty with 
the unconstrained political expression of a particular people’s collective identity. As 
Habermas pointed out long ago, the meaning of democratic self-determination based 
on homogeneity is not “the political autonomy of individual citizens but rather 
national independence—the self-assertion, self-affirmation, and self-realization of a 
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nation in its specificity.”279 Once we locate the project of redeeming a “we” at the 
center of democratic politics, we cannot put any limits to the disciplinary or coercive 
powers of the state, let alone preserve the plurality of voices in the public sphere as 
Mouffe aims to maintain.  
In what follows, I, first, discuss Schmitt’s defense of Catholic rationality with 
reference to notions like, justice, the priority of life, alterity and peace, during his 
Catholic phase. Then I move on to problematize his reformulated notion of the 
political as friend-enemy distinction. Finally, I assess and reject Mouffe’s re-
interpretation of Schmitt in her defense of agonistic model of democracy.  
 
V. THE RATIONALITY OF CATHOLICISM AND THE PRIORITY OF 
LIFE:  
According to Schmitt functional differentiation belongs to a certain 
modernity that Weber correctly traces back to the Protestant ethic. However, Schmitt 
rejects the use of the term rationalization to characterize this process. His preferred 
terms are depoliticization and neutralization. In Visibility of the Church and Roman 
Catholicism and Political Form, Schmitt invokes another Western modernity that 
has its origins not in the alliance of Protestant theology, capitalism, individualist 
liberalism, and natural sciences but of Catholic theology, politics, humanity, and 
                                                
279 Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other : Studies in Political Theory., 136. 
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jurisprudence. The rationality of Catholicism, in Schmitt’s view, is superior the 
economic-technical thinking that dominates Germany.  
The superiority of Catholic rationality hinges on its moral-humanitarian 
foundations that gives rise to the idea of representation. The Roman Church 
represents civitas humana, claims Schmitt. “It represents in every moment the 
historical connection to the incarnation and crucifixion of Christ. It represents the 
Person of Christ Himself: God become man in historical reality.”280 The Church, in 
other words, represents the idea of justice.281 It aims to bring peace to the world.282 
To this extent, it is not concerned with the domination and exploitation of the matter 
but with the normative guidance of human life.283 This is what distinguishes 
Catholicism from the extreme inhumanity of Protestantism, in Schmitt’s view. In 
Protestantism, as Weber suggests, there is no room for intermediaries between God 
and man. Everything of the flesh is separated from God by an unbridgeable gap: “No 
one could help [the individual]. No priest, for the chosen one can understand the 
word of God only in his own heart. No sacraments…No Church…Finally, even no 
God. For even Christ had died only for the elect, for whose benefit God has decreed 
His martyrdom from eternity. This, the complete elimination of salvation through the 
                                                
280 Carl Schmitt, "Roman Catholicism and Political Form," in Roman Catholicism and 
Political Form (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996)., 21.  
281 Ibid. 30. 
282 Ibid. 32. 
283 Ibid. 13. 
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Church and the sacraments (which was in Lutheranism by no means developed to its 
final conclusions), was what formed the absolutely decisive difference from 
Catholicism.”284 The Protestant ethic “in its extreme inhumanity” places the 
individual entirely on his own responsibility in worldly matters.285 The total 
separation of man from God gives way to a “feeling of unprecedented inner 
loneliness of the single individual…[H]e [is] forced to follow his path alone to meet 
a destiny which had been decreed for him from eternity.”286 Schmitt offers a 
theological rejection of the Protestant conception of God as “wholly other,” and the 
immediate relationship between God and man. “Man is not alone in the world,” 
suggests Schmitt. “The world is good, and what evil there is in the world is the result 
of the sin of man.” These two tenets “obtain their religious significance from the fact 
that God become man.”287  
Pace Protestantism, Catholicism, insofar as it keeps the contact with God 
through mediation, rests on the “priority of life over death.”288 Schmitt goes as far as 
to suggest that from a theological perspective Protestantism where the contact with 
God is carried on in deep spiritual isolation resulting in an “anxious fear of death” is 
                                                
284 Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism., 104-105. Emphasis mine. 
285 Ibid. 104, 109. 
286 Ibid. 104. 
287 Schmitt, "The Visibility of the Church: A Scholastic Consideration.", 47. Emphasis mine. 
288 Ibid. 56. 
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not a religion but simply psychology.289 Catholicism, on the other hand, understands 
not only the psychological nature of man but also his sociological nature as a 
communal being. “A religious experience should not be obtained from a psychic 
phenomenon, claims Schmitt. “For if true solitude is in God, then the way of man to 
God must not be a negation of community with other men, any more than suicide can 
be considered an act of mortification in a Christian sense.”290 
In Schmitt’s view, Catholicism, unlike Protestantism, does not tear the 
individual apart from the community. Whereas the latter is founded in the private 
sphere, the former takes place in the public sphere. Personality in Catholicism is not 
developed by following a path alone but “exists only in the realm of mediation 
between God and the mundane world,” the ground of which is the Word of God.291 
Catholicism insofar as it rests on the recognition of an essentially human element, 
that is, language, provides a new foundation for community, suggests Schmitt. 
However, the essentially public nature of Christianity does not leave the individual to 
                                                
289 Weber finds the perfect expression of the Protestant fear of death in Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s 
Progress: “In the description of Christian's attitude after he had realized that he was living in 
the City of Destruction and he had received the call to take up his pilgrimage to the celestial 
city, wife and children cling to him, but stopping his ears with his fingers and crying, "life, 
eternal life", he staggers forth across the fields. No refinement culd suppass the naïve feeling 
of the tinker who, writing in prison cell, earned the applause of a believing world, in 
expressing the emotions of the faithful Puritan, thinking only of his own salvation…Only 
when he himself is safe does it occur to him that it would be nice to have his family with 
him. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.,107. 
290 Schmitt, "The Visibility of the Church: A Scholastic Consideration.", 49-50. Emphasis 
mine. 
291 Ibid. 51. 
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the mercy of the community. Rather Catholicism by recognizing that every person is 
unique is what protects the individual from the community. 
Individuality coexists only in that God keeps the person in the world. The 
person is unique in the world and thus also in the community. His relation to 
ad se ipsum is not possible without a relation to ad alterum. To be in the 
world means to be with others. From a spiritual standpoint, all visibility is 
construed in terms of a constitution of community. The members of the 
community derive their dignity from God and thus cannot be destroyed by 
the community. But they can only return to God through the community. 
Thus arises a visible Church. Man is not alone in the world. God stands by 
him. Thus the world cannot destroy him.292  
 
In contrast to what Meier suggests, the original sin plays no essential role in 
Schmitt’s interpretation of Catholic theology. Rather Schmitt argues fervently 
against the total depravity thesis of Protestantism, and speaks of “human nature as 
only wounded, weakened, and troubled, thus permitting the use of gradations and 
adaptations.”293 The figure of Providential enemy is nowhere to be found. On the 
contrary, he refers to an originary union or sociability before the Fall of Man into sin. 
“The juridical regulation of human relations existed before evil and sin, and was not 
its result,” he claims.294 Such a union or friendship in Catholicism does not translate 
into an argument for an egalitarian organization of human relationships. It, rather, 
represents a whole hierarchy of mediation: “that the woman conduct herself toward 
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293 Schmitt, "Roman Catholicism and Political Form.", 8. 
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the man as the man toward his Church, and as the Church toward Christ the 
mediator.”295  
What is interesting to note is the role concepts like the priority of life, 
alterity, humanity, universal justice, peace play in his thinking during his Catholic 
phase, which is commonly neglected in the literature on Schmitt. As I discuss in the 
next section, Schmitt purges all these terms from his vocabulary once he takes up the 
problem of how to found a new authority without the sanction of the Church. 
Nonetheless, as we will see what Arendt calls, “the need for an absolute,” continues 
to inform Schmitt’s thinking in his post-Catholic phase.  
VI. SCHMITT’S POST-CATHOLIC PHASE AND THE FRIEND-ENEMY 
DISTINCTION:  
What is missing in Meier’s reading of Schmitt is the central role democracy 
qua popular sovereignty, however misguided it may be, plays in his conception of 
the political as the friend-enemy distinction. Schmitt is aware that the zeitgeist of the 
age is democracy,296 and that a return to a religious legitimation of political 
institutions is not possible. Even though he may have briefly entertained the idea of 
“an alliance between a nationalist dictator and the Catholic Church,” as Richard 
Thoma claims, the Church plays no role in the legitimation of political authority in 
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296 Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy., 30 
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his legal-political writings.297 For Schmitt democracy is a historical fact that no 
political theory can afford to ignore. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the friend-
enemy distinction with respect to his definition of democracy that refers to a 
“substantial equality within the circle of equals.”298  
Chantal Mouffe’s reading, to which I will return below, does capture this 
dimension in Schmitt’s work. However, she downplays or ignores the way in which 
Schmitt selectively borrows from the vocabulary of theology in order to defend his 
polemic conception of democracy. Even though a certain secularization does take 
place in Schmitt’s thinking, that is, the emancipation of the political authority from 
the Church, it does not amount to a displacement of theology. Rather we see the 
sacralization or theologization of the new recipient of sovereignty, that is, the people 
whose will is supposed to be incarnated by a personalistic instance.299 Just like God 
becomes flesh in Jesus Christ, the people becomes flesh in the persona of the 
popularly acclaimed leader.300 In her reflections on the French Revolution, Hannah 
                                                
297 Thoma, “On the Ideology of Parliamentarism,” in The Crisis of Parliamentary 
Democracy, 82. See also Schmitt’s remark in Political Theology: “Conceptions of 
transcendence will no longer be credible to most educated people, who will settle for either a 
more or less clear immanence-pantheism or a positive indifference to any metaphysics.” 
Schmitt, Political Theology, 50.  
298 Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 10 
299 Ellen Kennedy defines this process as the transformation of the divine into the civic. See, 
Ellen Kennedy, Constitutional Failure : Carl Schmitt in Weimar (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2004)., 177-178. 
300 It is important to note that Schmitt interprets the popularly acclaimed leader not after the 
institutionalized charisma of the Pope but the personal charisma of the Prophet that cannot 
be limited by any previous norm or revelation. In Roman Catholicism and Political Form 
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Arendt captures this paradoxical outcome of the secularization of political authority, 
that is, the re-occupation of the absolute sovereignty of the king by the absolute 
sovereignty of the nation. As she suggests, the need for an absolute from which to 
derive both power and law remains a constant problem even after the emancipation 
of the state from the church. In this movement, we have the deification of the people, 
and the interpretation of the origin of law as “an event in which the ‘word had 
become flesh,’ that is, an absolute that had appeared in historical time as a mundane 
reality.”301 “The very fact that secularization was accompanied by the rise of 
absolutism and the downfall of absolutism followed by revolutions whose chief 
perplexity was where to find an absolute from which to derive authority for law and 
power, could well be taken to demonstrate that politics and the state needed the 
sanction of religion even more urgently than religion and the churches had ever 
needed the support of princes.”302  
                                                                                                                                     
Schmitt emphasizes that the Pope is not the Prophet. Unlike the latter, the Pope’s charisma is 
not unlimited but institutionalized. “Such a ceremonial function precludes all the fanatical 
excesses of an unbridled prophetism,” claims Schmitt. This is in fact what the juridical 
rationality of Catholicism is all about. It “resides in institutions,” and, “its greatest 
achievement is having made the priesthood into an office—a very distinctive type of office.” 
There Schmitt praises the Catholic conception of authority for not lapsing into an irrational 
exceptionalism. The pope cannot issue new revelations and his authority is limited to the 
interpretation of the divine law. When read from the perspective of Catholicism that Schmitt 
depicts in Roman Catholicism, Schmitt’s later call for absolute sovereignty is nothing but the 
glorification of normless exceptionalism. Schmitt, "Roman Catholicism and Political Form.", 
14.  
301 Arendt, On Revolution., 160.  
302 Ibid. 161. 
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In Arendt’s view, the use of the absolute to legitimize political authority is 
simply a “pseudo-solution,”303 a solution that, nonetheless, very much informs 
Schmitt’s thinking. As he argues in Political Theology: “all significant concepts of 
the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts.”304 Schmitt 
makes quick analogies between God and the people as the omnipotent lawgiver, on 
the one hand, and between the miracle and the state of exception, on the other. These 
analogies cannot be interpreted as a recognition of God’s sovereignty over the world 
on Schmitt’s part, as Meier’s reading suggests. On the contrary, from the perspective 
of Catholic theology or any theology that presupposes an omnipotent God of the 
entire universe, the elevation of the people to the metaphysical position earlier 
occupied by God should be considered as blasphemous.305 
                                                
303 Ibid. 159. 
304 Schmitt, Political Theology : Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty., 36. See also 
his definition of secularization in Political Romanticism: “Today, many varieties of 
metaphysical attitude exist in a secularized form. To a great extent, it holds true that different 
and, indeed, mundane factors have taken the place of God: humanity, the nation, the 
individual, historical development, and even life for its own sake, in its complete spiritual 
emptiness and mere dynamic. This does not mean that the attitude is no longer metaphysical. 
The thought and feeling of every person always retain a certain metaphysical character. 
Metaphysics is something unavoidable, and . . .we cannot escape it by relinquishing our 
awareness of it. What human beings regard as the ultimate, absolute authority, however, 
certainly can change, and God can be replaced by mundane and worldly factors. I call this 
secularization.” Carl Schmitt, Political Romanticism (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986)., 
17-18. 
 
305 I agree with Norris’ following remark against Meier: “Pace Heinrich Meier, Schmitt 
argues here not that God is inescapable, but the metaphysical position of authority that He 
occupied is. We might say that in the end Schmitt's political theology reveals itself to be a 
political metaphysics, one that insists upon the authority of the metaphysical and the 
metaphysics of authority.” Andrew Norris, Carl Schmitt's Political Metaphysics: On the 
Secularization of 'the Outermost Sphere', Theory and Event Issue 4.1, 2000 
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Once popular sovereignty is interpreted after the theological model, the 
people is understood as a unitary subject endowed with will. To purify the demos 
from heterogeneous elements turns into a logical necessity, as we have seen in the 
Turkish example. As Schmitt famously argues, democracy requires “first 
homogeneity and second—if the need arises—elimination of heterogeneity.” To 
illustrate this principle Schmitt refers to Turkey, “with its radical expulsion of the 
Greeks and its reckless Turkish nationalization of the country.” 306 Popular 
sovereignty, entails, first and foremost, the existential decision about the identity of 
the people as a whole. What is at stake is not self-legislation but self-realization or 
self-affirmation.307 This is why Schmitt rejects Weber’s differentiation of the 
political from other spheres like religious or economic. Every sphere becomes 
political once it is strong enough to group people along friend-enemy distinction. 
The political bond can spring from any domain. The political “does not describe its 
own substance, but only the intensity of association of human beings whose motives 
can be religious, national…economic, or of another kind and can effect at different 
times different coalitions and separations.”308 The difference between the political 
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308 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political., 38. 
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and other spheres is not one of kind but one of intensity for the “substance of the 
political is contained in the context of a concrete antagonism.”309  
It is based on this questionable logic of unity that Schmitt declares the 
conceptual incompatibility between popular sovereignty and human rights, 
democracy and constitutional state. The sovereign by virtue of being identical to 
itself is above and beyond the law. The supposed primacy or autonomy of the 
political rests on this substantialist conception of the people whose will is legitimate 
by virtue of what it is. Nothing precedes it. It is the omnipotent lawgiver, and as such 
it cannot be conditioned or limited by legal norms.  “If democratic identity is taken 
seriously,” claims Schmitt, “then in an emergency, no other constitutional institution 
can withstand the sole criterion of the people’s will, however expressed.310  
To the extent that political will-formation takes the form of the collective self-
realization of a people, public discussion becomes redundant. Schmitt goes as far as 
to suggest the compatibility of democracy with dictatorship. “If for practical reasons 
the representatives of the people can decide instead of the people themselves, then 
certainly a single trusted representative could also decide in the name of the same 
people. Without ceasing to be democratic, the argument would justify an 
antiparliamentary Caesarism.”311 Along with public discussion, Schmitt also 
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questions the validity of competitive elections as an instrument of modern mass 
democracy. “The will of the people can be expressed just as well and perhaps better 
through acclamation, through something taken for granted, an obvious and 
unchallenged presence,” than secret ballot.312 Then, as Cohen explains, 
 
The only practical questions are who shapes the will of the people, who has the 
control over the means with which the will of the people is constructed, and 
who can claim to embody or to be identical with it? This flawed theory of 
representation as a form of incarnation leads Schmitt to construe the will of the 
people as that which is embodied by the successful political actor (the 
sovereign representative) who manages to get the people to "identify" (their 
will and their very identity as a people) with him. Thus, neither the form of 
democratic decision-making nor the presence of deliberative civil publics 
matters once past the age (nineteenth century) of parliamentarism. The only 
thing that matters is the ability of a political leader or instance to get the 
people to identify their will with his, be it via plebiscites, referenda, or other 
forms of acclaim.313 
 
It is important to note that Schmitt offers the friend-enemy distinction not simply as 
an intellectual answer to the said crisis of democracy. Its purpose goes beyond 
finding a source for political authority and solidarity. It is at the same time a 
metaphysical answer to the disenchantment of the world.314  In my discussion on 
Weber, I have pointed out how the political becomes the path to salvation after the 
disintegration of the meaning-giving unity of religious and metaphysical worldviews. 
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Schmitt’s break with Catholic theology leads to a similar sublimation of the political 
sphere. The deeper meaning is that without a common enemy, without bloodshed we 
would not have a sense of ourselves; our lives would be meaningless. It is not 
accident that Schmitt defines the high moments of politics as those when the enemy 
is concretely identifiable. “The friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real 
meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing.”315 
War-making takes over the function of salvation from the meaninglessness of 
modern existence. Making sacrifices in the battlefield becomes the ultimate political 
act. Enmity, accordingly, is inescapable or necessary not because man is evil, but 
because it responds to the loss of meaning. In a world where the possibility of war is 
absent, claims Schmitt, “there would not be a meaningful antithesis whereby men 
could be required to sacrifice life, authorized to shed blood, and kill other human 
beings.”316 It is “by virtue of this power over the physical life of men, the political 
community transcends all other associations or societies.”317  
 
VII. MOUFFE AND AGONISM:  
In Meier’s reading, Schmitt does not defend the autonomy or the primacy of 
the political, rather the primacy of God from which enmity ensues. In a stark 
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contrast, in Chantal Mouffe’s view, Carl Schmitt is a thoroughly political thinker 
from whom we can learn a lot in order to understand what is truly at stake in 
democratic politics. Mouffe in a series of books uses Schmitt’s conception of the 
political in order to defend an agonist conception of democracy as an alternative to 
the deliberative conception of democracy defended by Jürgen Habermas.318 
Deliberative democracy, which I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter, 
rejects Schmitt’s thesis that liberalism and democracy are at odds with one another. 
Put briefly, Habermas’ thesis is that the rule of law is implicit in the very exercise of 
popular sovereignty. Rather than grounding democratic legitimacy in substantive 
will as Schmitt does, he links it to processes of collective deliberation oriented 
toward achieving rational consensus. In Mouffe’s view, Habermas is unable to 
acknowledge not only the impossibility of finding impartial solutions to political 
issues without exclusion but also the integrative role conflict plays in democratic 
                                                
318 The agonistic conception of democracy is also defended by other political theorists, like 
William Connolly, Bonnie Honig, and Ernesto Laclau. The radical conception of democracy 
defended by this paradigm is similar to deliberative democracy in its departure from 
formalistic conceptions of democracy as the aggregation of pre-given interests. However, 
unlike deliberative democracy, it perceives of mutual agreement and consensus as 
misguided, reflecting the expression of hegemonic, temporary power relations. Despite their 
differences, the defenders of agonistic model of democracy, influenced by psychoanalysis, 
understand politics as a site of collective antagonism and contestation. They value 
democracy for its ability to institutionalize and preserve the continuation of contestation. 
However, unlike Mouffe, other agonistic democrats like William Connolly, for instance, do 
not take Schmitt’s conception of the political as their starting point. For Connolly’s critique 
of Mouffe on Schmitt, see “Secularism, Partisanship, and the Ambiguity of Justice,” in 
Political Theory and Partisan Politics, 150-153. 
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politics.319 Rather than trying to solve the tension between liberalism and democracy, 
Mouffe invites us to re-negotiate it by bringing the friend-enemy distinction back in. 
 
Democratic logics always entail drawing a frontier between “us” and “them,” 
those who belong to the “demos” and those who are outside it. This is the 
condition for the very exercise of democratic rights. It necessarily creates a 
tension with the liberal emphasis on the respect of ‘human rights’ since there 
is no guarantee that a decision made through democratic procedures will not 
jeopardize some existing rights. In a liberal democracy limits are always put 
on the exercise of the sovereignty of the people. Those limits are usually 
presented as providing the very framework for the respect of human rights 
and as being non- negotiable. In fact, since they depend on the way “human 
rights” are defined and interpreted at a given moment, they are the expression 
of the prevailing hegemony and thereby contestable. What cannot be 
contestable in a liberal democracy is the idea that it is legitimate to establish 
limits to popular sovereignty in the name of liberty. Hence its paradoxical 
nature.320  
 
What motivates Mouffe’s analysis is the danger involved in the identification of 
present democracy with real democracy. She invites us to pay attention to the fact 
that every consensus entails exclusions, and that temporary majorities do not 
represent the people as a whole. This point is meaningful but it does not explain why 
                                                
319 Mouffe, On the Political., 31.  
320 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox., 4. Failing to capture the relationship between the rule 
of the people and the rule of law, Mouffe is forced to accept the legitimacy of liberal 
democracy as an ethnocentric idea that belongs only to Europe. “I assert that our allegiance 
to democratic values and institutions is not based on their superior rationality and that liberal 
democratic principles can be defended only as being constitutive of our form of life….This is 
why I envisage the normative dimension inscribed in political institutions as being of an 
ethico-political nature, to indicate that it always refers to specific practices, depending on 
particular contexts, and that it is not the expression of a universal morality.” Mouffe, On the 
Political., 121. In the following chapters, I will also challenge this view and following 
Habermas and Derrida argue for the possibility of re-thinking the democratic constitutional 
state as a universalizable model beyond the charge of ethno- or euro-centrism.  
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there is only a contingent articulation between constitutionalism and democracy. It is 
true that every legal system is permeated by the ethical self-understanding of a 
particular people, but this does not eradicate the universal content of human rights.321 
To the extent that human rights are positive legal norms with a universal content, 
they cannot be reduced to the will of any particular democratic subject.322 Nor can 
the meaning of human rights be reduced to the external limitation of popular 
sovereignty as she maintains. Rather, to the extent that in a democratic regime the 
authors and addresses of law are (or should be) one and the same, there is no 
conceptual reason to presuppose a hierarchical relationship between public and 
private rights.323 I will return to this issue in the next chapter.  
A second objection concerns her argument that the very orientation towards 
mutual understanding and agreement via reasoned deliberation is misguided.324 If 
every inclusion entails an exclusion, a point that I do not contest, then, our 
democratic efforts should be oriented towards making the friend component of 
                                                
321 Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State.", 122-128. 
322 I will return to this issue in the next chapter in my discussion on the priority of right over 
the good in Habermas.  
323 See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 
and Democracy., Chapter III.  
324 What is further problematic is Mouffe’s own presupposition of a “conflictual consensus” 
on equality and liberty on the part of the citizenry as a whole. On the one hand, this 
presupposition weakens her very critique of Habermas and rational consensus. On the other 
hand, having located an ineradicable antagonism at the origin of every community, it is not 
clear where such a critical consensus can be grounded to begin with. Mouffe, On the 
Political., 31. The Democratic Paradox, 102–103. On this point, see also, Breen, "Agonism, 
Antagonism and the Necessity of Care.", 138. 
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democracy more inclusive, which entails, first and foremost, the dis-incorporation of 
the subject of sovereignty. Once we get rid of what Habermas calls “an overly 
concrete reading of popular sovereignty,” the relationship between democracy qua 
popular sovereignty and liberalism qua human rights becomes a conceptual 
necessity, irrespective of the paradoxical nature of such a relationship. As Habermas 
suggests, “the initial decision to engage in democratic self-legislation can only be 
carried out by realizing the rights that the participants must mutually grant one 
another if they want to legitimately regulate their life in common by means of 
positive law.”325 The basic rights, in other words, “spring from the very idea of the 
legal institutionalization of the procedure of democratic self-legislation.”326 Mouffe 
cannot follow this more fertile theoretical path because her starting point is too much 
indebted to Schmitt’s “insight” that a group of people can only become unified as 
friends as long as they share a common enemy.  
 
Politicization cannot exist without the production of a conflictual 
representation of the world, with opposed camps with which people can 
identify, thereby allowing for passions to be mobilized politically within the 
spectrum of the democratic process…In order to act politically people need to 
be able to identify with a collective identity which provides an idea of 
themselves they can valorize. Political discourse has to offer not only policies 
but also identities which can help people make sense of what they are 
experiencing as well as giving them hope for the future.327  
                                                
325 Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other : Studies in Political Theory.,137 
326 Ibid. 137. Habermas’ emphasis.  
327 Mouffe, On the Political., 25. 




Mouffe carries Schmitt’s theological logic of identity into modern democratic 
politics. This logic asserts that a collective identity is a self-enclosed totality 
endowed with will, and, hence, capable of action. In order to secure its integrity such 
a collectivity needs to wage war not only against the other without but also the other 
within. War, in other words, is inscribed in the very structure of this conception of 
identity. To this extent, the we/they discrimination that she locates at the heart of 
democratic politics cannot breed pluralism as she claims. Rather it can only inform 
totalitarian politics. Unless friendship and consensus are brought back into the 
concept of the political we will remain entrapped in the Schmittian political theology 
that cannot differentiate democracy from dictatorship. The emphasis on friendship 
and consensus does not exclude heterogeneity and dissent. Nor does it not remove 
conflict (or even war) from the realm of politics. Rather it provides a ground on 
which we can survive conflicts.  
 A related problem that infects both Mouffe and Schmitt is their understanding 
of democratic politics in existential terms. The exercise of popular sovereignty is 
reduced to a process of self-realization. Politics, in other words, is understood 
essentially as a meaning-making activity though which we understand or become 
who we essentially are. It is introduced as an antidote to the alleged loss of meaning. 
“The drive to become a part of a crowd and to lose themselves in a moment of fusion 
with the masses,” is part and parcel of the psychological make-up of human beings, 
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Mouffe claims.328 Participation in democratic politics, which is understood simply as 
fighting for one’s identity, seems to provide a modern form of salvation.  
 As we have seen in the previous two chapters, the early nation making process 
in Turkey is informed by a conception of national sovereignty that is very much 
similar to that of Schmitt’s, yet supplemented by the caesaropapist control of Islam. 
In this chapter, I have tried to show the inherent flaws of Schmitt’s conception of 
democratic legitimacy that conflates the demos with the ethnos. In the following 
chapters, my aim is to re-formulate popular sovereignty as well as secularism in a 
way to leave room for plurality, heterogeneity, dissent, as well as consensus and 











                                                
328 Ibid. 121. Emphasis mine. 
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CHAPTER IV: SECULAR MODERNITY, POPULAR SOVEREIGNY, AND 
RIGHTS 
Starting with this chapter I will build the theoretical foundations of a secular 
democratic state that respects modern individual freedoms and the rule of law. In 
order to prepare the ground for that discussion, I will refer to one of the most 
powerful critics of secular modernity today, Talal Asad, who questions the validity 
of Western concepts like secularism in non-Western societies. In his view, 
secularism, far from being neutral or power free, is fraught with myth and violence. 
It entails an entire worldview that privileges a particular conception of the good life 
based on a misguided notion of sovereign human being, whose essence is constituted 
in terms of inalienable rights.329 Following Foucault’s approach to power relations, 
Asad claims that the right is essentially an ideological instrument that masks 
relations of domination.330 The system of rights, under the cover of a universal 
discourse of emancipation, conceals the ways in which new subjects are 
manufactured and made obedient to the nation-state. The law is not emancipatory, 
rather it enslaves. In order to resist the reach of the state into our lives, we are told to 
leave aside the juridical discourses of rights and sovereignty altogether.  
                                                
329 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion : Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity 
and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993)., 200-238. Mahmood, Politics 
of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject., 5-14. 
330 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular : Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Cultural Memory 
in the Present (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003).,134-137.  
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Asad does not claim to be moral philosopher. In his own words, he is an 
anthropologist who is simply engaged in the business of describing every tradition in 
its own terms. This is what distinguishes Asad from previous anthropologists who 
have tried to analyze non-Western traditions with the terms derived from the 
vocabulary of Kantian Enlightenment. They have moralized, Asad simply 
describes.331 In this chapter I would like to question Asad’s self-description. Studied 
closely, one sees that Asad’s critique of secularism is developed from the point of 
view of a strange combination of MacIntyre’s communitarian ethics of the good and 
Foucault’s post-structuralist approach to power relations.332 Asad identifies a series 
                                                
331 Asad, Genealogies of Religion : Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam., 200.  
332 Asad draws on MacIntyre and Foucault simultaneously. In Saba Mahmood’s words, 
“despite important overlaps, there are two critical differences…between Macintyre's notion 
of tradition and that of Talal Asad. One, Asad places an emphasis on relations of power that 
are necessary both for the propagation of a tradition in relation to other discursive traditions 
and to the process by which certain practices and arguments become hegemonic within a 
tradition. In Macintyre's theory of tradition, there is no discussion of power. Asad also 
differs from Macintyre in that he emphasizes the role embodied capacities (in addition to 
rational argumentation) play in the reproduction of a tradition. Mahmood, Politics of Piety: 
The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject., 115. However, Mahmood does not explain 
how genealogy and tradition can be brought together. A comparison of the two is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. Nonetheless, I should simply point out that there is a deep 
discrepancy between the concept of tradition (MacIntyre) and genealogy (Foucault) that 
Asad is trying to combine. Both approaches challenge a universal conception of rationality. 
However, unlike the groundless nature of genealogy, the notion of tradition offers a ground 
on which particular modes of moral inquiry can take place. Rationality, according to 
MacIntyre, is developed within the tradition of a community. To this extent, the concept of 
tradition, as MacIntyre himself points out, rejects the relativism of genealogy. How these 
two different modes of inquiry are brought together by Asad is altogether unclear. In my 
view, Asad’s critique would have been much more consistent (though still problematic) if he 
had left Foucault aside and focused simply on MacIntyre. For MacIntyre’s critique of 
genealogy see: Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Versions of Moral Inquiry: Encyclopedia, 
Genealogy, and Tradition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990).   
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of hierarchically constructed binaries in Western metaphysics, like secular vs. 
religious, rights vs. duties, private and public, autonomy vs. heteronomy, individual 
vs. community, modern vs. traditional.333 In each case the first term of the pair is 
taken to be more originary than the second, that is, valued more highly and given a 
privileged position. This kind of theorizing, Asad suggests, conceals the ways in 
which hierarchies formed and power exercised. “The insistence on a sharp separation 
between the religious and the secular goes with the paradoxical claim that the latter 
continually produces the former,” he suggests, for instance. Asad is not the first to 
point to the role binary opposites play in Western metaphysics. In this regard he 
follows Foucault. What is problematic, I suggest, is what Asad does with the de-
mystified binary. He simply reverses the hierarchy in favor of the previously 
subjugated term. Community, duties, heteronomous action are privileged over 
individualism, rights, and autonomous action. Hence, Asad’s communitarian 
moment.  
 Leaving aside the confusing foundations of Asad’s approach, let me refer to 
what is entirely missing in this critique of modernity, that is, democracy. Western 
modernity, in Asad’s reading, is simply reduced to contractarian liberalism. Why is 
there no discussion of democracy and popular sovereignty? Why are we led to 
assume that modernity is simply about possessive individualism? The relationship 
between liberalism and democracy is obscured from view in his analysis. I propose 
                                                
333 See especially, Asad, Genealogies of Religion : Discipline and Reasons of Power in 
Christianity and Islam., 200- 238 
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that it is all the more necessary to bring the juridical discourses of popular 
sovereignty and rights back in order to rethink secularism, especially in contexts 
where religious authorities aims to monopolize the correct form of religiosity. As I 
discuss below, the secular concept of the state is much more complex and can be 
much more tolerant toward different worldviews than Asad wants us to believe. It is 
uniquely equipped to protect not only freedom of religion but also freedom from 
religion, which Asad’s post-secular modernity cannot bring about. 
Drawing on Habermas, I suggest that there is no need to oppose autonomy to 
dependency, community to individual, popular sovereignty to human rights. 
Habermas offers a novel way to re-think these binaries in a non-oppositional fashion 
beyond the liberal-communitarian dichotomy.334 He moves us beyond the conception 
of popular sovereignty as self-realization that I associated with Schmitt and Mouffe 
in the previous chapter. At the same time he also avoids a moral reading of human 
rights while preserving the individualistic core of the modern conception of freedom. 
He interprets collective will-formation as an intersubjective process where “all those 
affected” participate in public deliberations as free and equal members with the aim 
to reach an agreement. This approach, I suggest, does not prioritize one particular 
form of life at the expense of others. On the contrary, it protects different traditions 
and forms of life from the whims of the majority culture but without imprisoning 
individuals into their particular life contexts. I will explain this below with reference 
                                                
334 As I will discuss in the next chapter, Derrida too embeds the same insight in his 
conception of democracy, albeit starting from different premises. 
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to the distinction Habermas makes between ethical questions of self realization and 
moral questions of justice.  
In what follows, I will discuss Asad’s critique of secular modernity and 
Enlightenment values and institutions like freedom, autonomy, sovereignty, rights 
and law (I). Then I move on to Habermas’ reconstruction of popular sovereignty and 
the system of rights (II). Finally, I discuss the way in which Habermas prioritizes 
moral questions of justice over ethical questions of self-realization (III).  
 
I. ASAD’S CRITIQUE OF SECULAR MODERNITY 
Talal Asad’s assessment of secularism is partly informed by Foucault’s post-
structuralism in questioning the neutrality of unitary discourses about cognitive 
conception of religion and partly by a moral agenda that assumes embodied 
conception of religion does and should play a formative role in the making of 
meaningful identities. Based on these deeply contradictory normative foundations 
Asad questions the validity of secularism as a universal category and interprets it as 
an entire worldview aiming to redeem particular subjects through discipline and, if 
necessary, through physical violence. In a Foucauldian manner, he claims that in 
order to fully appreciate what is at stake in secular politics we need to abandon the 
juridical schema that aims to establish the legitimacy of power and accept that the 
system of rights implements relations of domination rather than relations of 
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sovereignty.335 “A secular state does not guarantee toleration; it puts into play 
different structures of ambition and fear. The law never seeks to eliminate violence 
since its objective is always to regulate violence,” claims Asad.336  
Asad traces the origins of secularism to contractarian liberalism in Thomas 
Hobbes and John Locke where right is regarded as a commodity (held by individuals 
in the state of nature) that can be alienated or transferred through the juridical act of 
contract. Even if the idea of the state of nature was a secular condition, “there is still 
                                                
335 In Foucault’s view, human qua individual is not a rights-bearing subject as liberals claim 
but a power-effect. The juridical theory of sovereignty is said to be absolutely incompatible 
with the relations of domination that disciplinary power implements throughout the social 
body. The hallmark of sovereignty, according to this reading, is the right to put to death. Its 
symbol is the sword. The disciplinary power, on the other hand, that has the objective of 
making the body more productive contradicts this logic. However, Foucault does not hold 
this position consistently. Whether the logic of discipline contradicts and displaces the logic 
of sovereignty or supplements it is not entirely clear in Foucault’s analysis. Despite his 
critique of the Marxist understanding of ideology in explaining power relationships, 
Foucault suggests that the theory of sovereignty continued to exist as an ideology of right. 
The juridical theory of sovereignty, claims Foucault, “made it possible to superimpose on the 
mechanism of discipline a system of right that concealed its mechanisms and erased the 
element of domination and the element of domination and the techniques of domination 
involved in discipline, and which, finally, guaranteed that everyone could exercise his or her 
own sovereign rights thanks to the sovereignty of the State…In our day, it is the fact that 
power is exercised through both right and disciplines, that the techniques of discipline and 
discourse born of discipline are invading right, and that normalizing procedures are 
increasingly colonizing the procedures of law, that might explain the overall workings of 
what I would call a “normalizing society.” The argument is not simply that the norms of the 
panoptic society that puts everyone under continuous surveillance has made the juridical 
system of law meaningless. Foucault’s critique cuts deeper. He suggests that the juridical 
discourse of rights has never been meaningful to begin with. The right is not what limits 
sovereignty but what expands it. It is not what emancipates the individual, but what enslaves 
him to the sovereign. The logic of sovereignty and human rights deeply contradict each other 
to the point of being mutually exclusive. Sovereignty cannot be limited, shared, or 
conditioned by the rule of law. Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the 
Collège De France, 1975-76, 1st ed. (New York: Picador, 2003)., 37-39. See also Michel 
Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, vol. 1 (New York: Vintage Books, 
1990). 
336 Asad, Formations of the Secular : Christianity, Islam, Modernity., 8. Asad’s emphasis.  
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an essence attributed to “the human”—the essence that the early European theorists 
of natural law recognized as inalienable rights.”337 Asad interprets Locke’s thesis of 
natural right as a limit to arbitrary government as a strategy to stabilize “the 
contingent character of the self through a legal concept of the person.” The human 
being becomes “a sovereign, self-owning agent—essentially suspicious of others—
and not merely a subject conscious of his or her own identity. It is on this basis that 
the secularist principle of the right to freedom of belief and expression was 
crafted.”338  
What Asad finds entirely ambiguous in contractarianism is the fact that the 
universal character of the rights-bearing subject is made the responsibility of 
sovereign states, which, in turn, undermines the very concept of self-determining 
individual. “Although the individual does not have the right to decide his own fate, 
authorities of the state of which he is a citizen have the constitutional right to decide 
it for him.”339 In this model the very idea of religious toleration becomes the political 
means for the imposition of an exclusive national identity in order to secure strong 
state power.340 The discourse of rights is not emancipatory, but rather it is what 
enables sovereign states to realize their civilizing project. 
                                                
337 Ibid. 133.  
338 Ibid. 135. 
339 Ibid. 137. 
340 Ibid. 137. 
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The way in which Asad opposes rights to sovereignty is very much indebted 
to Foucault, and hence susceptible to the objections raised above. However, his 
critique of modernity comes with a twist. What bothers Asad is the way in which 
religion has become marginal in modern society “as the site for producing 
disciplined knowledge and personal discipline.”341 “Religion is indeed now optional 
in a way that science is not,” laments Asad.342 In his genealogical analyses on 
religion Asad discusses how in medieval Latin Christianity “the ways in which 
historical forms of power became not merely the means of coercion and subjection 
but the conditions for creating particular potentialities-individual, social, and 
cultural.”343 Asad aims to show that dispositions, virtues, feelings, sensibilities, and 
instincts were constituted through repetitive practices on the body. With the arrival 
of liberal secularism that makes the individual morally sovereign in religious 
matters, this “visceral register” has been ignored in the West. Religion came to be 
understood cognitively as a matter of belief, in contrast to its medieval meaning as a 
mode of living embodied in practice and discourse.344  
                                                
341 Asad, Genealogies of Religion : Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam., 46, 78.  
342 Ibid. 49. 
343 Ibid. 83. 
344 Political theorist William Connolly makes a similar argument. “Active cultivation of 
virtues by repetitive practices on the body “help constitute the dispositions, sensibilities, and 
ethos through which meaning is lived.” Secularism, Connolly claims, ignores this visceral 
register that need to be engaged with more openly. William E. Connolly, "Pluralism and 
Faith," in Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World, ed. Hent de Vries 
and Lawrence Eugene Sullivan (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006)., 290. See also 




Several times before the Reformation, the boundary between the religious 
and the secular was redrawn, but always the formal authority of the Church 
remained preeminent. In later centuries, with the triumphant rise of modern 
science, modern production, and the modern state, the churches would also 
be clear about the need to distinguish the religious from the secular, shifting, 
as they did so, the weight of religion more an more onto the moods and 
motivations of the individual believer. Discipline (intellectual and social) 
would, in this period, gradually abandon religious space, letting “belief,” 
“conscience,” and “sensibility” take its place.345 
 
What Asad suggests is that secularization in the West has not led to the 
disappearance or displacement of religion.346 Rather in this movement we have the 
construction of religion as a new historical object: “anchored in personal experience, 
expressible as belief-statements, dependent on private institutions, and practices in 
one’s spare time. This construction of religion ensures that it is part of what is 
inessential to our common politics, economy, science, and morality.”347 Asad finds 
two interrelated problems with the cognitive conception of religion. First, it relies on 
a misguided conception of the self prior to all social relations. This radically 
disembodied subject downplays the productive role disciplinary techniques play in 
                                                                                                                                     
William E. Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1999). 
345 Asad, Genealogies of Religion : Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam., 39. 
346 This is, of course, not Asad’s discovery. See Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern 
World. 
347 Asad, Genealogies of Religion : Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam., 207. Asad’s emphasis. 
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the formation of necessary virtues for the proper cultivation of public reason. 
Echoing communitarians like McIntyre, Asad argues that reasoning cannot proceed 
apart from shared traditions and practices.348 Second, this modern, privatized notion 
of religion that emphasizes moral autonomy of the individual is colonizing the 
Middle East, leading to the loss of an embodied conception of religion that he 
identifies with Islam.  
According to Asad’s anthropological reading, Islam is not an abstract belief 
system based on a direct link between God and the individual. Nor is Islam, the 
argument goes, what people who call themselves Muslim say it is. Rather, it is a 
discursive tradition.349 This is to say “what is Islam?” and “who is a a true Muslim” 
are not questions that can be answered by private individuals.350 “The sharia,” insists 
                                                
348 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Nortre Dame: University of 
Nortre Dame Press, 2007). 
349 “If one wants to write an anthropology of Islam one should begin, as Muslims do, from 
the concept of a discursive tradition that includes and relates itself to the founding texts of 
the Qur’an and the Hadith…Islam is neither a distinctive social structure nor a 
heterogeneous collection of beliefs, artifacts, customs, and morals. It is a tradition,” claims 
Asad. This definition a priori excludes those self-identified Muslims who choose to interpret 
Islam individually. It also stigmatizes them for deviating from the will of God. See Talal 
Asad, "The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam," Qui Parle 17, no. 2 (2009)., 2, 14 [emphasis 
mine]. Nonetheless, empirical research shows that the number of self-identified Muslims 
who demand an autonomous space for themselves from tradition as well as from the state is 
growing. Asad’s definition disqualifies their claim to be Muslims. See Jocelyne Cesari, 
"Islam, Secularism and Multiculturalism after 9/11: A Transatlantic Comparison," in 
European Muslims and the Secular State, ed. Jocelyne Cesari and Seán McLoughlin 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe 
and in the United States..   
350 For other interpretations that refuse to define a single true Islam for Muslims, see. Sami 
Zubaida, Islam, the People and the State: Essays on Political Ideas and Movements in the 
Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001)., 133-131. Abdul Hamid el-Zein, "Beyond 
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Asad, “rejects the idea that the moral subject is completely sovereign. Islamic 
jurists…regard the individual’s ability to judge what conduct is right and good (for 
oneself as well as for others) to be dependent not on an inaccessible conscience but 
on embodied relationships.”351 One, in other words, becomes Muslim only in a 
Muslim community where external authorities intervene and shape behavior, 
dispositions, sensibilities, and forms of reasoning. In a sharp contrast to liberal 
individualism that posits a sovereign self, Islam requires absolute heteronomy and 
unconditional obedience.352 The members of the umma, claims Asad, do not hold 
“the right to choose his or her own ends.”353 
To the extent that the moral formation of the individual is the precondition of 
possibility for the emergence of true Islamic society, politics has a different 
genealogy and direction than it is in Western societies: “The formation of strong 
state power in the contemporary Middle East has a very different genealogy…In 
such polities, there is no public use of reason in Kant’s sense, nor are religious truths 
and religious criticism typically regarded by their public spokesman as matters 
                                                                                                                                     
Ideology and Theology: The Search for the Anthropology of Islam," Annual Review of 
Anthropology 6(1977)., 227. 
351 Asad, Formations of the Secular : Christianity, Islam, Modernity., 247-8, see also Saba 
Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject., 32-38.  
352 Asad, Genealogies of Religion : Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam., 222. 
353 Asad, Formations of the Secular : Christianity, Islam, Modernity., 222.  
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properly confined to the personal domain.”354 What Asad means is that reasoning 
from within Islam requires as its precondition a particular public that puts heavy 
restrictions on freedom of speech and behavior. Public deliberation, in other words, 
is deployed to construct moral selves whose ultimate obedience is to the sovereign 
God (Allah). Hence, in such polities, the public is not the sphere where strangers 
grant each other equal rights of participation with the expectation to agree on 
mutually binding norms but where a collective self strives to become the tool of 
divine inspiration and to mediate the bond between God and the pious individual. In 
such contexts, the argument goes, speech is not deployed to subvert social norms or 
to challenge religious authorities but to construct obedient selves and to re-strengthen 
God’s authority over the world.355 
Drawing on Saba Mahmood’s ethnographical research, Asad refers to the 
contemporary relevance of the embodied conception of Islam for Muslim women in 
modern Egypt.356 The women’s mosque movement analyzed by Mahmood is critical 
of the reduction of Islam into an abstract belief system; and aims to educate Muslims 
in those “virtues, ethical capacities, and forms of reasoning that participants perceive 
to have become either unavailable or irrelevant to the lives of ordinary Muslims.”357 
                                                
354 Asad, Genealogies of Religion : Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam., 207. 
355 See also Charles Hirschkind, "Religious Reason and Civic Virtue: An Islamic Counter-
Public," Cultural Anthropology 16, no. 1 (2001). 
356 Asad, Formations of the Secular : Christianity, Islam, Modernity., 89-91. 
357 Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject., 4. 
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The mosque movement, suggests Mahmood, “emerged in a response to the 
perception that religious knowledge, as a means for organizing daily life, had 
become increasingly marginalized under modern structures of secular 
governance.”358 One of the main objectives of the movement is to cultivate Islamic 
virtues of female modesty and obedience to appropriate male authorities. These 
women, claims Mahmood, willingly disempower themselves vis-à-vis Muslim 
men.359  
Asad and Mahmood offer the disempowered self or the religious virtuoso as a 
normatively superior alternative to the rights bearing, self-owning subject. The 
power exercised by these traditions of moral discipline on the body-and-mind, it is 
claimed, is not repressive but creates potentialities for meaningful experience.360 
Specific relations of subordination, the argument goes, enable the formation of a 
kind of virtuous moral subjectivity, which has been subjugated by secular 
modernity.361 
                                                
358 Ibid. 44. 
359 Even though the mosque movement attacks secular modernity for allowing what the 
tradition forbids, namely, an individualized Islam, it invokes the language of rights to claim 
access to true Islamic knowledge. Ibid. 71. 
360 Asad, Genealogies of Religion : Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam., 38. Mahmood Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist 
Subject., 31, 148. 
361 According to the anthropological reading, women’s fundamentalist preferences for gender 
hierarchy are based on essentially religious/moral reasons. However, empirical research 
shows that often economic rather than religious reasons underlie such preferences. 
According to a study conducted in eighteen Middle Eastern countries, “women with limited 
economic opportunities are more likely to take on fundamentalist (gender inequality) and 
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I suggest we unpack the aspiration to power in these discourses of 
disempowerment. It is worth emphasizing that the piety movement in Egypt aims to 
form an environment where pious selves can be cultivated, the precondition of which 
is the exclusion of practices that are deemed sinful. “The techniques through which 
pious desires are cultivated,” claims Mahmood, “include practices such as avoiding 
seeing, hearing, or speaking about things that make faith (iman) weaker, and 
engaging those acts that strengthen the ability to enact obedience to God’s will.”362 
The movement works to remove the obstacles in the realization of true Islamic 
selves, which includes practices like stigmatizing or ostracizing the less pious, if not 
physical exclusion or extermination. The pious women analyzed by Mahmood may 
disempower themselves vis-à-vis their male counterparts but they do empower 
themselves vis-à-vis those who are perceived to be less pious by the movement, male 
or female. In other words, the movement empowers self-appointed authorities of the 
so-called true Islamic traditions, especially vis-à-vis other self-identified Muslims 
who choose to interpret Islam in a manner they see fit, if necessary by breaking with 
the tradition altogether. As Asef Bayat suggests, the renewal proposed by 
fundamentalist movements in Egypt could not be achieved “by merely praying or 
fasting (ibada); da‘wa, making others equally pious, was now paramount. This could 
                                                                                                                                     
traditionalist belief systems that enhance their value as potential marriage partners.” See Lisa 
Blaydes and Drew A. Linzer, "The Political Economy of Women's Support for 
Fundamentalist Islam," World Politics 60, no. 4 (2008).  
362 Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject., 12. 
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cause division by breeding competition and differentiation instead of solidarity. 
Women of identical religiosity would associate among themselves (suhba) and shun 
the “less pious,” nonreligious, and non-Muslim. Although individual women 
enhanced their autonomy with this “turn to religion,” by reproducing patriarchal 
constraints they shut down possibilities for other women who did not share their 
ideology.”363 
What seems to be problematic in this alternative modernization project is the 
underlying conception of politics. Even though the emphasis on virtues brings to 
mind the civic republican tradition, these virtues have no relation to the joint practice 
of self-government as in the latter.364 Rather, virtues are seen to be necessary for the 
realization of social conformity to divinely ordained norms. To the extent that the 
mosque movement is a “world-making project” politics is understood as a process of 
“ethical self-realization,” to use Habermas’ terminology. In Mahmood’s view, this 
project does not challenge so much the secular doctrine of the separation of religion 
from issues of the state, but rather the process by which religion is relegated to its 
own differentiated sphere. Mahmood needs to explain how the separation of state 
and religion is supposed to take place in the absence of a distinction between the 
                                                
363 Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007)., 156. 
364 In the civic republican tradition that goes back to Aristotle, a good polity is seen to 
depend on its members being virtuous. For contemporary approaches to civic republicanism, 
see: Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, 1998); 
Pocock, The Ideal of Citizenship since Classical Times, Queen’s Quarterly, 99:1, 33-55. 
Adrian Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World 
(Routledge). Philip Petit, Republicanism (Oxford University Press, 1997) 
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political and the religious spheres. This is, perhaps, where the irony lies. Islamic 
morality invoked by the mosque movement is not juridical, suggests Mahmood. 
There are no centralized authorities to enforce the moral norm.365 Nonetheless, she 
recognizes that these Islamic movements to succeed need access to coercive state 
power in order to control the means with which the community is to be educated, to 
restrict freedom of speech and behavior, and to criminalize apostasy.366 They, in 
other words, have to monopolize the political and (if the salvation of the community 
is at stake distinguish friend from enemy and demand readiness to die). Hence, we 
are back to square one. The post-secular modernity can do nothing but affirm what it 
has challenged in the first place, that is, an intrusive state.   
Asad and Mahmood challenge secularism for aiming to normalize a 
particular ontology of the subject whose relationship to faith is entirely cognitive. In 
opposition to this generalized agency, we have an equally homogenized Muslim 
subject whose faith is embodied in and mediated by a Muslim community. As Judith 
Butler explains:  
 
It would seem that we are being asked to understand this battle as one 
between, on the one hand, a presumptively secular framework tied to an 
ontology of the subject as self-owned, on the other hand, a nonsecular 
framework that offers an ontology of the subject as dispossessed in 
                                                
365 Mahmood, Politics of Piety, p. 30. 
366 Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject., 193-194. 
Asad, Genealogies of Religion : Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam., 
218. 
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transcendence. This explanation, however, asks us to assume that there is a 
certain generalized secular ontology of the subject, and that secularization has 
effectively succeeded in establishing that ontology within the parameters of 
law and politics. I have questions about whether the secular and 
secularization are as monolithic as this.367 
 
I have also questions about whether Islam is as monolithic as it is suggested. While 
Asad is critical of a universal definition of religion, he finds no problem in 
normalizing a particular definition of Islam as universal. Asad does not hesitate to 
use expressions like the real Muslims, the virtuous Muslim, the pious Muslim, or the 
devout Muslim as if anthropology has a unique access to what true Islam is.368 The 
authoritative voice on Islam, I suggest, stems from a flawed use of Foucault’s 
genealogical method.  
Foucault defines genealogy as a method to resurrect “knowledges that have 
been disqualified as nonconceptual knowledges: naïve knowledges, hierarchically 
inferior knowledges that are below the required level of erudition and 
scientificity.”369 Asad claims to employ this method in his analyses of religion and 
secularism.370 His objective, in part, is to resurrect the knowledge of Islamic 
                                                
367 Judith Butler, "The Sensibility of Critique: The Response to Asad and Mahmood," in Is 
Critique Secular?: Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech, ed. Talal Asad (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2009)., 119. 
368 See Asad, Genealogies of Religion : Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam., 212, 219; Talal Asad, "Reading a Modern Classic: W. C. Smith's "the Meaning and 
End of Religion"," History of Religions 40, no. 3 (2001)., 139, 144.  
369 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-76., 7. 
370 Asad, Formations of the Secular : Christianity, Islam, Modernity., 16. 
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traditions that have allegedly been subjugated by secular modernity. However, for 
Foucault the whole point of de-subjugating the knowledge of the psychiatrized, for 
instance, is to make the critique of the normalizing tendencies of all modern 
discourses, successful or subjugated, possible. Accordingly, Foucault defines 
genealogy as a form of political strategy and intervention to fight the power-effects 
characteristic of all unitary discourses, scientific or religious, which seek 
orthodoxy.371 Foucault is equally critical of claims to power made by subjugated 
discourses, for such power would do nothing but re-constitute new relations of 
domination.372  Asad, on the other hand, suspends the genealogical critique when he 
analyzes the moral claims of subjugated Islamic traditions that are no less 
authoritarian than their “secular” alternatives. What these traditions themselves 
exclude is nowhere discussed.  
Foucault explicitly urges us to resist the temptation to form unitary discourses 
with knowledges resurrected by genealogy, a strategy that Asad persistently employs 
to essentialize the Muslim and to criticize secularism. Pace Asad, Foucault does not 
moralize discourses that claim to be true bodies of knowledge. Nor does he idealize 
the knowledge of the psychiatrized as Asad idealizes traditional Islamic knowledges. 
“That is the trap that is being set for us,” warns Foucault, and that is the trap into 
                                                
371 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-76., 10. 
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which Asad wants us to fall.373 Cohen and Arato succinctly capture the nature of 
Foucault’s method of genealogy that Asad ignores: 
 
Foucault is not a partisan of a simplistic reversal of values. Genealogical 
analyses reveal the power strategies involved in constituting new objects and 
identities (the homosexual, the hysterical woman, the pervert, the 
delinquency, insanity, sexuality) and the pejorative connotations attached to 
them. But the purpose of such analyses is not to encourage a revaluation in 
which homosexuality, the perversions, crime, insanity, sexuality are liberated, 
deemed natural, freed to speak out in their own voice. Such a strategy would 
do nothing to question the categorization in the first place or to undermine the 
agencies and mechanisms that perpetuate the grips of power on bodies, 
pleasures, and forms of knowledge. Instead, genealogy is meant to challenge 
not only the moral valuations of the normal and the perverse, for example, 
but also the very normalizing tendency associated with the demand that we 
understand ourselves through our sexuality, as if this says who we are.374 
 
Asad’s method of genealogy, on the other hand, serves different political purposes 
and yields different results. Pace Foucault, Asad uses genealogy precisely to reverse 
moral values. Asad aims to tip the balance of power in favor of the (essentialized) 
Muslim subject. In other words, Asad ends up creating the very problem that 
genealogy is meant to resist, that is, the formation of unitary discourses about the 
truth of a given identity. This critique is not equipped to offer us an alternative if our 
objective is to limit the reach of the state and other forms of societal discipline. We 
are led to assume that the resurrection of the virtuous Muslim through the techniques 
                                                
373 Ibid. 11. 
374 Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, Studies in 
Contemporary German Social Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992)., 291. 
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of discipline is the only way to reconstitute “meaning” in the Muslim Middle East 
and to stabilize Islamic political regimes. The assumption is that people in the 
Middle East understand themselves primarily through Islam—an assumption that has 
not been (theoretically or empirically) substantiated. Asad and Mahmood, just like 
Schmitt, assume that identity and meaning-making require the subjection of the 
individual to an external authority. Hence, the post-secular modernity ends up 
vindicating the responsibility of religious traditions to impose moral uniformity 
through the threat and the use of violence. Having equated constitutionalism with 
myth and violence, Asad and Mahmood, just like Foucault, cannot appeal to the 
empowering dimensions of law and rights. They leave us with no conceptual tools to 
challenge the normalizing discourses of religious traditions that grant themselves the 
responsibility/right to exclude the other. By avoiding the discourse of rights 
altogether, they abandon the “Muslim” to the goodwill of the self-appointed 
guardians of so-called religious traditions.  
 
II. BRINGING RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY BACK IN: JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS 
In Asad’s account of modernity, the term democracy scarcely appears.375 In 
an article called, “What Might an Anthropology of Secularism Look Like?” Asad has 
                                                
375 In Mahmood’s case, there is no discussion of democracy at all. In “Politics of Piety,” the 
term democracy appears only once. p.189. 
   
 
179 
a section entitled “Democratic Liberalism and Myth,” where there is only one 
paragraph that can give us a sense of what Asad means by liberal democracy:  
  
In fact liberal democracy expresses the two secular myths that are, 
notoriously at odds with each other: the Enlightenment myth of politics as a 
discourse of public reason whose bond with knowledge enables the elite to 
direct the education of mankind, and the revolutionary myth of universal 
suffrage, a politics of large numbers in which the representation of 
“collective will” is sought by quantifying the opinion and fantasy of 
individual citizen-electors. The secular theory of state toleration is based on 
these contradictory foundations: on the one hand elite liberal clarity seeks to 
contain religious passion, on the other hand democratic numbers allow 
majorities to dominate minorities even if both are religiously formed.376 
 
One presumes that, in this quotation, Asad is referring to the elitist conceptions of 
democracy defended by Joseph Schumpeter and his students.377 Even if Asad is right 
                                                
376 Asad, Formations of the Secular : Christianity, Islam, Modernity., 61. 
377 In Schumpeter’s view, ordinary citizens lack the necessary expertise to judge the matters 
of domestic or foreign policy. “The typical citizen,” Schumpeter suggests, “drops down to a 
lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field…He becomes a 
primitive again. His thinking becomes associative and affective.” These assumptions 
coupled with the experience of the rise of National Socialism, led Schumpeter to argue that 
active participation in the processes of will-formation is dangerous. Democratic politics is 
best when left to elites and professionals, and citizen participation is reduced to voting.  
Accordingly, Schumpeter defines democracy as a method “for arriving at political decisions 
in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people’s vote.” The voters must understand that “once they have elected an individual, 
political action is his business and not theirs.” In this model, it is the elites who form the 
political will from above. The idea of popular self-government is an incoherent and 
dangerous ideal. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: 
Routledge, 2003)., 262, 269, 295. See also: Adam Przeworski, "Minimalist Conception of 
Democracy: A Defense," in Democracy's Value, ed. Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-
Cordon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Anthony Downs, An Economic 
Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957). William Riker, Liberalism 
against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of 
Social Choice (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1982).  
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to criticize the limits of this model, the elitist conception of liberal democracy is by 
no means unchallenged in political theory. One work that immediately comes into 
mind is, of course, that of Jürgen Habermas. One expects that a critique that claims 
to unmask the mythical foundations of liberal democracy and its hypocrisy engage 
with the latter’s most fervent defender in the twentieth century.378 Habermas’ work is 
much more resilient against Asad’s (anachronistic) critique of liberal democracy, I 
suggest.  
The deliberative approach to liberal democracy challenges the competitive 
elitist model described above.379 According to Habermas, democracy cannot be 
reduced to a method for selecting leaders, who, in turn, are supposed do the 
“deciding.” Nor can the participatory features of democracy be reduced to the 
negative control of the representatives via secret, individual vote. Democratic 
politics, in this model, is not about the aggregation of pre-political preferences. On 
                                                
378 Only in one context and quite briefly does Asad refer to Habermas’ work saying “So 
Kant’s ideas of public, publicity, and critical reason have become part of a Habermasian 
story of the progressively liberating aspects of secular, bourgeois society.” Asad, Formations 
of the Secular : Christianity, Islam, Modernity., 202. Habermas’ work on public sphere and 
democracy is of course very much indebted to Kant but it also deviates from it. On the 
difference between Kantian moral theory and discourse ethics, see Habermas, Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action., 204-205. 
379 For comparisons of the two models, see: Jon Elster, "The Market and the Forum: Three 
Varieties of Political Theory," in Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, 
ed. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997). Joshua Cohen, 
"Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason 
and Politics, ed. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997). 
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the contrary, it entails the transformation of preferences in public deliberations.380 
Accordingly, collective will-formation is understood as an intersubjective process 
where “all those affected” participate in public deliberations as free and equal 
members with the aim to reach an agreement. In this model, there is no room for a 
special elite who is supposed to educate or manipulate the citizenry. Rather public 
interests and goals are formulated in public discourses with the participation of all 
those affected where only the force of the better argument prevails.381  
Habermas is able to defend the ideal of popular self-government precisely 
because he avoids a moral reading of human rights and reformulates the individualist 
impetus of liberalism intersubjectively. The objections raised by Asad and Mahmood 
concerning the ontology of the subject as sovereign in the state of nature prior to the 
community do not apply to the basic concepts of discourse ethics. Habermas’ distinct 
approach to law and democracy offers a “system of rights” that, unlike the liberal 
individualist model criticized by Asad and Mahmood, gives equal weight to both the 
                                                
380 On this point see Bernard Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation," Political 
Theory 15, no. 3 (1987). The process of deliberation, the confrontation of various points of 
view, helps to clarify information and to sharpen their own preferences. They may even 
modify their initial objectives, should that prove necessary. It is, therefore, necessary to alter 
radically the perspective common to both liberal theories and democratic thought: the source 
of legitimacy is not the predetermined will of individuals, but rather the process of its 
formation, that is, deliberation itself,” Manin suggests. (351-352) 
381 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and Rationalization of Society., 
25.Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy., 103. Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics., 
23. See also Seyla Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy," in 
Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political ed. Seyla Benhabib 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996)., 70.  
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private and the public autonomy of citizens.382 In this model, human rights and 
popular sovereignty, rather then being mutually exclusive, presuppose one another. 
In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas offers a critique of the normative, 
liberal approach to law in German jurisprudence from Immanuel Kant to Hans 
Kelsen. The latter’s individualistic reading of rights, Habermas claims, obscures the 
conceptual relationship between the principles of morality, law, and democracy. In 
the Kantian tradition, the system of rights is seen to be prior to and independent from 
democratic lawmaking and is not justified within legal theory itself. The priority of 
private autonomy over public autonomy or of rights over popular sovereignty 
defended in the Kantian tradition conceals the real problem concerning private 
rights: “the source from whence enacted law may draw its legitimacy is not 
successfully explained,” claims Habermas.383  
In Habermas’ view, the priority of private autonomy rests on a misguided 
notion of solitary individual who already has at his disposal the capacity for moral 
reasoning prior to all association. Habermas is no less sanguine about the conceptual 
incoherence of liberal individualism than Asad.384 He explicitly rejects “the 
monological approach of Kant, who assumed that the individual tests his maxims of 
action foro interno or, as Husserl put it, in the loneliness of his soul. This singularity 
                                                
382 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy., 118. 
383 Ibid. 89.  
384 See also Asad, Formations of the Secular : Christianity, Islam, Modernity., 137. 
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of Kant’s transcendental consciousness simply takes for granted a prior 
understanding among a plurality of empirical egos; their harmony is 
preestablished.”385  
In contrast to Kant, Habermas holds a dialogical perspective, where norms of 
action are established in an intersubjective manner in public discourses. In this 
model, the individual is not set against the community; rather the two are 
interdependent. “No one can maintain his identity by himself,” claims Habermas.386 
The formation of individual identities requires mutual recognition and collaboration. 
Seen from this perspective, public autonomy is not secondary or inferior to private 
autonomy since those who participate in the joint practice of lawmaking are the same 
individuals who use these rights individually as private persons. This is to say, the 
authors and addressees of the law are one and the same: “At a conceptual level, 
rights do not immediately refer to atomistic and estranged individuals who are 
possessively set against one another. On the contrary, as elements of the legal order 
they presuppose collaboration among subjects who recognize one another, in their 
reciprocally related rights and duties, as free and equal citizens. This mutual 
recognition is constitutive for a legal order from which actionable rights are 
derived.”387  
                                                
385 Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action., 203. 
386 Ibid. 200. 
387 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy., 88. Habermas’ emphasis.  
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Habermas not only distances himself from the moral reading of human rights, 
but also from the ethical reading of popular sovereignty that he finds in Rousseau. 
According to Habermas, while both Kant and Rousseau understand that public and 
private autonomy can be reconciled as the two sources of legitimacy, the former 
gives primacy to private autonomy, the latter to public autonomy. In Habermas’ 
view, Rousseau bases public autonomy on a pre-existing homogeneous community 
as a macro subject capable of will and action. He grounds law in the shared life of a 
unitary and virtuous ethical community. Therefore, Rousseau fails to explain how 
general will can be reconciled with the free choice of individuals without 
repression.388 
The intersubjective character of rights defended by Habermas avoids the 
pitfalls of liberal individualism while simultaneously securing the individualistic 
core of the modern conception of freedom. Autonomy and dependency, according to 
this model, need not be put in an antagonistic relationship. I will return to this issue 
in the next chapter. However, we still have not addressed the question of the 
impartiality of the state with respect to different conceptions of the good. The 
discourse theory of democracy aims to guarantee the equal rights of every group to 
co-existence by positing the priority of the right over the good. This is not a trivial 
presupposition, and as we have seen, according to the critics of secularism the very 
                                                
388 Ibid. 101-103. For a critique of Habermas’ interpretation of both Kant and Rousseau, see 
Ingeborg Maus, "Liberties and Popular Sovereignty: On Jü Rgen Habermas’s 
Reconstruction of the System of Rights," Cardozo Law Review 17(1995-1996). 
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idea of democratic constitutional state that claims to be impartial with respect to the 
question of the good life is a violent myth concealing the ways in which non-secular 
traditions are subjugated. The problem with this critique, I suggest, is that it operates 
within a monolithic understanding of practical reason that fails to differentiate 
between moral discourses of justice and ethical discourses of self-realization. In the 
absence of this differentiation, critics like Asad and Mahmood fail to offer a theory 
of integration in the face of the fact of pluralism. Once these two spheres are 
differentiated at a conceptual level, we can imagine two different and yet 
interdependent forms of integration: the political integration of all citizens into an 
abstract identity and the ethical integration of various sub-groups into particular 
collective identities around their own conceptions of the good. Based on the work of 
Habermas, I suggest that it is precisely the differentiated structure of modernity that 
can secure the co-existence of a plurality of different form of life (religious or not) 
without being subjected to coercion. The democratic constitutional state is uniquely 
equipped to give us an idea of living together regardless of different worldviews we 
uphold.  
 
III: DISCOURSE ETHICS AND THE PRIORITY OF JUSTICE 
What is missing in Asad’s critique of secularism is an impartial medium 
through which different groups organized around different conceptions of the good 
can communicate and agree on those norms that would regulate their living together 
without resorting to violence. It operates with a monolithic understanding of 
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practical reason that fails to differentiate between moral discourses of justice and 
ethical discourses of self-realization. According to Habermas, given the “fact of 
pluralism,” philosophy can no longer be concerned with the question of good life or 
of the meaning of life.389 Ethical clarification at the level of individual or collectivity 
concerns only those that are involved and not philosophy. “In view of the morally 
justified pluralism of life projects and life-forms, philosophers can no longer provide 
on their own account generally binding directives concerning the meaning of life,” 
claims Habermas.390 This approach gives priority to questions of justice over 
questions of the good life.391 
                                                
389 Habermas is taking issue with the communitarian approaches to philosophy that defines 
the task of the latter as clarifying the meaning of life. 
390 Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics., 75. Habermas’ 
emphasis.  
391 The priority of the right over the good is a distinctive feature of Kantian deontological 
theory. For contemporary interpretations see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1971). Rawls, Political Liberalism; John Rawls, "The Priority of 
Right and Ideas of the Good," Philosophy & Public Affairs 17, no. 4 (1988). In 
contemporary literature, the claim that the right (justice) is prior to the good has led to what 
is known as the “liberal-communitarian” debate. Similar to the critique of Asad and 
Mahmood, the communitarian challenge mainly revolves around the foundation of liberalism 
in an atomistic conception of individual prior to all social relations. Michael Walzer, for 
instance, claims that that there is nothing external to community, hence, a society is just if its 
organized around the shared understandings of its members. Michael Sandel makes a similar 
argument in suggesting that the self is embedded in existing practices. Therefore, he defines 
common good as a substantive conception of the good life. Based on these criticisms, 
communitarians argue that the claim that the right is prior to the good in fact privileges a 
particular conception of good life based on individual autonomy instead of achieving 
neutrality. Nonetheless, this critique cannot be applied to the basic principles of discourse 
theory as the latter is based on an intersubjective conception of the self. Michael J. Sandel, 
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic 
Books, 1983). For other communitarian critiques of liberalism, see Charles Taylor, 
Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge 




Habermas defines discourse ethics as an intermediate position between the abstract 
individualism of Kantian moral theory and the communitarian ethics of the good in 
the tradition of Aristotle and Hegel.392 Discourse ethics, claims Habermas, “takes its 
orientation for an intersubjective interpretation of the categorical imperative from 
Hegel’s theory of recognition but without incurring the cost of a historical 
dissolution of morality in ethical life.”393 Habermas’ aim is to show the different 
ways in which discourse theory is related to moral, ethical, and pragmatic questions. 
                                                                                                                                     
University Press, 1985). MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. For 
commentaries on the liberal-communitarian debate, see Amy Gutmann, "Communitarian 
Critiques of Liberalism," Philosophy and Public Affairs 14, no. 3 (1985). Allen E. 
Buchanan, "Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism," Ethics 99, no. 4 (1989).  
392 Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics., 1, 91. As the 
following discussion suggests, given the distinction Habermas makes between ethics and 
morality it is more accurate to talk about a discourse theory of morality rather than discourse 
ethics. However, despite the confusion Habermas continues to speak of discourse ethics 
since it has become customary. Following Habermas and others, I will continue to employ 
the term discourse ethics instead of discourse morality. See Ibid. vii. 
393 Ibid. 1. See also ———, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action., 195-216. 
Habermas mitigates Kant’s moral solipsism by embedding moral consciousness within an 
intersubjective context. In discourse ethics, there is no prior shared understanding preceding 
the individual except for the universals of language use. Therefore, moral reasoning is not a 
hypothetical conversation with oneself that takes place in the privacy of one’s mind, rather it 
refers to actual public communicative exchanges practiced intersubjectively by all involved 
as equal partners. Opinions and decisions are formed though intersubjective dialogue. To 
this extent, the moral point of view is different than Rawls’ original position where moral 
argumentation takes place under the “veil of ignorance.”  Moral norms are right not because 
the participants are unaware of each others’ actual positions or life contexts. On the contrary, 
norms are right because they take into account the input of all involved. For other 
commentaries see, Seyla Benhabib, "In the Shadow of Aristotle and Hegel: Communicative 
Ethics and the Current Controversy in Practical Philosophy," in Situating the Self: Gender, 
Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992). 
Kenneth Baynes, "The Liberal-Communitarian Controversy and Communicative Ethics," 
Philosophy and Social Criticism 14, no. 3-4 (1988). 
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In what follows, I restrict my discussion to the distinction between moral and ethical 
discourses, leaving aside pragmatic ones.394 
Ethical discourses, claims Habermas, take place within the horizon of the life 
history of an individual asking the question “Who am I, and who would I like to 
be?”395 When translated into the political realm, ethical questions take the form of 
“Who are we and who would we like to be as citizens?”396 Such questions are 
existential in nature and inextricably interwoven with each individual’s or group’s 
identity. They concern not simply contingent disposition but the self-realization of a 
person or a collectivity. In the realm of ethics, self-understanding is embedded in the 
context of a specific life history and specific traditions.  
Asad and Mahmood do not refute this conception of ethics when they call for 
the necessity to consider each tradition in its own terms.397 Just like Habermas, they 
define ethics as local and particular, concerning specific discourses and techniques 
through which subjects are formed, and have a sense of themselves. “The mosque 
                                                
394 In the realm of pragmatic discourses the classical question of ethics “What should I do?” 
proceeds within the horizon of purposive rationality in the Weberian sense, with the goal of 
discovering relevant strategies and programs. Pragmatic recommendations takes the 
semantic form of conditional imperatives or what Habermas calls “relative oughts” 
specifying what one must do under given conditions to achieve certain goals. Habermas, 
Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics., 2-3. ———, Between Facts 
and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy., 159-160.  
395 Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics., 4. 
396 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy., 160 
397 Asad, Genealogies of Religion : Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam., 200. Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject., 28. 
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movement’s goal is to introduce a common set of shared norms or standards by 
which one is to judge one’s own conduct, whether in the context of employment, 
education, domestic life, or other social activities,” suggests Mahmood.398 According 
to Habermas, on the other hand, even if such norms have the semantic form of 
unconditional imperatives, the logic of these imperatives cannot be universalized for 
they designate “what is good for me or for my group.” In other words, they are only 
unconditional within a given life history or tradition. “The meaning of this 
imperative can be understood as an “ought” that is not dependent on subjective 
purposes and preferences and yet is not absolute. What you “should” or “must” do 
has here the sense that it is “good” for you to act in this way in the long run, all 
things considered. Aristotle speaks in this connection of paths to the good and happy 
life. Strong evaluations take their orientation from a goal posited absolutely for me, 
that is, from the highest good of a self-sufficient form of life that has its value in 
itself.”399 
In contrast to the ego or ethno-centric logic of ethical discourses, moral 
discourses have a universal logic. They concern the question “what is equally good 
for all?” In moral discourses, the teleological point of view is replaced by the 
universal point of view from which we intersubjectively decide in public discourses 
on those norms that are meant to regulate our living together. “In moral discourse,” 
                                                
398 Ibid. 46. 
399 Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics., 5.  
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suggests Habermas, “the ethnocentric perspective of a particular collectivity expands 
into the comprehensive perspective of an unlimited communication community, all 
of whose members put themselves in each individual’s situation, worldview, and 
self-understanding, and together practice an ideal role taking.”400  
The virtue of the moral perspective is its insistence on the imperative to give 
an equal voice to all those affected. Given the prevalence of a variety of conceptions 
of the good life in modern societies, Habermas gives priority to justice (or the right) 
over the good in order to include everyone on an equal footing. The demand for 
universal inclusion, in turn, requires a shift in perspective or a certain distancing 
from the self and the particular life context or tradition within which it is embedded: 
“Participants in processes of self-clarification cannot distance themselves from the 
life histories and forms of life in which they actually find themselves. Moral-
practical discourses, by contrast, require a break with all of the unquestioned truths 
of an established, concrete ethical life, in addition to distancing oneself from the 
contexts of life with which one's identity is inextricably interwoven.”401 
However, Habermas is faced with the question of the very possibility of 
transcending one’s life context that is required from the moral point of view. Is a 
                                                
400 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy., 162. 
401 Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics., 12.  
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break with one’s life history or tradition possible or desirable?402 Richard Bernstein 
strongly opposes to the distinction between questions of justice and of good life, 
calling it “a violently distortive fiction.” In his view, it is meaningless to suggest that 
universal questions of justice require a different logic of argumentation than 
questions of self-realization. In his view, Habermas is guilty of “the myth of the 
framework.”403 “It is a fiction—and indeed a violently distortive fiction—to suggest 
that ethical discourse is limited to discourse about particular historical groups—that 
ethical discourse qua ethics never has a genuinely universal scope. It is a fiction to 
suggest that there are, or ever were, two separate types of discourse—ethics and 
morals, with two independent logics. Such a dichotomy falsities both ethics and 
morals,” claims Bernstein.404 
A similar objection is also raised by Thomas McCarthy who suggests that 
questions of justice always arise within the framework given life histories and 
traditions. Accordingly, the priority of the right over the good cannot be absolute. 
“The standpoint of impartiality cannot be institutionalized “independently of any 
specific, context-dependent conception of the good.” Rather, “neutrality” has to be 
                                                
402 Alasdair MacIntyre fiercely dismisses the claim that public reasoning can proceed 
without shared traditions. He suggests that unless participants make an existential 
commitment to a tradition, they cannot make moral judgments. “I can only answer the 
question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘Of what story or stories do I 
find myself a part?” MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory., 216.  
403 Richard J. Bernstein, "The Retrival of Democratic Ethos," in Habermas on Law and 
Democracy: Critical Exchanges, ed. Michel Rosenfeld and Andrew Arato (Berkeley: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998)., 302. 
404 Ibid. 301.  
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interpreted in relation to the cultures and self-understandings of historically 
determinate collectivities,” claims McCarthy.405 Based on these criticisms, Bernstein 
and McCarthy call for the abandonment of the distinction between moral and ethical 
discourses.406  
Bernstein and McCarthy do have a point when they suggest moral discourses 
are already permeated by ethical discourses of self-understanding, and that a radical 
break with the latter would run the risk of making the former unintelligible. 
Habermas himself is not entirely unequivocal with respect to these objections. For 
instance, at one point, he suggests “the individual attains reflective distance from his 
own life history only within the horizon of forms of life that he shares with 
others.”407 In a similar vein, elsewhere, he suggests, “every legal system is also the 
expression of a particular form of life.”408 From the perspective of Bernstein and 
McCarthy, one could argue that Habermas is caught in a performative self-
contradiction. Either he must grant that reflective distance arises within the horizon 
                                                
405 Thomas McCarthy, "Legitimacy and Diversity: Dialectical Reflections on Analytic 
Distinctions," in Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges, ed. Michel 
Rosenfeld and Andrew Arato (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 147. 
406 Even if both Bernstein and McCarthy challenge the distinction between moral and ethical 
discourses, they approach the issue from different angles. While Bernstein is critical of 
Habermas for not grounding deliberative democracy in a democratic ethos; McCarthy’s 
criticism attacks the issue of rational consensus as he sees substantive disagreements over 
conceptions of the good life as an inevitable feature of democratic politics.  
407 Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics., 11. Emphasis 
mine.  
408 Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State.", 124. 
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of one’s life history, which, in turn, contradicts his call for the necessity of a break 
with ethical life. Or he must grant that a break is desirable and possible but then he 
gets entangled with the kind of Kantian abstract individualism that he tries to 
distance himself from. However this contradiction is not self-defeating. Rather it is 
due to the way in which moral and ethical discourses are interrelated. There is no 
need to oppose the right to the good or construct them in a mutually exclusive 
fashion in order to suggest the priority of right over the good. The priority or excess 
of the right over the good does not designate an antagonism between questions of 
justice and questions of self-understanding. Rather it seems to call for their 
inseparability. This is not to suggest that one can equate justice with ethical life 
either, for we cannot determine “what is equally good for everyone” once and for all. 
Accordingly, one could argue that we cannot talk about questions of justice (what is 
equally good for all) without an appeal to the particularity of our life contexts; and 
we cannot talk about ethical questions (what is good for me or for my group) without 
an appeal to the moral point of view.409 As Habermas suggests “if the actors do not 
bring with them, and into their discourse, their individual life-histories, their 
                                                
409 William Rehg clarifies the relevance of goods in moral discourse succinctly: “How else 
could participants determine that a norm was “equally good for all” or had “acceptable 
consequences for the satisfaction of each individual’s interests” if each participant did not 
have some sense of the others’ notion of the good life? Without this it would be impossible 
to evaluate whether a norm put someone else at a relative disadvantage.” William Rehg, 
Insight and Solidarity: A Study in the Discourse Ethics of Jurgen Habermas (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994)., 101.  
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identities, their needs and wants, their traditions, memberships, and so forth, 
practical discourse would at once be robbed of all content.”410 
What I am trying to suggest is even if the transcendence of one’s life history 
required by the moral point of view may remain an impossible task, foreign to the 
order of “I can;” without at least the thought of this abstract question “what is 
equally good for all” prior to all conceptions of the good, we would not have an idea 
of living together beyond ego or ethno-centrism. Habermas is right to suggest that in 
the absence of a distinction between ethical questions of good life and moral 
questions of justice it is inevitable that we arrive at a Schmittian type of politics.  
 
If questions of justice cannot transcend the ethical self-understanding of 
competing forms of life, and if existentially relevant value conflicts and 
oppositions must penetrate all controverted political questions, then in the 
final analysis we end up with something resembling Carl Schmitt's 
understanding of politics. If political conflicts are essentially ethical in 
nature, and thus as such do not allow one to expect a rationally motivated 
solution at the more abstract level of justice, then citizens must assume that 
for the sphere of politics as a whole it is fruitless to expect anything other 
than (more or less reasonable) dissensus. Any alternative other than this 
would mean that citizens could also adopt a different perspective, say that of 
justice, which would take them beyond the perspective of members who are 
immediately engaged in value conflicts. As long as this is not considered a 
possibility, it remains incomprehensible how political debates shot through 
with rationally irresolvable value conflicts and dominated by opposing 
identities should be settled at all except by existential struggle or force 
imposed from above, or at best by imposed procedures of compromise.411 
                                                
410 Habermas, "A Reply to My Critics.", 255. 
411 Jürgen Habermas, "Reply to Symposium Participants, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of 
Law," in Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges, ed. Michel Rosenfeld and 
Andrew Arato (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 395-396. Emphasis mine.  




The critics of secularism like Asad and Mahmood rightly point out the 
difficulties minorities face in those contexts where a majority (or a minority) culture 
dominates legal relations. However, ignoring the differentiation between the 
questions of self-realization and questions of justice, they lack an egalitarian theory 
of integration that accepts plurality and difference. Asad goes as far as to suggest that 
Muslims cannot live under liberal democratic regimes as Muslims. “Because in 
theory the citizens who constitute a democratic state belong to a class that is defined 
only by what is common to all its members and its members only. What is common 
is the abstract equality of individual citizens to one another, so that each counts 
one.”412 This interpretation ignores half of what is or should be meant by integration 
into a common political culture. The internal connection between the abstract 
political identity that includes all citizens equally and the particular collective 
identities of various sub-groups is obscured from view.  
In contrast to the monistic interpretation criticized by Asad, Habermas’ 
differentiation of moral and ethical discourses points to a distinction between two 
levels of integration, national and subnational. Accordingly, the abstract equality of 
all at the political level does not negate the association of various groups around 
particular conceptions of the good at the sub-political level. Rather they complement 
one another. “The integrity of the individual legal person cannot be guaranteed 
without protecting the intersubjectively shared experiences and life contexts in which 
                                                
412 Asad, Formations of the Secular : Christianity, Islam, Modernity., 173. 
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the person has been socialized and has formed his or her identity,” suggests 
Habermas.413 The distinction between the two levels of integration achieves two 
objectives at once. First, it prevents the majority from usurping state prerogatives 
and violating the equal right to co-existence. Put differently, it allows groups to 
associate around particular conceptions of the good without being subjected to the 
whims of the majority. Second, the abstract legal equality at the political level 
prevents subgroups from coercing their own members through an appeal to the 
prerogatives of religion and the like.  
From this perspective, there is no conceptual necessity to craft the theory of 
secular state on a particular ontology of the subject. Nor on an essentialized 
conception of religion. A secular state that aims to secure freedom of religion via an 
intersubjective interpretation of the system of rights that can include groups 
organized around an embodied conception of religion, but it cannot recognize the 
right of any group (religious or not) to coerce its own members. This is to say that 
individuals are free to enter into relationships of subordination at a sub-political level 
within life contexts that they deem authentic or meaningful.  
What is meant by the priority of the right over the good has nothing to with 
the normalization of a particular conception of the good life, but with the protection 
of interpersonal autonomy without which we cannot begin to talk about non-coercive 
forms of living together. It is true that to the extent that it secures personal autonomy 
                                                
413 Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State.", 129. 
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from self-appointed religious authorities, the differentiated structure of the 
constitutional state could easily lead to the decline of illiberal religious traditions 
since it can only make “the hermeneutic achievement of the cultural reproduction 
possible, but it cannot guarantee it. For to guarantee survival would necessarily rob 
the members of the very freedom to say yes or no that is necessary if they are to 
















                                                
414 Ibid. 130. As Cesari suggests, the experience of Muslims living in Europe where the state 
does not seek to define the Islamic tradition has let to the individualization of Muslim 
religiosity and the emergence of a young generation of Muslim men and women who 
demand autonomy from traditional authorities. Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet: 
Muslims in Europe and in the United States. See also Gema Martin-Munoz and Ana Lopez-
Sala, "Migration and the Religiosity of Muslim Women in Spain," in European Muslims and 
the Secular State, ed. Jocelyne Cesari and Seán McLoughlin (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005). 
Christine Jacobsen, "The Quest for Authenticity: Islamization Amongst Muslim Youth in 
Norwar," in European Muslims and the Secular State, ed. Jocelyne Cesari and Seán 
McLoughlin (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005). Olivier Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 
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CHAPTER V: FRIENDSHIP, JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRACY 
 In this chapter, I will continue to inquire into the nature of secular democratic 
constitutional state by focusing on the work Jacques Derrida and deconstruction. 
Derrida gives us the missing element in Schmitt, that is, the friend. By displacing the 
logic of opposition between the self and the other on the one hand, autonomy and 
dependency on the other hand, Derrida manages to locate a minimum of friendship at 
the origin of all social relations moving us beyond Schmitt’s nationalism. He 
interprets sovereignty as a weak force always conditioned, limited, and shared; and 
the political as a sphere of mutual rights and responsibilities, thereby he arrives at a 
universalizable model of constitutional democracy. I suggest that deconstruction à la 
Derrida offers a conception of the political not only beyond the sacrificial logic of 
Schmittian political theology but also without falling into the fallacies of Habermas’ 
new post-secular approach, which I will discuss in this chapter. 
 I develop my reading around Derrida’s critics and defenders alike, arguing 
that what is meaningful in deconstruction regarding the secularization of the political 
and of sovereignty is misinterpreted by both. The critics characterize deconstruction 
as a new form of Schmittian political theology. The defenders, on the other hand, 
celebrate deconstruction for revealing the essentially adversarial nature of 
democratic politics. I will address these charges in return. My point being they are 
both wrong, albeit for different reasons.415  
                                                
415 There are other readings in the literature that are more in line with mine. See, for instance: 
Michael Naas, Derrida from Now On (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008). Naas 
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First, the critics: My two interlocutors are Richard Wolin and Wendy Brown. 
Both Wolin and Brown, albeit from different perspectives, claim to identify a certain 
political theology (that both find Schmittian) infecting deconstruction in general and 
Derrida’s thinking about law, justice, and democracy in particular. However, it must 
also be noted that despite their agreement on the alleged Schmittianism of Derrida, 
they offer contradictory reading of Derrida (which, perhaps, stem from their 
divergent readings of Schmitt). For Wolin, Derrida is a nihilist tout court with a 
strong aversion to concepts like constitutional democracy and human rights. Rather 
committing itself to universal norms or rights, deconstruction “glorifies the moment 
of particularity in a manner that is frankly decisionistic.”416 Derrida, according to this 
reading, by divorcing law and justice raises the specter of judgmental arbitrariness. 
“Under the cover of the “undecidable,”” claims Wolin,  “Derrida has already made a 
momentous and unequivocal decision: for “singularity,” “madness,” and the 
                                                                                                                                     
has two important chapters on Derrida’s understanding of secularism and sovereignty (Ch. 3, 
7 respectively). On deconstructive ethics, see John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of 
Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1997). See 
also Caputo’s discussion in John D. Caputo, "A Commentary: Deconstruction in a Nutshell," 
in Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, ed. John D. Caputo 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2004). This volume also contains a roundtable 
discussion where Derrida explains his understanding of sovereignty, religion, and ethics. On 
Derrida’s perspective on justice, law, and politics see Drucilla Cornell, "The Violence of the 
Masquerade: Law Dressed up as Justice," Cardozo Law Review 11(1989-1990); Drucilla 
Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson, eds., Deconstruction and the 
Possibility of Justice (New York: Routledge,1992).  
416 Richard Wolin, "Down by Law: Deconstruction and the Problem of Justice," in The 
Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to 
Postmodernism (2004)., 236. 
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“mystical,” against formal procedures, rules, and rationality.”417 The logic of 
deconstruction is essentially theological, according to this reading. 
Wolin criticizes Derrida for drawing on Schmitt. It is true that Derrida 
focuses on many themes that Schmitt had problematized throughout his life, like the 
nature of the political, of sovereignty, or the relationship between the rule of law and 
sovereignty. As I discuss below, these agreements on certain subject matters and 
diagnoses make Derrida hardly a Schmittian. On the contrary, whenever Derrida 
draws on Schmitt it is to challenge and ultimately refute the right to suspend rights 
and law that Schmitt associates with sovereignty. Whenever Derrida invokes 
sovereignty and decision, it is to affirm the norm, not to discredit it. Nor does he 
reduce the rule of law to an inferior, secondary form of rule next to the rule of the 
people. As I discuss below, Schmitt and Derrida deeply disagree on the nature of 
sovereignty. Not only does Derrida show the conceptual incoherence of Schmitt’s 
understanding of sovereignty as decision on the exception, but also he offers a novel 
way to re-think and re-justify a universalizable model of liberal constitutional 
democracy today.  
In contrast to Wolin, Brown presents us a “liberal” Derrida, one who is 
unconditionally committed to the principles of constitutional democracy that she 
finds utterly unjustifiable in its theological logic.418 Liberal constitutionalism, in 
                                                
417 Ibid. 238. 
418 Wendy Brown, "Sovereign Hesitations," in Derrida and the Time of the Political, ed. 
Pheng Cheah and Suzanne Guerlac (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2009). 
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Brown’s reading, rests on the political theology of a sovereign subject who is free to 
do what he pleases, an ontology that (supposedly) continues to inform Derrida’s 
notion of democracy-to-come.  
I concur with Wendy Brown that Derrida’s notion of democracy-to-come is 
strongly tied to the rule of law and human rights. However, our agreement ends there 
for her account, I suggest, rests on two fallacies. First, the argument that democracy-
to-come re-iterates the theological logic of Schmittian sovereignty as the final 
authority over life and death rests on an extremely one-sided reading of Derrida’s 
deconstruction of ipseity (selfhood) and completely ignores the role the notion of 
autoimmunity or what I call “self-differentiation” plays in Derrida’s re-thinking of 
sovereignty as a weak, divided force. Second, I reject her claim that there is no 
conceptual relationship between the discourses of law, sovereignty and rights on the 
one hand, and democracy on the other. Brown invites us to take the step that Derrida 
refuses and completely divorces democracy from the whole logic of sovereignty. As 
I discuss below, for Derrida the loss of the concept of sovereignty translates into the 
loss of justice.  
Wolin’s and Brown’s readings of Derrida are, of course, not the only ones 
available in the literature. Derrida has been usually celebrated by and influenced the 
agonistic readings of democracy (Chantal Mouffe and Bonnie Honig, for instance). 
The latter theorists often invoke his work in order to discredit the discourse theory of 
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democracy defended by Habermas. They argue that Habermasian notions like 
consensus and reconciliation are misguided attempts to reduce democracy to the rule 
of law. The discourse theory, according to this reading, fails to capture the inherently 
adversarial nature of democracy that cannot be disciplined by communicative 
rationality. Derrida, in their opinion, understands this agonistic dimension of 
democracy better than Habermas.  
The differences between critical theory à la Habermas and deconstruction à la 
Derrida notwithstanding, I argue that starting from deconstruction one cannot arrive 
at agonism or antagonism defying the whole logic of discourse theory of democracy. 
I suggest that just like Wolin and Brown, the defenders of an agonistic conception of 
democracy also conceal what is defensible in the way in which Derrida re-thinks 
constitutional democracy. Agonists mis-appropriate Derrida’s work and wrongly 
oppose the rule of the people to the rule of law in order to rescue the democratic 
agency of the present and, hence, in my view, remain in the paradigm of theological 
sovereignty defended by Schmitt. Below I show that what Derrida locates at the 
origin of constitutional democracy is not an originary antagonism but an originary 
sociability in order to arrive at a secular understanding of the political. Even though 
Derrida is attentive to the moments of rupture in democratic processes, he does not 
reduce democratic decision-making to extra-legal moments that wholly escape legal 
norms. On the contrary, he warns us against such “pure” notions of politics wholly 
separated from juridical battles.  
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It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to analyze the differences and 
similarities of critical theory and deconstruction. Nevertheless, I will return to them, 
albeit often superficially, throughout this chapter. In my opinion, Habermas and 
Derrida’s approach to philosophy and political theory is informed by the same 
question, that is, “what would be an idea of living-together in friendship and 
solidarity given the fact of pluralism?” The differences between deconstruction and 
critical theory notwithstanding, both imagine this idea of living-together by means of 
positive law.  They deeply agree on certain premises like the complementary nature 
of the rule of law and the rule of the people and the necessity of thinking sovereignty 
and politics beyond Schmitt’s theological model, while disagreeing on the “ground” 
on which such premises must be defended and re-analyzed (intersubjectivity in 
Habermas and self-differentiation in Derrida).419 Their deepest disagreement that is 
                                                
419 It is worth noting that at certain critical junctures after the 9/11 Habermas and Derrida 
have agreed to appear together and in one occasion signed a declaration together (written by 
Habermas) saying that it is urgent that “French and German philosophers lift their voices 
together, whatever disagreements may have separated them in the past,” given the 
imperialist projects of the United States disregarding international law and the UN 
resolutions. Both agree to share the following premises and perspectives: “the determination 
of new European political responsibilities beyond any Eurocentrism; the call for a renewed 
confirmation and effective transformation of international law and its institutions, in 
particular the UN; a new conception and praxis for the distribution of state authority, etc., 
according to the spirit, if not the precise sense, that refers back to the Kantian tradition.” See 
Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, "February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A 
Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe," Constellations 10, no. 
3 (2003)., 291. See also their interviews with Giovanna Borradori right after the 9/11 in 
Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and 
Jacques Derrida (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003). In this book, Borradori 
also offers insightful analyses into the differences and similarities between them. In a 
remarkable piece explaining the complex relationship between Derrida and Habermas, 
Simon Critchley makes the following observations with which I fully agree: “in the future 
we might at the very least be able to imagine a peaceful cohabitation, where they [Habermas 
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relevant to my thesis is perhaps the notion of post-secular that Habermas defends in 
his recent writings. As I discuss below, Derrida, pace Habermas, does not break with 
the differentiation thesis and the traditional “secularist” insistence on the necessity of 
radically separating state and positive religion. I suggest that Derrida’s understanding 
of political democracy, not only implies the separation of state and religion based on 
a radical notion of religious neutrality, but also secures freedom of religion and 
conscience without granting religious citizens special privileges in lawmaking as in 
Habermas.  
In what follows, I will briefly discuss what deconstruction means in the work 
of Derrida (I), explain the way in which Derrida deconstructs sovereignty (II), 
understands democratic solidarity (III), and constitutional democracy (IV). In the 
final section, I will assess and reject Habermas’ argument for post-secular 
constitutional democracy (V). 
I. WHAT IS DECONSTRUCTION? 
What is deconstruction? A full answer to this simple question, if there is one, 
would require a thesis of its own, starting from Ancient Greece, passing through the 
metaphysics of major world religions and culminating in the Kantian Enlightenment. 
                                                                                                                                     
and Derrida] would occupy separate apartments in the same intellectual building, perhaps 
with a connecting door or two.” Simon Critchley, "Remarks on Derrida and Habermas," 
Constellations 7, no. 4 (2000)., 456. Norris suggests that “deconstruction, properly 
understood, belongs within the same ‘philosophical discourse of modernity’ that Habermas 
sets out to defend against its present-day detractors.” Christopher Norris, "Deconstruction, 
Postmodernism and Philosophy: Habermas on Derrida," in Derrida: A Critical Reader, ed. 
David Wood (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992)., 170. 
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Such an undertaking is beyond the simple objectives of this chapter. Nonetheless, in 
the hopes of being clear and true to Derrida’s intentions, I suggest the following: 
deconstruction is a novel way to re-think binaries (universal/singular, male/female, 
friend/enemy, etc.) in a non-oppositional fashion.  
In Western metaphysics, claims Derrida, binaries are arranged in a 
hierarchical fashion. The first term of the pair (the male, for instance) is marked as 
positive or privileged as primary at the expense of the other (the female). 
Deconstruction aims at destabilizing or displacing this oppositional logic by showing 
that the privileged term in the opposition is never pure but always unequal to itself, 
that is, forever dependent on the other term for its very meaning. Hence, the second 
term is not derivative or secondary but equally original and primary as the first 
term.420 Put simply, this is to suggest that binaries rather than negating each other in 
                                                
420 In an interview, Derrida makes the following observations about gender hierarchy, which 
can clarify the logic of deconstructive interventions: “when sexual difference is determined 
by opposition in the dialectical sense (according to the Hegelian movement of speculative 
dialectics which remains so powerful even beyond Hegel’s text), one appears to set off “the 
war between the sexes”; but one precipitates the end with victory going to the masculine sex. 
The determination of sexual difference in opposition is destined, designed, in truth, for truth; 
it is also in order to erase sexual difference. The dialectical opposition neutralizes or 
supersedes the difference. However, according to a surreptitious operation that must be 
flushed out; one ensures phallogocentric mastery under the cover of neutralization every 
time. These are now well-known paradoxes.” Derrida suggests that this phallogocentric logic 
that a priori places women in the private sphere can and should be displaced by a new kind 
of feminism that rejects hierarchical difference at the very root of gender, which would, in 
turn, free a new from of equality. This, of course, does not mean the elevation of “the 
woman” to a privileged place in opposition to “the man,” which would only repeat the 
hierarchy of the traditional binary, albeit in the opposite direction. Rather what is necessary 
is to re-think a new form of identity that is internally differentiated. I shall return to the issue 
of identity below. Jacques Derrida, Points...1974-1994, ed. Elisabeth Weber (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1995)., 100-101. For a long discussion on the exclusion of the 
female from politics and the public sphere, see Derrida, The Politics of Friendship. 
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a dialectical fashion, mutually presuppose one another, that is, they are co-original, 
albeit in a paradoxical way.  
It is important to note that deconstruction does not take anything and 
everything as deconstructible. This is why, pace what critics suggests, deconstruction 
is not self-defeating.421 The paradoxical movements of deconstruction takes place 
against the background of certain notions that are undeconstructible, notions that 
cannot be fully objectivized, such as justice, faith-without-dogma, the wholly other, 
the gift, etc. For instance, when Derrida differentiates law from justice, arguing that 
while law is deconstructible and justice is not, it is not to discredit the normative 
relevance of law but to affirm it all the more rigorously without being discouraged 
by the paradoxes that one necessarily encounters in such an undertaking.  
I will return to the relationship between law and justice in Derrida below. My 
point here is that deconstruction is at once structuralist and anti-structuralist. Not 
only does it disassemble a structure, unmasking its ideological functions; but at the 
same time it assembles or brings together a new structure, which never closes itself 
off to new, unheard-of forms of deconstruction. These two apparently contradictory 
gestures or imperatives of deconstruction cannot be separated from each other. 
Otherwise, to put it simply, we would be throwing out the baby with the bathwater. 
In that sense, Derridean deconstructive genealogical analyses are different than, say, 
                                                
421 See for instance the critiques of Thomas McCarthy, "On the Margins of Politics," The 
Journal of Philosophy 85, no. 11 (1988). Nancy Fraser Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices: 
Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory (Minneapolis: The 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989)., Ch. 4.  
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Foucauldian post-structuralist genealogical analyses that stop at destruction, falling 
short of building new structures that would have, in turn, universal application and 
open to infinite perfectibility. In that sense, pace post-structuralism, deconstruction is 
always affirmative.422 It affirms justice, democracy, law, rights, and most 
importantly the irreducible singularity of every other. Unlike Foucault and his 
followers like Asad and Brown, Derrida is aware that deconstructive critiques of a 
one-sided or ideological application of universalistic discourses do not reveal the 
inherent flaws or violence of such discourses but already presuppose the very 
principles and standards contained in them. As Derrida puts it in an interview: 
“Deconstruction, let’s say it one more time, is not demolition or 
destruction...Deconstruction concerns, first of all, systems. This does not mean that it 
brings down the system, but that it opens onto possibilities of arrangement or 
assembling, of being together if you like, that are not necessarily systematic, in the 
strict sense that philosophy gives to this word.”423  
                                                
422 I agree with Simon Critchley’s following observation: “Derrida is not and never was a 
postmodernist. He is not a private ironist, nor is he some sort of mystical or anarchic neo-
Heideggerian. His work does not exacerbate nihilism, nor does it refuse or attempt to 
overcome the Enlightenment, the Subject, or what- ever else. Deconstruction, in Derrida’s 
hands, does not level the genre distinction between philosophy and literature (in fact, the 
opposite might be closer to the truth), nor does Derrida denigrate politics, society, and 
history to the status of the ontic.” Critchley, "Remarks on Derrida and Habermas.", 455. The 
last charge is made by Habermas. See Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity: Twelve Lectures (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990)., Lecture VII. 
423 Derrida, Points...1974-1994., 211-212. In another interview, against the charge of 
nihilism, Derrida argues that deconstruction is a thinking of affirmation: “Deconstruction as 
such is reducible to neither a method nor an analysis (the reduction to simple elements); it 
goes beyond critical decision itself. That is why it is not negative, even though it has often 
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II. DECONSTRUCTION/SECULARIZATION OF SOVEREIGNTY  
“The theological notion of indivisible sovereignty is at the very heart of 
deconstructive project, whether this be the sovereignty of the self, the nation-state, or 
God,” claims Michael Naas.424 In this section I will outline the way in which Derrida 
conceptualizes the sovereignty of the individual through deconstruction of ipseity, by 
which he suggests “the self, the one-self, being properly oneself, indeed being in 
person.”425 I will argue that, as in all deconstructive interventions in the Derridean 
sense, the deconstruction of ipseity aims to affirm a transformed notion of 
sovereignty as conditioned, limited, and shared. Derrida, as I will discuss in the 
subsequent sections, understands this re-formulated understanding of “sovereignty as 
weak force” as the condition of possibility of a universalizable model of political 
democracy.  
Derrida understands the transformation from heteronomy to autonomy as the 
beginning of secularization. However, it is just the beginning, an admirable 
beginning to be sure, the implications of which has not been entirely exhausted in the 
Western tradition from Ancient Greece up to the Kantian Enlightenment. In the 
latter, the subject of this transformation has been “the concept of man,” claims 
Derrida. Ipse “designates the oneself as master in the masculine: the father, husband, 
                                                                                                                                     
been interpreted as such despite all sorts of warnings. For me, it always accompanies an 
affirmative exigency, I would even say that it never proceeds without love...” Ibid. 83. 
424 Naas, Derrida from Now On., 66.  
425 Derrida, Rogues : Two Essays on Reason., 11 
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son, or brother, the proprietor, owner, or seignior, indeed the sovereign.”426 The task 
is to transform it in a way to make it depend on its other, beginning, of course, with 
the feminine, but without giving in to the temptation of founding self-hood entirely 
on the concept of the other (autrui). “The other who is in me is greater than I,” 
suggests Derrida. “I can only gain access to my selfhood (ipséité), my egoity, etc., 
from this relation to the other in me, but the other in me can nevertheless not be 
incorporated or introjected – who is in me, greater than I.”427  
This is not to suggest that I am the other’s slave and must do or obey 
whatever he/she orders me to do. For that would keep the violent hierarchy between 
the self and the other intact.428 What Derrida is talking about is not absolute 
heteronomy. Nor is it absolute autonomy. Rather deconstructive autonomy as 
freedom can be called “autonomy without mastery,” or “heteronomy without 
servitude.”429 The conceptualization of the self with reference to the other, who is in 
                                                
426 Ibid. 12. 
427 Jacques Derrida, "Performative Powerlessness: A Response to Simon Critchley," 
Constellations 7, no. 4 (2000)., 467. 
428 Derrida’s work has been criticized by Habermas for being indebted to the “Jewish 
mysticism” of Levinas whose basis is not the concept of man but the other. However, this is 
a quite superficial critique for Derrida, though undeniably influenced by Levinas, is critical 
of him for opposing the self to the other in order to redeem the primacy of the other. See 
Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures., 165-167, 182-183. 
For Derrida’s critique of Levinas, see Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics: An 
Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," in Writing and Difference (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1978). See also Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The "Mystical 
Foundations of Authority"," in Acts of Religion, ed. Gil Anidjar (New York: Routledge, 
2002)., 250.  
429 Derrida, Rogues : Two Essays on Reason., 152. 
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me but who is greater than I, who exceeds me or comes before me, is a gesture or a 
strategy to put limits on or divide the sovereignty of the self, an impossible but 
necessary task as sovereignty, by definition, is that which cannot be divided or 
limited. Nonetheless, Derrida suggests that autonomy of the self, by itself, is 
meaningless, an archaic relic of the theological understanding of the sovereignty of 
God in monotheistic religions.  Rather he argues that it is always relational in the 
sense that it becomes intelligible or meaningful only with reference to the other. 
Derrida explains this transformation of the self with reference to a notion he calls 
autoimmunity. 
“An autoimmunitary process is that strange behavior where a living being, in 
quasi-suicidal fashion, “itself” works to destroy its own protection, to immunize 
itself against its “own” immunity,” claims Derrida.430 Autoimmunity, or what I 
prefer to call self-differentiation, destroys the integrity, the self-sameness, or the self-
adequation of ipseity and opens it to the other. This is to say that the self is never 
ONE. “One is already more than one, with or without my consent,” claims 
Derrida.431 
With these deconstructive interventions Derrida aims to re-think autonomy of 
the self beyond the monologic structure of the Kantian solitary individual. On this 
issue Derrida is in agreement with Habermas. However, the deconstructive way of 
                                                
430 Derrida and Borradori, "Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides: A Dialogue with 
Derrida.", 94. 
431 Derrida, The Politics of Friendship., 215. 
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thinking about the relationship between the self and the other is also different than 
Habermasian intersubjectivity. Habermas while affirming the dialogic nature of 
subjectivity and the necessity of “a partial renunciation of freedom on the part of 
everyone,” still insists on the possibility of an undistorted or power-free 
communication between the self and the other, that is, the ideal speech situation.432 
In discourse ethics, the participants to deliberation are symmetrically situated, and, 
therefore, it is possible to take the perspective of the other as one’s own.  
Deconstruction, on the other hand, while insisting on the imperative to 
deliberate and address the other via speech acts, puts the self and the other in an 
asymmetrical relationship and denies the possibility of recognizing or understanding 
the other fully, that is, the possibility of an undistorted communication. However, in 
Derrida, the impossibility of the ideal speech situation in the Habermasian sense, 
does not automatically translate to the argument that “ergo the political sphere is one 
of conflict,” as the agonistic theory of democracy suggests. Rather, the recognition of 
such a gap in language or in human relations translates into our mutual rights and 
responsibilities to make better, more rigorous translations. This is, in my opinion, 
what Derrida is trying to convey when he says that democratic culture is one in 
                                                
432 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy., 91. Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics., 
131.  
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which “the abstract possibility of impossible translation could nevertheless be 
announced.”433 
To sum up, deconstructive ethics situates the relationship between the self 
and the other within the modality of the impossible. My relation to the other, to every 
other, including the other in me, is a relation-without-relation. Derrida insists on this 
paradoxical notion of “the other in me, who is greater that I am,” meaning that I 
cannot and should not understand myself as a self-enclosed totality. Yet, this is not to 
suggest that “I” cannot and should not address the other. Rather, this gap or rupture 
within my own identity, this self-differentiation, this incompleteness is at once what 
enables and requires me to open myself up to the other, to address the other as the 
other. This dissociation within me is the condition of love, friendship, and solidarity, 
which I will treat in the next section. 
 
III. THE POLITICS OF FRIENDSHIP: 
As we know, Schmitt locates friendship in a pre-political community or 
nation that is substantively homogeneous along one key dimension and that also 
remains before and above the law. The sovereign exception or the exclusion of the 
other is in part justified with reference to this originary homogeneity that he takes for 
granted. Derrida too insists on something that is pre-political and that transcends the 
positive law. Yet, what Derrida inscribes at the very origin of law and sovereignty is 
                                                
433 Derrida, "Faith and Knowledge: Two Sources of "Religion" at the Limits of Reason 
Alone.", 56. Derrida’s emphasis.  
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not the belief in the homogeneity of the nation but a notion of faith in the 
heterogeneous singularity of the other by which he means an elementary trust that 
“founds” all relations to the other as the other. Derrida insists that this faith without 
which we cannot start talking about neither friendship nor the relationship between 
law and political democracy, is both secular and universalizable.  
In “Faith and Knowledge,” Derrida explains that it both possible and 
necessary to distinguish this elementary faith owed to every other, to “no matter 
who,” from theocentric salvation religions, what he calls Abrahamic religions 
(Judaism, Christianity, and Islam).434 The structure of this faith, claims Derrida, is 
messianic in the sense that it is “the opening to the future or to the coming of the 
other as the advent of justice, but without horizon of expectation and without 
prophetic prefiguration.”435 Unlike the messianism of Abrahamic religions, it does 
not follow any determinate revelation.436 It does not have a church or priests. Nor 
does it designate an identifiable group of people or a “chosen people.” It does not 
designate an unmediated relationship between the individual and the supra-mundane 
God as the concept of “calling” suggests. Rather, “it links pure singularities prior to 
any social or political determination, prior to all intersubjectivity.”437  
                                                
434 For Derrida’s further discussion on Abrahamic religions see also Jacques Derrida, The 
Gift of Death (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
435 Derrida, "Faith and Knowledge: Two Sources of "Religion" at the Limits of Reason 
Alone.", 56. Derrida’s emphasis.  
436 Ibid. 56. 
437 Ibid. 55. Derrida’s emphasis.  
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Derrida states his “unconditional preference” for “republican democracy as a 
universalizable model, binding philosophy to the public “cause,” to the res 
publica…to the enlightened virtue of public space.”438 He suggests that even if such 
a commitment requires the emancipation of public space from religious dogmatism, 
authority, and orthodoxy, it does not (and should not) translate into abandonment of 
all faith. For “no discourse or address of the other without the possibility of an 
elementary promise.”439 According to Derrida, this is a new way to interpret what 
Kant has called “religion within the limits of reason alone.” Even though Derrida 
agrees with Kant that it is possible to conceive of a universalizable notion of faith 
without dogma, he does not accept that such “reflecting faith” must start with the 
thesis that God is dead.440  
What Derrida is trying to achieve is to uproot Kant’s notion of rational faith 
from its foundation in a certain interpretation of Christianity. Even though Kant is 
trying to tame faith by putting it within the limits of reason, he ends up founding 
reason on religion  “in enabling us to think (but also suspend in theory) the existence 
of God,” claims Derrida.441 What is necessary, in his opinion, is to re-think faith at 
                                                
438 Ibid. 47. 
439 Ibid. 75. 
440 This is why, Derrida suggests, “the unconditional universality of the categorical 
imperative is evangelical.” However, this is not to suggest that a concept of faith that would 
be effectively universal, that is, the Kantian project, is not meaningful. The question is to 
arrive a notion of faith that is removed from the idea of God as the omnipotent first cause, 
absolute being, or natura naturans. Ibid. 50, 53.  
441 Ibid. 51.  
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the limits of reason, not within it. Rather than opposing faith to reason, one must 
affirm their interdependence in their absolute heterogeneity. As Derrida suggests in 
Rogues, “this faith is another way of keeping within reason, however mad it might 
appear.”442  
It is worth noting that Derrida’s emphasis on the mutual interdependence of 
faith and reason must be sharply distinguished from Habermas’ attempt to reconcile 
the two in a series of essays written in the past decade.443 Despite (or perhaps 
because of) all this faith-talk, Derrida’s position is not post-secular in the 
Habermasian sense. Unlike Habermas, Derrida does not suggest that we now live in 
a post-secular age where religious individuals and communities should be privileged 
to take positions on political questions or to engage in public debates. Nor is 
                                                
442 Derrida, Rogues : Two Essays on Reason., 153. 
443 These essays are collected in Jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion : 
Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity, 2008).. See also Jürgen 
Habermas, "An Awareness of What Is Missing," in An Awareness of What Is Missing: Faith 
and Reason in a Post-Secular Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010). Derrida’s understanding 
of faith should also be distinguished from Rousseau’s notion of civil religion, which he 
defines as “a purely civil profession of faith, the articles of which belongs to the sovereign to 
establish, not exactly as dogmas of religion, but as sentiments of sociability, without which it 
is impossible to be a good citizen or a faithful subject.” First, even though by faith Derrida, 
like Rousseau, suggests sentiments of sociability, it is not something to be established by the 
sovereign; rather it is already contained in sovereignty, albeit in a re-formulated sense. 
Second, in Rousseau civil religion serves the purpose of justifying the sovereign’s right over 
life and death. “A person [who] acts as if he does not believe them, he should be put to 
death; he has committed the greatest of crimes.” Derrida’s conception of faith, on the other 
hand, in affirming the life of the other in general is geared towards making capital 
punishment an unjustifiable act, with no exceptions. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Basic Political 
Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1987)., 226. [Emphasis mine.] On Derrida’s 
unconditional rejection of capital punishment see Jacques Derrida, "Capital Punishment: 
Another “Temptation of Theodicy”," in Pragmatism, Critique, Judgment: Essays for 
Richard J. Bernstein, ed. Seyla Benhabib and Nancy Fraser (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
2004)., 197-223.  
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Derrida’s call for a secular faith based on a recognition that “religious traditions have 
a special power to articulate moral intuitions.”444 I will return to Habermas’ 
understanding of post-secular age below. What is crucial for the time being is 
Derrida’s insistence on the possibility and desirability of differentiating faith from 
religion that is reduced to one another in Habermas’ writings. “Religion,” claims 
Derrida, “does not follow the movement of faith any more necessarily than the latter 
rushes toward faith in God.”445 The elementary promise that Derrida is talking about 
is not necessarily inscribed in a “religion.” The structure of deconstructive faith is 
secular and universal in the sense that it is a priori inscribed in all speech acts. He, in 
other words, derives this faith from within the pragmatics of language, prior to all 
juridical determinations. He argues that there are no pure reportive utterances. Rather 
every speech act contains the performative structure of the promise to tell the 
truth.446 Whenever I open my mouth, even for the purpose of lying or deceiving the 
                                                
444 Habermas, "Religion in the Public Sphere: Cognitive Presuppositions for the "Public Use 
of Reason" by Religious and Secular Citizens.", 131. 
445 Derrida, "Faith and Knowledge: Two Sources of "Religion" at the Limits of Reason 
Alone.", 69. Derrida’s emphasis.  
446 Habermas too focuses on the illocutionary aspects of utterances (performing an action in 
saying something) over against propositional content. In his view, illocutionary acts contains 
a rationally motivated binding force between two or more speakers. Habermas, The Theory 
of Communicative Action: Reason and Rationalization of Society., 278, 288-295. 
Nonetheless it must be noted that for Habermas meaning is transparent, that is, my 
utterances can be fully understood by the other. For Derrida, on the other hand, language is 
inherently opaque, that is, meaning is never stable. Yet, for Derrida it is this opacity is what 
increases our responsibilities to the other. It is what gives us the impulse to make better 
translations. “No response, indeed, without a principle of responsibility: one must respond to 
the other, before the other and for oneself.” Derrida, "Faith and Knowledge: Two Sources of 
"Religion" at the Limits of Reason Alone.", 64 
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other, I am caught in this structure: “You cannot address the other, speak to the 
other, without an act of faith, without testimony. What are you doing when you attest 
to something? You address the other and ask, “believe me.” Even if you are lying, 
even in a perjury, you are addressing the other and asking the other to trust you. This 
“trust me, I am speaking to you” is of the order of faith, a faith that cannot be 
reduced to a theoretical statement, to a determinative judgment; it is the opening of 
the address to the other.”447 
In The Politics of Friendship, Derrida discusses the paradoxical structure of 
speech acts through a deconstruction of a remark that has been attributed to Aristotle 
by Montaigne, Florian, Kant, Nietzsche, Blanchot and Deguy, that is, “O my friends, 
there is no friend.” This declaration addressed to friends, even if to tell them that 
there is no friend, is not purely reportive but has a performative structure in 
promising to tell the truth.448 The “performative contradiction” in this remark 
consists in the fact that the two utterances, the vocative (O my friends) and the 
reportive (there is no friend), reveal a logical absurdity. “How can you claim to 
address friends when you tell them there are no friends?”449 This logical absurdity or 
performative contradiction must be left intact, according to Derrida, for two reasons. 
                                                
447 Jacques Derrida, "The Villanova Roundtable: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida," in 
Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, ed. John D. Caputo 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2004). 22. Derrida, "Faith and Knowledge: Two 
Sources of "Religion" at the Limits of Reason Alone.", 64. Derrida, The Politics of 
Friendship., 214.  
448 Ibid. 214. 
449 Ibid. 212-213. 
   
 
218 
First, the vocative entails a promise or appeal toward the future: “We know that there 
is no friends, but I pray you, my friends, act so that henceforth there are.”450 Second, 
the vocative also turns towards the past in the sense that it presupposes that there is 
already a minimum of friendship or a minimal community of friends. For I must 
already have friends in order to tell them that there is none. 
The lesson that Derrida draws for us from this impossible declaration is that a 
sort of friendship must never be sealed, a friendship prior to all friendships, one that 
takes place in the future anterior, between “not yet” and “already.” “Friendship,” 
claims Derrida, “is never a present given, it belongs to the experience of expectation, 
promise, or engagement.”451 This gesture to re-think friendship in the future anterior 
(already-but-not-yet) is a deconstructive strategy to a priori extend a minimum of 
friendship to all living beings in general.452 The implications of this gesture for the 
purposes of my thesis are two-fold, both of which aim to secularize the theological 
logic of Schmitt’s understanding of the political.  
First, such an understanding of friendship introduces a rupture within the 
very concept of friend as well as of enemy. From this perspective, neither the friend 
                                                
450 Ibid. 235. 
451 Ibid. 236. 
452 Derrida argues that the extension of friendship to the living in general has no precedent. 
“The Thou shalt not kill—with all its consequences, which are limitless—has never been 
understood within the Judeo-Christian tradition, nor apparently by Levinas, as a “Thou shalt 
not put to death the living in general.” It has become meaningful in religious cultures for 
which carnivorous sacrifice is essential, as being flesh.” See Derrida, Points...1974-1994., 
279. 
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nor the enemy is concretely identifiable. For Derrida this is indeed the loss of the 
political and of sovereignty in the Schmittian sense but it is also the opening of a 
new concept of the political or of political sovereignty, one that does not derive its 
energy from putting the other to death.453 The political in the Derridean sense rather 
derives its meaning from a notion of love that is “bound to an affirmation of life, to 
the endless repetition of this affirmation.”454 
Pace Schmitt, deconstruction reveals that if the other is what I need to have a 
sense of myself, my identity, then, logically, the other is that which I depend on. If I 
depend on something other than myself, then, at no instance we can talk about 
absolute sovereignty of the self (or of the people) above and beyond the other. This 
is a conceptual necessity. It is as if I command the other to be free, “for I need his 
freedom in order to the address the other qua other.”455 The other, then, cannot be 
that which negates me, my life, as Schmitt suggests. My originary gesture/reflex 
                                                
453 Derrida, The Politics of Friendship., 104 
454 Ibid. 123. In “Faith and Knowledge,” without raising Schmitt’s name, Derrida enters into 
a debate with him regarding the nature of the technical. The technical (that which repeats 
itself without sovereign intervention) is Schmitt’s target of attack in two key texts in his 
“diagnoses” into Western modernity. In Schmitt’s opinion, the technical or the spirit of 
technicity as the instrument of depoliticization of the twentieth century is essentially 
concerned with the domination and exploitation of matter. Unlike Schmitt, Derrida insists 
that the notion of the technical or the machine-like is what enables us to repeat the 
affirmation life continuously. “No faith, therefore, nor future without everything technical, 
automatic, machine-like supposed by iterability. In this sense, the technical is the possibility 
of faith, indeed its very chance.” Derrida, "Faith and Knowledge: Two Sources of "Religion" 
at the Limits of Reason Alone.", 83. See Schmitt, "Roman Catholicism and Political Form.", 
13.  
455 Derrida, The Politics of Friendship., 174. 
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towards the other is one of love and trust not enmity and exclusion. In Schmitt, 
Derrida claims “to love in love or in friendship would always mean: I can kill you, 
you can kill me, we can kill ourselves. Together or one another, masculine or 
feminine. Therefore in all cases, we already are (possibly, but this possibility is, 
precisely, real) dead for one another.”456 In contrast to Schmitt, one must say that I 
receive “my very life from the heartbeat of the other,” claims Derrida.457 This is why 
I must grant myself and up to the other the law.  
From Schmitt’s perspective, the absolute possibility or necessity to kill the 
enemy is also what exposes the friend to violent death.  Risking lives and making 
blood sacrifices in the battlefield with the aim of killing the enemy is what gives the 
political and political enmity their dignity and what supposedly makes our lives 
meaningful. I suggest that the self-differentiated understanding of identity also 
challenges the privileged position given to self-sacrifice and martyrdom in Weber 
and Schmitt in the making of the self/man/citizen. Self-differentiation, or in 
Derrida’s terminology autoimmune, “consists in compromising sui- or self-
referentiality, the self or sui- of suicide…it threatens always to rob suicide itself of its 
meaning and supposed integrity.”458 Derrida is trying to show that what is proper to 
“man” does not consist in his ability to risk his life in sacrifice or in putting the other 
                                                
456 Ibid. 122. Derrida’s emphasis.  
457 Ibid. 69. 
458Derrida, Rogues : Two Essays on Reason., 45. 
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to death, but rather in his/her ability to relate to the other in friendship.459 In this 
notion of friendship, there is no room for a discourse glorifying the so-called heroic 
(manly) acts of self-sacrifice.  
Secondly, by a priori extending friendship to all, Derrida also aims to 
challenge the foundations of a requirement of homogeneity that Schmitt locates at 
the heart of democracy.460 In Derrida’s opinion, in thinking about democratic 
community one should not oppose gathering to separation. These two forces are 
simultaneously at work in every community. Auto-immunity is the name that 
Derrida gives to this aporetic logic. From this perspective, heterogeneity or 
                                                
459 Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow--: A Dialogue (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004)., 147. 
460 The emphasis on homogeneity in Schmitt, insists Derrida, in The Politics of Friendship, is 
not a strategy to exclude primarily national minorities, as it is always suggested, but to 
exclude the female from politics. “In this implacable logic of absolute hostility, what should 
be massively evident but goes as unnoticed as absence itself…is the woman or the sister. Not 
even a mirage. Nothing…Not even a woman-soldier.” (156). Derrida goes on to suggest that 
“woman’s slow and painful access to citizenship would go hand in hand with the symptoms 
of depoliticizing neutralization noted by Schmitt.” (158) Derrida suggests that “this 
phallogocentric neutralization of sexual difference” is found not simply in Schmitt but in 
Western literature on friendship in general. What disturbs Derrida the most in the great 
discourses on friendship in the West is a double exclusion: “on the one hand, the exclusion 
of friendship between women; on the other hand, the exclusion of friendship between a man 
and a woman.” (290) The exclusion of the feminine, claims Derrida, “privileges the figure of 
the brother.” (279) Though the exclusion of the woman in Schmitt is without doubt, I have 
questions about to what extent the figure of the brother informs Schmitt’s thinking, but I will 
continue to follow Derrida for I am interested in his deconstruction of the logic of 
nationalism that can work in the absence of the figure of the brother, if not in the absence of 
the male. Derrida himself admits that Schmitt “speaks little of the brother, but always in a 
significant and serious way.” He derives the meaning of the brother in Schmitt primarily 
from his post-WWII declarations under interrogation in the internment camp where he was 
held over a year. There Schmitt responds to the question “Who can be my enemy?” with the 
answer “Myself or again my brother.” (149). This is the main textual base of Derrida’s 
claims about the role the figure of the brother plays in Schmitt.  
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separation is not an obstacle to the formation of the demos but its very condition of 
possibility. “The demos is at once the incalculable singularity of anyone, before any 
“subject,” the possible undoing of the social bond by a secret to be respected, beyond 
all citizenship, beyond every “state,” indeed every “people,” indeed beyond the 
current state of the definition of a living being as living “human” being; and the 
universality of rational calculation, of the equality of citizens before the law, the 
social bond of being together.”461 
This auto-immune logic that threatens the demos from within, making 
democracy suicidal, is not bad news, suggests Derrida. It is rather what enables an 
exposure to the other, what makes room for the radical otherness of the other.462 This 
is to say that we should be able to speak in the name of a “we” but without 
assurance, always questioning the naturalness of the border that divides “us” from 
“them,” the “friend” from the “enemy.” This “we” must always remain undetermined 
even if we can and should speak in its name. This aporetic logic of the demos or 
what Derrida calls “community without community” is the chance (and fragility) of 
political democracy.  
Derrida’s internally differentiated notion of identity should be sharply 
distinguished from Chantal Mouffe’s notion of “divided identity” that re-inscribes 
the Schmittian logic of us/them relation into democracy. Mouffe (mis)appropriates 
                                                
461 Derrida and Borradori, "Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides: A Dialogue with 
Derrida.", 120. Derrida’s emphasis. 
462 Derrida, Rogues : Two Essays on Reason., 152.  
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Derrida’s notion of “constitutive outside” in order to vindicate a theory of democracy 
that she calls agonistic. According to Mouffe, and pace what Habermasians suggests, 
the antagonistic notion of us/them relations is the very essence of democratic politics 
and cannot be disciplined through rational deliberation. Otherwise, we would lose 
the adversarial dimension, which, in her opinion, is constitutive of democracy.  
What is problematic is Mouffe’s claim that this originary aggressiveness, 
which is the condition of democratic friendship, is captured in Derrida’s notion of  
“constitutive outside.” “The work of Jacques Derrida is also relevant for my project. 
In his case, it is the notion of the ‘constitutive outside’ which helps me to emphasize 
the usefulness of a deconstructive approach in grasping the antagonism inherent in 
all objectivity and the centrality of the us/them distinction in the constitution of 
collective political identities.”463 
I suggest that such a rehabilitation of Schmitt via Derrida is profoundly 
mistaken. I hope it is clear by now that Derrida’s deconstruction of the friend/enemy 
antithesis does not result in the affirmation of an ineradicable antagonism between 
the friend and the enemy. Nor does it boil down to the necessity of an identifiable 
group of people (enemies) in the immediate outside of the people. Rather, as I 
discussed above, deconstruction attacks this very oppositional logic. Stefan 
Rummens captures this dimension very well in his critique of Mouffe’s appropriation 
of Derrida: “the enemy [in Derrida’s reading] is not an identifiable outside, but is 
                                                
463 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox., 12. Emphasis mine. See also: Mouffe, The Return of 
the Political.114; Mouffe, On the Political., 15.  
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always already present inside my own brother or friend and, ultimately, always 
already present inside my own self.”464 “The people who fight for their identity,” 
claims Derrida: 
must pay attention to the fact that identity is not the self-identity of a 
thing…but implies a difference within identity. That is, the identity of a 
culture is a way of being different from itself; a culture is different from 
itself; language is different from itself; the person is different from itself. 
Once you take into account this inner and other difference, then you pay 
attention to the other and you understand that fighting for your own identity 
is not exclusive of another identity, is open to another identity. And this 
prevents totalitarianism, nationalism, egocentrism, and so on.465 
 
What Derrida aims to vindicate through deconstruction is not an originary 
antagonism that Mouffe believes is constitutive of human societies but an originary 
friendship or sociability that is deeply intertwined with the law, which I will return in 
the next section.  
 
IV. DEMOCRACY, THE RULE OF LAW AND JUSTICE  
Above I have suggested that Derrida locates a minimum of friendship or an 
elementary promise at the origin of democracy or in his terminology, democracy-to-
come. In what follows, I will explain the way in which his conception of democracy-
                                                
464 Stefan Rummens, "Democracy as a Non-Hegemonic Struggle? Disambiguating Chantal 
Mouffe's Agonistic Model of Politics," Constellations 16, no. 3 (2009)., 10. For a similar 
critique of Mouffe’s reading of Derrida see also Arash Abizadeh, "Does Collective Identity 
Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged Incoherence of Global Solidarity," American Political 
Science Review 99, no. 1 (2005).. Abizadeh, unlike Mouffe, understands that “the Derridean 
category of the constitutive outside is not coterminous with an empirically specifiable set of 
concrete individuals.” p. 57. 
465 Derrida, "The Villanova Roundtable: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida.", 13.  
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to-come grounded in friendship and faith is intimately related to the rule of law. I 
suggest that, unlike what critics suggest, Derrida rather than reviving the Schmittian 
sovereign above and beyond the law, helps us re-think the “foundations” of 
sovereignty and law in order to arrive at a universalizable model of constitutional 
democracy that is meaningful today. 
Derrida’s understanding of constitutional democracy is intimately tied to a 
distinction he makes between law and justice, a distinction that his critics like Wolin 
consider dangerous.466 He argues that the two are heterogeneous in the sense that 
justice cannot be reduced to a set of established norms. While justice 
(infinite/undeconstructible) takes place within the modality of the impossible, the 
law (finite/deconstructible) within the modality of the possible.467 Law is the element 
                                                
466 On the distinction between justice and law see also Teubner who, drawing in part on 
Derrida, suggests that “Justice begins where the law ends.” Gunther Teubner, "Self-
Subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendence Formula of Law?," The Modern Law 
Review 72, no. 1 (2009)., 16.  
467 It is important to note that Derrida’s notion of the impossible is different than the ideal in 
the Kantian sense. Deconstructive understanding of justice is not a Regulative Idea in the 
sense that the latter, in Derrida’s view, remains “in the order of the possible, an ideal 
possible, to be sure, one that is infinitely deferred, but one that participates in what at the end 
of an infinite history would still fall into the realm of the possible, the realm of what is 
virtual or potential, of what is within the power of someone, some “I can,” to reach, in 
theory, in a form that is not wholly freed from all teleological ends,” suggests Derrida. The 
impossible that Derrida is talking about, on the other hand, is foreign to the order of the “I 
can.” In other words, in Kantian metaphysics the Idea is inaccessible empirically simply 
because perfection is too difficult to achieve in the real world; in deconstruction, on the other 
hand, an undeconstructible idea is inaccessible because it is unconceivable in its very 
essence or in its very telos. Nonetheless, Derrida often argues: “my reservations [against the 
Regulative Idea] are not straightforward objections. They are precisely reservations. For lack 
of anything better, if we can say this about a regulative idea, the regulative idea remains 
perhaps an ultimate reservation. Though such a last recourse risks becoming an alibi, it 
retains a certain dignity; I cannot swear that I will not one day give in to it.” See Derrida and 
Borradori, "Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides: A Dialogue with Derrida.", 133-
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of calculation while justice is incalculable. Yet, this does not mean that one should 
not calculate, rather, for the deconstruction these two modalities 
(impossible/possible, incalculable/calculable) are equally imperative, albeit aporetic. 
As Derrida suggests, justice “demands that one calculate with the incalculable.”468 
This is what Derrida is trying to convey when he says “justice is an experience of the 
impossible.”469 The paradox (that cannot be rationally resolved once and for all) is 
that even if justice is transcendent with respect to the juridical and the political, the 
very condition of the impossible possibility of justice calls for the political and the 
juridical. “The heterogeneity between justice and law does not exclude but, on the 
contrary, calls for their inseparability: there can be no justice without an appeal to 
juridical determinations and to the force of law; and there can be no becoming, no 
transformation, history, or perfectibility of law without an appeal to justice that will 
nonetheless always exceed it.”470  
I argue that this excess of justice over law is what turns the political sphere 
into a sphere of mutual rights and responsibilities. The gap between justice and law 
                                                                                                                                     
135; Derrida, Rogues : Two Essays on Reason., 83-94. Derrida, The Politics of Friendship., 
222. Derrida, "Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundations of Authority".", 254.  
468 Ibid, 244. 
469 Ibid. 244. 
470 Rogues Derrida, Rogues : Two Essays on Reason., 150. Elsewhere, Derrida suggests: 
“Justice is what gives us the impulse, the drive, or the movement to improve the law, that is, 
to deconstruct the law. Without a call for justice we would not have any interest in 
deconstructing the law.” Derrida, "The Villanova Roundtable: A Conversation with Jacques 
Derrida.", 17 
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is what gives us the impulse, the drive, or the movement to improve the law. “The 
fact that law is deconstructible is not bad news,” argues Derrida. “One may find in 
this the political chance of all historical progress.”471 Accordingly, Derrida’s 
viewpoint is decisively different than Walter Benjamin’s that severs the whole 
relationship between justice and law in his articulation of divine (just) violence that 
escapes all legal norms.472 In fact, Derrida finds Benjamin’s project quite dangerous:  
“This excess of justice over law and calculation…cannot and should not serve as an 
alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state, 
between institutions or states. Abandoned to itself, the incalculable and giving idea 
of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst for it can always be 
reappropriated by the most perverse calculation.”473  
What, then, would be a responsible manner of making a system of law 
effective, if justice cannot be wholly rationalized or objectivized? As the preceding 
                                                
471 Derrida, "Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundations of Authority".", 242. 
472 In Benjamin’s view, divine (law-destroying) violence is different from mythical (law-
making) violence. Divine violence expiates in annihilating. In his own words, “it is lethal 
without spilling blood.” Walter Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," in Reflections: Essays, 
Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writing, ed. Peter Demetz (1978)., 297. Derrida’s essay, 
“Force of Law,” deconstructs the opposition between law-making and law-destroying 
violence with an attempt to show the inconsistency of Benjamin’s defense of divine 
violence. Derrida suggests that Benjamin’s emphasis on “the lack of bloodshed” could 
perhaps provide a justification for the “final solution”. “When one thinks of the gas 
chambers and the cremation ovens, this allusion to an extermination that would be expiatory 
because bloodless must cause one to shudder. One is terrified at the idea of an interpretation 
that would make of the holocaust an expiation and an indecipherable signature of just and 
violent anger of God.” Derrida, "Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundations of Authority".", 
298. For a recent defense of Benjamin’s notion of pure violence see Giorgio Agamben, State 
of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005)., 87-88.  
473 Derrida, "Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundations of Authority".", 257 
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discussion implies, even if one cannot reduce justice into finite number of norms; the 
law, nevertheless, inaugurates a promise to justice. He suggests that what he calls 
faith-without-religion is already present at the moment of constitution-making, at the 
origin of every sovereignty and democracy. Yet it does not exhaust itself in the 
original decision. In “Faith and Knowledge,” he suggests: “This faith without dogma 
is announced wherever, reflecting without flinching, a purely rational analysis 
brings the following paradox to light: that is the foundation of law—law of law, 
institution of institution, origin of constitution—is a “performative” event that 
cannot belong to the set that it founds, inaugurates or justifies. Such an event is 
unjustifiable within the logic of what it will have opened.”474 
Derrida considers the paradox of foundation as the rational expression of “the 
self-inadequation of every present and presentable democracy.”475 A foundation is a 
promise that is never fully kept, that needs to be continuously re-affirmed. What he 
means is that I cannot address myself to the other in a just and responsible fashion 
without making a system of law effective; but the law will always remain imperfect. 
The founding moment only defers the problem of justice. Hence, the open-endedness 
and the infinite perfectibility meant by democracy to come.  
                                                
474 Derrida, "Faith and Knowledge: Two Sources of "Religion" at the Limits of Reason 
Alone.", 57. Derrida’s emphasis. See also Derrida, "Force of Law: The "Mystical 
Foundations of Authority".", 241. 
475 Derrida, Rogues : Two Essays on Reason., 38 
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Similarly, Habermas too characterizes the paradox of foundation as “the 
understandable expression of the future-oriented character, or openness, of the 
democratic constitution.”476 Habermas sounds very much like Derrida in suggesting 
that the system of rights is never fully actualized in the founding moment but forever 
deferred. In Habermas’ view: “This fallible continuation of the founding event can 
break out of the circle of a polity’s groundless discursive self-constitution only if this 
process—which is not immune to contingent interruptions and historical 
regressions—can be understood in the long run as a self-correcting learning 
process.” Bonnie Honig criticizes Habermas for characterizing  his hoped-future in 
progressive terms that “turns the future into a ground.”477 Honig invoking the work 
of Derrida, among others, suggests that when the relationship between democracy 
and constitutionalism is set against a determinate future, “the present cannot 
inaugurate its future.”478  
Habermas’ approach to constitutional democracy has been criticized by many 
for being strictly rights-based, dismissing the moments of ruptures in democratic 
processes. In Honig’s version, such dismissal of ruptures leads to the loss of the 
democratic agency of the present. Habermas, in her view, does not strike the right 
balance between the rule of the people and the rule of law. I have argued against this 
                                                
476 Jürgen Habermas, "Constitutional Democracy:  A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory 
Principles?," Political Theory 29, no. 6 (2001)., 774. 
477 Bonnie Honig, "Dead Rights, Live Futures: A Reply to Habermas's "Constitutional 
Democracy," ibid., 797. 
478 Ibid. 797. 
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interpretation in Chapter IV, discussing the way in which Habermas understands 
democracy as self-legislation under law.479 It seems to me that, despite her attempts, 
it is Honig who does not strike the right balance when she opposes the rule of law to 
the rule of the people. She seems to understand these two forms of rule as ultimately 
contradictory or mutually exclusive; either the dead letter of law or the live action 
the people. She also seems to be putting too much faith in the democratic agency of 
the present when she says that “a self-limiting civil society is either impossible or 
suicidal from a democratic perspective.”480  
Honig, in my view, is too much indebted to the model of theological 
sovereignty defended by Schmitt. She does not understand the way in which self-
limiting revolution, in the work of Cohen and Arato on whom Habermas relies, aims 
to break with Schmitt’s understanding of creation/revolution ex nihilio. “The self 
limiting revolution,” as they suggest, “avoids the total destruction of its enemy, 
which would inevitably mean putting itself into the place of the sovereign, thereby 
                                                
479 An important point that Habermas underestimates is the role social movements play in 
democratization, which does not do justice to the potentials of his theory. Influenced by his 
theory of communicative action, Cohen and Arato develops a much more broader analysis of 
civil society than Habermas as a locus of democratization. They move us beyond Habermas’ 
understanding of new social movements in terms of their defense against the colonization of 
lifeworld by revealing their emancipatory potential. In their view, the movements are not 
merely defensive but also “generate new solidarities, alter associational structure of civil 
society, and create a plurality of new public spaces while expanding and revitalizing spaces 
that are already institutionalized.” Cohen and Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory., 530.   
480 Honig, "Dead Rights, Live Futures: A Reply to Habermas's "Constitutional Democracy.", 
800. 
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depriving society of its self-organization and self-defense.”481 Derrida would surely 
agree with this claim. In my view, Honig’s reliance on Derrida, like that of Mouffe, 
is flawed. It is true that Derrida is attentive to the moments of ruptures or what he 
calls the event. Such events, in Derrida’s view, should remain unrecognizable from 
the point of view of the present, otherwise we cannot talk about inventions or 
progress, a term that Honig aims to discredit. However, nowhere does Derrida 
suggest that the event is what enables the present to inaugurate its future. The future 
that democracy inscribes belongs to no one in particular, least of all to the present 
generation, which, in Derrida’s view, would risk reducing democracy to the rule of 
the strongest. “The expression “democracy to come,” claims Derrida, “does indeed 
translate a call for a militant and interminable political critique. A weapon aimed at 
the enemies of democracy, it protests against all naivite and every political abuse, 
every rhetoric that would present as a present or existing democracy, as a de facto 
democracy…The “to-come” not only points to the promise but suggests that 
democracy will never exist, in the sense of present existence.”482 
                                                
481 Cohen and Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory., 74. Nadia Urbinati too is critical of 
Habermas for not being sufficiently attentive to the moments of ruptures. Yet, her critique, 
unlike agonistic readings of democracy, does not end up prioritizing or valorizing people’s 
sovereignty in such moments. She argues: “The phenomenon that demands our attention lies 
between the state of organic normalcy and the extreme event of a violent and radical break 
of the legal order, when through their active and creative presence citizens disclose and 
denounce the political distance between the “real” and the “legal” nation, but do not reclaim 
the decision-making power.” Nadia Urbinati, Representative Democracy: Principles and 
Genealogy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006)., 27-28. Emphasis mine.  
482 Derrida, Rogues : Two Essays on Reason., 86 
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The concept of decision plays an essential role in Derrida’s understanding of 
democratic sovereignty. However, the reason he invokes the notion of decision is not 
to reclaim people’s sovereignty in the present or rescue it from the dead letter of the 
law but to open up democracy to its future and to its others. Derrida tells us that in 
order to do that one need not oppose the rule of law to the rule of the people. Neither 
form of rule precedes the other ontologically or chronologically. They are 
heterogeneous but inseparable, co-original.  “For a decision to be just and 
responsible,” claims Derrida, “it must, in its proper moment, if there is one, be both 
regulated and without regulation, it must preserve the law and also destroy it or 
suspend it enough to have to reinvent it in each case, rejustify it, reinvent it at least in 
the reaffirmation and the new and free confirmation of its principle.”483 
The above quote, I suggest, reveals the different way in which Derrida 
conceptualizes the relationship between the norm and the exception than Schmitt on 
which agonistic conception of democracy relies. As we know, in Schmitt’s view, the 
exception is chronologically and ontologically precedes the norm. Before the rule of 
law, there is the sovereign and the absolute decision. Even if at times Schmitt refers 
to the conceptual independence between the norm and the exception,484 he, 
nonetheless, insists on “the independent meaning of the decision.”485 “Unlike the 
                                                
483 Derrida, "Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundations of Authority".", 251. Emphasis mine.  
484 Schmitt, Political Theology : Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty., 12. 
485 Ibid. 6. 
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normal situation, when the autonomous moment of decision recedes to a minimum, 
the norm is destroyed in the exception,” claims Schmitt.486  
Derrida, on the other hand, attacks this logic of opposition head on. Without 
discarding the concept of the decision, he challenges the arbitrariness of Schmitt’s 
decisionism. In Derrida’s view, even if the decision cannot be wholly subjected to 
the rule of law, it cannot be wholly blind to it either. The norm and the decision 
depend on each other, even if one cannot and should not reduce them to one another. 
The decision, hence, is not the moment when unlimited sovereignty is unleashed but 
when it is arrested. What the decision establishes is not the right to suspend the law 
but the right to law. As Cornell suggests, “for Derrida, a legal system could not 
aspire to justice if it did not make this promise to conservation of principle and the 
rule of Law. But it would also not aspire to justice unless it understood this promise 
as a promise to justice.”487  
For Derrida the question is not “who is supposed to have unlimited 
power?,488 rather “what would be a responsible decision?”  “If the act [the decision] 
simply consists of applying a rule, of enacting a program or effecting a calculation, 
one will perhaps say that it is legal, that it conforms to law, and perhaps, by 
metaphor, that it is just, claims Derrida. “But one would be wrong to say that the 
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487 Cornell, "The Violence of the Masquerade: Law Dressed up as Justice.", 1060.  
488 Schmitt, Political Theology : Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty., 10.  
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decision was just. Simply because there was, in this case, no decision.”489 One must 
at the same time follow the rule and invent a new rule. There are no decisions ex 
nihilio, but a decision that simply follows a rule is not a decision worthy of its name.  
I suggest that the way in which Derrida re-thinks democratic sovereignty is 
ultimately mis-understood by his agonistic defenders. The paradox of foundation in 
the agonistic view delivers bad news about the nature of constitutional democracy. 
They find a defect in it. This is not bad news, Derrida (as well as Habermas) tells us. 
Rather he finds the virtue (as well as the danger) of constitutional democracy in the 
foundational paradox. It a priori disarms those who reduce democracy to the 
democracy of the present, to the rule of the people. What the paradox evinces is not 
the right to exception or the right to suspend law as Schmitt suggests, but the fact 
that no sovereignty (whether of the self or of the people) is adequate to itself, that is, 
pure sovereignty is meaningless. Autoimmunity, or what I have been calling self-
differentiation, is already at work whenever we start to conceptualize sovereignty. 
“To confer sense or meaning on sovereignty, to justify it, to find a reason for it, is 
already to compromise its deciding exceptionality, to subject it to rules, to a code of 
law, to some general law, to concepts,” claims Derrida.490 Hence the two temptations 
of deconstruction: to conserve and abolish sovereignty. Without simultaneously 
                                                
489 Derrida, "Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundations of Authority".", 251. 
490 Derrida, Rogues : Two Essays on Reason., 101.  
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affirming and limiting this subject, we cannot theorize the relationship between the 
rule of law and the rule of the people. 
Before concluding this section, let me return to the critique of Wendy Brown, 
that Derrida is wrong in conceptualizing democracy with reference to sovereignty, 
for sovereignty, in her view, is inherently antidemocratic. Brown asks: “Why? Why 
these arduous endeavors of recuperation and rescue, protection and relocation, in lieu 
of a more radical challenge to sovereignty? Why not join Agamben, Hardt, Negri, 
and other contemporaries in identifying sovereign power as what must be challenged 
on behalf of global justice, as what must be left behind in the democracy to 
come?”491 
The answer to this question should be clear by now, but let us repeat once 
more. Democracy requires sovereignty because there is no democracy, no freedom 
without law. And the law in return calls for sovereignty. It is as simple or as complex 
as that. “Democracy and sovereignty are at the same time, but also by turns, 
inseparable and in contradiction with one another. For democracy to be effective, for 
it to give rise to a system of law that can carry the day, which is to say, for it to give 
rise to an effective power, the cracy of the demos—of the world demos in this 
case—is required,” claims Derrida.492 The difficult task that cannot be appreciated by 
                                                
491 Brown, "Sovereign Hesitations.", 115.  
492 Derrida, Rogues : Two Essays on Reason., 100. Finally, what about nation-state 
sovereignty? What does Derrida have to say about that? Through the deconstruction of 
sovereignty, Derrida aims to defend a notion of “living together” beyond the classical notion 
of citizenship in a sovereign state. He suggests that the state form should not be the last word 
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the Foucauldian paradigm that Brown invokes is to re-think sovereignty beyond 
Oneness, with reference to autoimmunity or self-differentiation, that is, as a weak or 
vulnerable force, always conditioned by norms.  
For Derrida it is impossible to talk about human rights without reference to 
the logic of sovereignty. For human rights are not natural but need to be established 
and continuously re-iterated by acts of decision (but without falling into the trap of 
Schmittian decisionism). The very possibility to make universal right claims depends 
on the image of a sovereign subject that is at once autonomous and heteronomous. 
“One cannot therefore, in a responsible manner, threaten the whole logic of the 
principle of sovereignty without compromising, by the same token, what are today 
the most stable foundations of morality, law, and politics, and the only requirements 
said to be universalizable. In particular of human rights,” claims Derrida.493  
I argue that Derrida’s reformulated understanding of sovereignty helps us 
envision a secular constitutional democracy that respects freedom of religion as well 
as freedom from religion. Not only does it give the individual a degree of autonomy 
                                                                                                                                     
of the political. However, in contrast to other cosmopolitans, Derrida does not find the 
nation-state obsolete. Practically, the disappearance of nation-state sovereignty would not 
automatically translate into the extension of human rights to all. Rather it would render the 
weak powerless in the face of the strong. Nation-state sovereignty still constitutes a “force of 
resistance” to the powerful players of the international order like the US. He states that the 
task today is to strengthen the existing institution and extend citizenship to all stateless 
persons. “One can deconstruct it [the sovereignty of the nation-state] and combat it on one 
level, while continuing, for the same reasons, to support it on another,” suggests Derrida. 
Derrida, "Provocation: Forewords.", xix. For another defense of nation-state sovereignty, see 
Jean L. Cohen, "Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law," Ethics & 
International Affairs 18, no. 3 (2004). 
493 Derrida, "Provocation: Forewords.", xix. 
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from religion but also enables her to interpret it and practice it, if she feels like it. 
Whether she likes to practice it, say, by covering her head, is entirely her business. 
She cannot be simply coerced into either position, covering or dis-covering. In my 
view, what constitutional democracy cannot and should not tolerate is, first of all, 
dogmatism and arbitrary coercion. This is to say that no group, religious or not, can 
impose its particular will or way of life on others or suspend the right to law, even, or 
especially, when they are in the majority. This is the “dogmatic” core of democratic 
constitutional state. Before returning to Habermas’ and post-secular democracy, let 
me quote Derrida one last time:  
The expression “democracy to come” takes into account the absolute and 
intrinsic historicity of the only system that welcomes in itself, in its very 
concept, that expression of autoimmunity called the right to self-critique and 
perfectibility. Democracy is the only system, the only constitutional 
paradigm, in which, in principle, one has or assumes the right to criticize 
everything publicly, including the idea of democracy, its concept, its history, 
and its name. Including the idea of constitutional paradigm and the absolute 
authority of law. It is thus the only paradigm that is universalizable, whence 
its chance and its fragility.494 
 
V. HABERMAS REVISITED: THE POST-SECULAR DEMOCRACY:  
 
In Chapter III, I explained the main pillars of the differentiation thesis put 
forward by Max Weber in “Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions.” 
I  argued that even though the differentiation thesis is sine qua non for the 
secularization of the political sphere, Weber unnecessarily burdens it by the core 
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questions of salvation religions, that is, the meaning of life and death. Weber’s “loss 
of meaning thesis” hinges on the alleged need for a theodicy of suffering and dying 
that he takes to be universal, timeless human need. In The Theory of Communicative 
Action, Jürgen Habermas reconstructs Weber’s project as a phenomenon with 
universal significance. As is well known, Habermas’ reconstruction of the complex 
notion of rationality underlying Weber’s differentiation thesis is not simply 
secondary or auxiliary in Habermas’ work on communicative rationality but 
constitutes its very foundation.495  
In his reconstruction of Weber’s understating of rationality, Habermas 
forcefully rejects Weber’s two theses, the loss of meaning and the loss of freedom, 
that allegedly leads individuals to alienation, and society to disintegration. He 
discredits Weber’s argument that “moral consciousness at a posttraditional stage 
cannot be stabilized without being embedded in religion.” In contrast, he suggests 
that “if the ethical rationalization of religious worldviews leads to the differentiation 
of a value sphere specialized in moral-practical questions, we would expect that 
ethical rationalization would continue within this sphere of value.”496 In Habermas’ 
                                                
495 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and Rationalization of Society., 
143-273. In Habermas’ view Weber wrongly assumes that processes of societal 
rationalization could come into view only from the standpoint of purposive rationality, and 
neglects value rationality (which Weber, in Habermas’ view, confuses with an appeal to 
particular values). This is due to the fact that in Weber’s view value rationality is ultimately 
embedded in a religious ethic, which has lost its structure-forming effects after the collapse 
of the meaning-giving unity of religious worldviews by scientific and economic 
rationalizations.   
496 Ibid. 230. 
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reformulation the value sphere of religion has no structure-forming effect, rather, the 
collapse of the meaning-giving unity of religious worldviews is interpreted as the 
chance for the emancipation of public sphere from totalizing discourses with a new 
understanding of communicative rationality oriented to reaching mutual 
understanding.  
Habermas’ new writings on religion, however, reverse the role accorded 
religion in societal rationalization. Now Habermas argues that something has been 
missing. That which has been missing is the unexhausted force of religious 
traditions. He implies that perhaps Weber was not wrong after all in his “diagnosis” 
that the theodicy of death is a universal human need. He now sides with Max Frish 
who (despite being an agnostic) publicly declared that “the enlightened modern age 
has failed to find a suitable replacement for a religious way of coping with the final 
rite de passage which brings life to a close.”497 This declaration, he suggests, is not 
“an expression of melancholy over something which has been irretrievably lost,” but 
“tells us something about secular reason, namely that it is unsettled by the 
opaqueness of its merely apparently clarified relation to religion.”498 He apologizes 
for treating religion and revelation “as something alien and extraneous” to his 
previous understanding of post-metaphysical thinking.499 He suggests that the secular 
                                                
497 Habermas, "An Awareness of What Is Missing.", 15. 
498 Ibid. 15-16. 
499 Ibid. 17. 
   
 
240 
self-understanding of modernity is now in the process of disintegration due to its 
dismissal of the theological self-understanding of the major world religions.  
Habermas’s new awareness of what has been (allegedly) missing seems to be 
a re-affirmation/formulation of Weber’s two theses about modernization (the loss of 
meaning and freedom), that is, after the collapse of the meaning giving unity of 
religious worldviews we can no longer make sense of our finite existence, which, in 
turn, leads to alienation and societal disintegration. Habermas suggests in a neo-
Weberian fashion: “The competition between worldviews and religious doctrines 
that claim to explain human beings’ position in the world as a whole cannot be 
resolved at the cognitive level. As soon as these cognitive dissonances penetrate the 
foundations of the normative regulation of the social interactions of citizens, the 
political community fragments into irreconcilable religious and ideological segments 
based on a precarious modus vivendi.”500  
Of course, regarding this argument Habermas’ sharpest critique is no one 
other than the Habermas of The Theory of the Communicative Action, who suggested 
that not only the loss of meaning thesis was not plausible but also discredited its 
connection to the loss of freedom thesis.501 Habermas owes us to explain why 
“human beings’ position in the world as a whole” or in Weber’s words, “the 
                                                
500 Habermas, "Religion in the Public Sphere: Cognitive Presuppositions for the "Public Use 
of Reason" by Religious and Secular Citizens.", 136. Emphasis mine.  
501 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and Rationalization of Society., 
243-254. 
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reception of the all-important grasp of the meaning of the world and of [one’s] own 
existence,”502 has once more become the question of our age. He needs to show how 
the politicization of this originally theological question is supposed to yield the 
uniting bond of a legally unenforceable civic solidarity. Yet, unlike Weber, 
Habermas does not derive from the loss of unity an argument for the polytheism of 
gods. Rather he seems to be suggesting that secular reason, unless supplemented by 
religion, has exhausted its meaning-giving capacity. In his view, while religion offers 
“key resources for the creation of meaning and identity,” secular reason is a source 
of societal disintegration.503 As McLennan suggests, “all the humanity and richness 
and morality fall on the religion side, with nothing but alienation and 
depersonalization on the side of secularism/scientific naturalism.”504  
What is further problematic in Habermas is his suggestion that world 
religions, at least in Europe, has already become reflexive. By reflexivity he means 
that world religions have already accepted the legitimacy of the plurality of 
competing belief systems and of the scientific monopoly on the production of 
knowledge. Yet, he gives us no empirical evidence, nor any systematic argument to 
                                                
502 Weber, "Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions.", 353. 
503 Habermas, "Religion in the Public Sphere: Cognitive Presuppositions for the "Public Use 
of Reason" by Religious and Secular Citizens.", 131. 
504 Gregor McLennan, "Towards Postsecular Sociology?," Sociology 41, no. 5 (2007)., 868. 
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prove this claim.505 Based on this alleged fact, he argues that the neutrality of the 
state vis-à-vis different worldviews will be compromised if religious citizens are not 
“allowed to express and justify their convictions in a religious language when they 
cannot find secular “translations” for them.”506 If we require religious citizens to put 
their arguments in a language accessible to all, we would be putting asymmetrical 
cognitive burdens on them. Religious citizens require a certain degree of autonomy 
from the unreasonable cognitive demands of the public use of reason. “The liberal 
state, which protects all religious forms of life equally, must release religious citizens 
from the burden of having to make a strict separation between secular and religious 
reasons in the public arena when they experience this as an attack on their personal 
identity,” claims Habermas.507  
The exemption of religious citizens from the obligation to provide reasons 
accessible to all seriously undermines Habermas’ differentiation of practical reason 
into moral-practical questions and ethical-practical questions.508 Previously, 
                                                
505 His whole case seems to depend on the romanticization funeral of Max Frisch, an 
agnostic whose “final rite de passage” has taken place in St. Peter’s in Zurich with no priest, 
no blessing. Habermas, "An Awareness of What Is Missing.", 15. 
506 Habermas, "Religion in the Public Sphere: Cognitive Presuppositions for the "Public Use 
of Reason" by Religious and Secular Citizens.", 130. Regarding the acceptability of religious 
arguments Habermas makes a distinction between informal (civil society) and formal 
(parliaments) public spheres. While religious arguments are allowed and translated in the 
former, the latter only accepts secular reasons.  
507 Ibid. 140. 
508 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy., 94-99,160-162. Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on 
Discourse Ethics., 1-17. 
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Habermas situated religious speech within the ethical use of practical reason and 
called for progressive expansions of interpretative horizon.509 The moral point of 
view, he suggested, requires the decentering of different perspectives and a break 
from the unquestioned truths of a concrete ethical life. This shift in perspective did 
not imply any damage to the integrity of the personality of religious citizens.510 Nor 
did it restrict their right to raise their own cognitive stance in public deliberations for 
ethical perspectives informed the moral use of practical reason. I have discussed the 
relevance of the good for moral discourses in Chapter IV. However, now Habermas 
distinguishes between ethical and religious discourses, the latter is deemed to have a 
cognitive plus that is relevant for everyone.511 As Christina Lafont suggests, 
                                                
509 I do not agree with Cooke’s claim that Habermas’ silence about the relevance of religion 
for public discussion in Between Facts and Norms is connected to “the fact that religious 
validity claims do not fit easily into either category of moral discourses or the category of 
ethical discourses” due to religions’ reference to a truth that hold for everyone, everywhere. 
What distinguishes moral discourses from ethical discourse is not the claim to complete 
inclusion for both have the semantic form of unconditional imperatives. What distinguishes 
the moral discourse is the requirement of abstraction from unquestioned truths (e.g. 
revelations) that is not necessary in ethical discourses. Therefore I do not think Habermas 
was silent about religion, rather he associated it, as one worldview among others, to the 
sphere of ethics and asked for the expansion of the interpretative horizon of religious 
worldviews. What is new in Habermas’ post-secular argument is that religion is no longer 
one worldview among others due to its said cognitive plus and moral intuition. Maeve 
Cooke, "Salvaging and Secularizing the Semantic Contents of Religion: The Limitations of 
Habermas’s Postmetaphysical Proposal," International Journal of Philosophy of Religion 60, 
no. 1/3 (2006)., 191-192. 
510 See for instance, Habermas, "Reply to Symposium Participants, Benjamin N. Cardozo 
School of Law.", 393. 
511 See also Maeve Cooke, "A Secular State for a Postsecular Society? Postmetaphysical 
Political Theory and the Place of Religion," Constellations 14, no. 2 (2007)., 225. What is 
further unclear is why participants are supposed to be “open to the “truth contents” or the 
“cognitive substance” of the central epistemic claims of the different religious believers.” 
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Habermas does not draw the important distinction between the “right to include in 
public political debate whatever views and reasons one honestly believes” and the 
“right to be released from the obligation to engage the views and reasons of others 
in order to justify to them the coercive policies one favors.”512 The latter does not 
flow automatically from the former. The exemption from the obligation to provide 
reasons accessible to all renders the moral point of view irrelevant.  
Nadia Urbinati in her critique outlines the negative effects of this post-secular 
vision on individual rights especially in mono-religious constitutional democracies 
like Italy. She suggests that “the fact that Catholic citizens make their anti-abortion 
claims in the name of the Thomistic conception of ius naturalis does not give any 
certainty that Catholic citizens will not form a voting block and employ their 
arguments in order to influence representatives in the Parliament.”513 As Urbinati 
rightly suggests, Habermas owes us to explain why religious reasons deserve 
differential treatment in law-making and not, say, economic interests or family 
values.514 
                                                                                                                                     
See Bernstein Richard J. Bernstein, "Naturalism, Secularism, and Religion: Habermas's Via 
Media," Constellations 17, no. 1 (2010).  
512 Cristina Lafont, "Religion and the Public Sphere: What Are the Deliberative Obligations 
of Democratic Citizenship?," Philosophy & Social Criticism 35, no. 1-2 (2009)., 252. 
513 Nadia Urbinati, "Laicite in Reverse: Mono-Religious Democracies and the Issue of 
Religion in the Public Sphere," Constellations 17, no. 1 (2010)., 11.  
514 Ibid. 13.  
   
 
245 
I suggest that Habermas goes too far when he infers from the recognition that 
“religion is here to stay” a special need for religious perspectives on political issues. 
The new post-secular argument obviously renders the moral point of view obsolete. 
Habermas owes us to explain how in a post-secular society (where religious citizens 
have the right to express themselves however they like) the internal connection 
between the individual rights of private persons and the public autonomy of the 
citizens is supposed to be secured. This connection, as we know, is not external or 
secondary to the discourse theory of democracy, but its very condition of possibility. 
We were told/taught by Habermas that a legal order is legitimate when it guarantees 
the autonomy of all citizens to an equal degree and that mutual norms require mutual 
justification. But since this is no longer the case; since religious citizens are 
exempted from the moral point of view; since they can no longer be “burdened” to 
transform their arguments in a language accessible to all, what Habermas seems to 
be discarding is not secularist prejudices about religion but his life-long argument for 
deliberative democracy. As Lafont suggests:  
Obviously, granting a right to ‘mono-glot’ political advocacy would be 
tantamount to giving up any serious commitment to deliberative democracy. 
It is essential to the ideal of a deliberative democracy that the pressure of 
justificatory scrutiny in the public sphere be pervasive. For only under such 
condition it is plausible to claim that public deliberation has an “epistemic 
dimension” that “grounds the presumption of rationally acceptable 
outcomes”. Granting a special right to immunization from justificatory 
pressure to any group of politically active citizens would directly undermine 
such presumption.515 
                                                
515 Lafont, "Religion and the Public Sphere: What Are the Deliberative Obligations of 
Democratic Citizenship?.", 253. 




The individual rights that are meant to safeguard the autonomy of religious citizens 
to shape their lives can be appropriately formulated as long as those affected 
articulate and justify their cases in a language that is accessible to all. This is not to 
suggest that public reason should be completely blind to different experiences and 
life circumstances that affect one’s access to equal opportunity to exercise individual 
rights. This is why Habermas put moral discourses and ethical discourse into a 
dialogue. The obligation to consider specific circumstances is a juridico-ethico-
political obligation and does not arise from the cognitive value of religious traditions. 
This is to say that the principle of equal respect for each individual should be 
actualized much more rigorously and consistently. Above I have discussed the 
paradoxes that one necessarily encounters in making a system of right effective. 
However, such paradoxes do not imply a need to introduce special rights for certain 
individuals or groups (religious or otherwise) that is alien to the individualistic core 
of the modern conception of freedom.  
Habermas, in my view, first, confuses political questions with existential 
questions about the overall meaning of the world. If the developments in genetic and 
brain research pose new questions about human life (something that deeply troubles 
Habermas), then the (difficult) task should be to come up with new answers, rather 
than reviving the questionable authority of religious traditions. Second, he wrongly 
reduces secularism to a comprehensive worldview with a strong aversion towards 
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religion. In his account, one cannot be both religious and secular. They are mutually 
exclusive.  
But Habermas already had a working theory of public argumentation that 
needed no reference to the cognitive plus of religion, nor to a fundamental opposition 
between religious and secular worldviews. In Chapter V, I have already discussed 
the interdependence of the moral and ethical uses of practical reason. The distinction 
between the ethical and the moral may not be easily drawn as Habermas implies. Nor 
may it be fully rationalized via communicative action. In a democratic regime, 
worthy of its name, the distinction may not be resolved once and for all but 
continuously posed and analyzed. It can and should be subjected to all forms of 
deconstructive interventions that I cannot pursue within the limits of this dissertation. 
However, I suggest that it is an analytically useful distinction that helps us 
understand what is at stake in the definition of those norms that are meant to regulate 
our living together. I see no insurmountable obstacles in embedding this distinction 
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CHAPTER VI: RE-THINKING LAÏCITÉ 
What is secularism? Everybody seems to agree that it entails some kind of 
separation between the state and the church, the state and organized religion, or the 
political and the religious spheres. Yet, there are diverging opinions in the literature 
concerning what that “some kind of separation” entails. Everything seems to depend 
on how the metaphor of separation is unpacked or, better, on how the political and 
the religious spheres are supposed to interrelate once they are differentiated from one 
another. There are diverging opinions in the literature. The two major historical 
models of secularism, the American “wall of separation” model and the French 
laïcité model, both of which refuse to subsidize or recognize any religion are under 
attack.516 The religion clauses of the First Amendment of the US constitution while 
recognizing the free-exercise of religion, prohibit the establishment of religion. The 
first two articles of the 1905 Law of Separation between Church and State in France, 
similarly, while guaranteeing freedom of conscience and the free exercise of religion 
(Article 1), prohibits the recognition or subsidy of any religion (Article 2). These 
strict separationist models have been subjected to immense criticism in the literature. 
The 2004 French law banning the wearing of conspicuous religious signs, including 
                                                
516 Stepan, "The World's Religious Syetems and Democracy: Crafting the "Twin 
Tolerations".", Casanova, "The Secular and Secularisms."; Casanova, "Religion, Politics and 
Gender Equality: Public Religions Revisited.", Kuru, "A Research Note on Islam, 
Democracy, and Secularism."; Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The 
United States, France, and Turkey. Bhargava, "Political Secularism."; Rajeev Bhargava, 
"What Is Secularism For?," in Secularism and Its Critics, ed. Rajeev Bhargava (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1998)., Taylor, "Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of 
Secularism."; Taylor, "Foreword. What Is Secularism?." 
   
 
249 
the headscarf, in primary and secondary schools convinced many that the principle of 
non-establishment far from guaranteeing the free-exercise of religion is the very 
obstacle to it.  
One could argue that in the past decade a new paradigm emerged accusing 
secularism for being a comprehensive moral doctrine informed by the Enlightenment 
critique of religion and calling for more and more inclusion of religion in the public 
sphere. Charles Taylor, for instance, makes a strong plea for the recognition of the 
importance of religion in providing a powerful base of solidarity.517 Even those who 
previously defended the separation of state and religion on normative grounds now 
apologize for their Eurocentric biases. Jose Casanova, who argued in his landmark 
study on public religions that it was possible to separate the theory of secularization 
from its ideological origins in the Enlightenment critique of religion, now regards the 
separation of state and church a Western ideology.518 Habermas, as we have seen in 
the previous chapter, refers to the untapped cognitive potentials inherent in world 
religions. Religion, in other words, came to be regarded as an ally of progress 
without which the public square will be “naked,” to use Neuhaus’ terminology, and, 
thereby, democracy will suffer. Jose Casanova goes as far as to suggest that “pious 
veiled Muslim women becoming ever more visible in the public sphere of Muslim 
societies and increasingly attending mosque services can be interpreted actually as a 
                                                
517 Charles Taylor, "Solidarity in a Pluralist Age," IWMpost 104(2010)., 8. 
518 Casanova, "The Secular and Secularisms."; Casanova, "Religion, Politics and Gender 
Equality: Public Religions Revisited." 
   
 
250 
sign of increasing religious gendered equality.”519 The more religion enters the 
public sphere on its own terms, the better it is for democracy, gender equality, 
freedom and the like.  
In previous chapters I approached the question of secularism indirectly, 
analyzing the theological underpinnings of the self-enclosed understanding of 
popular sovereignty as a unitary homogeneous subject and the more mundane idea of 
majoritarianism that remains indebted to this conception. Against the calls to revive 
political theology or the political as the friend enemy distinction that sacrifice 
constitutionalism and individual rights, I argued that it is possible to re-think the 
political sovereignty of the people beyond the Schmittian model and open it up to the 
other. With Habermas I have referred to and defended the republican idea that 
popular sovereignty and human rights are co-original. Furthermore, I discussed the 
differentiation of moral and ethical discourses underlining discourse ethics and the 
priority that must be given to the former in modern societies in the resolution of 
moral conflicts. With Derrida I complicated this picture to a certain extent by 
referring to his paradoxical statement, “the other in me, who is greater than I am,” 
that puts the self and the other into an asymmetrical relationship, obstructing the 
possibility of mutual perspective taking required by the ideal-speech situation. 
Nonetheless, I suggested that the relationless relation to the other is the very 
                                                
519 Casanova, "Religion, Politics and Gender Equality: Public Religions Revisited.", 21. 
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condition of love and friendship, announcing the abstract possibility of impossible 
translation, increasing our responsibility to the other, and leaving a space for alterity.  
My question, in this chapter, is whether it is possible to re-think a model of 
republican laïcité that does not lend itself to political theology, beyond the 
caesaropapist model embraced by the early nation builders in Turkey that allows the 
state to exercise sovereign authority in religious matters by virtue of its autonomous 
legitimacy stemming from the supreme/absolute will of the nation, as well as the 
transformed version of this model that rests on majoritarianism, finding its expression 
in the present AKP rule.520 My question is, in other words, whether it is possible to 
reconcile the separationist and abstentionist underpinnings of the laïcité model of 
secularism with the kind of democracy I have defended, one that embraces the 
worldly/secular genesis of the rule of law and its infinite perfectibility that 
inaugurates a promise to justice. My answer will be yes, that it is possible and indeed 
desirable to re-think a model of republican laïcité that guarantees the freedom of 
conscience via disestablishment without which there can be no democracy. The 
abstentionist and separationist dimensions of the laïcité model are precisely what we 
need to guarantee the freedom of conscience and the free exercise of religion as well 
as room for democratic politics. It is true that these dimensions in Turkey and to a 
lesser extent in France are imperfectly realized. But that fact does not show that the 
                                                
520 On Caesaropapism, see Weber Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive 
Sociology., 1159-1163. 
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ideal itself is flawed. Rather than abandoning laïcité as a myth, we should be looking 
for ways to revise it.  
In what follows, in the light of the above-mentioned insights of Habermas 
and Derrida, I will analyze Charles Taylor’s “overlapping consensus model” of 
secularism (I). Taylor’s model is informed by Rawls’ political liberalism on the one 
hand, Rajeev Bhargava’s notion of “principled distance” on the other hand. It gives 
us a communitarian reading of political liberalism where constitutional essentials, 
including the separation of state and religion, are defined in terms of an overlapping 
consensus between “spiritual families,” religious or non-religious. There are three 
problems with this model that I will analyze at length. First, given Taylor’s strong 
contextualist approach to rationality, that rejects communication across different 
“spiritual families,” the overlapping consensus model is extremely weak in terms of 
providing a plausible conception of democratic citizenship and of solidarity. Second, 
Taylor’s model by giving priority to founding views or spiritual families over 
individuals, imprisons the latter into the contingent life-contexts into which they are 
born and socialized. Third, by obscuring the Rawlsian distinction between public 
reasons and secular reasons in the public use of reason, Taylor’s model fails to 
provide a common basis of political reasoning that all can share as free and equal 
citizens. It reduces political deliberation into negotiated compromise that can be 
easily hijacked by the numerous or the strongest. The overlapping consensus model 
amounts to a modus vivendi at best and to a Schmittian dictatorship at worst.  
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Then, I will turn to Cecile Laborde’s critical republicanism (II). I will argue 
that Laborde’s revised version of laïcité that links together equality as secular 
impartiality, liberty as non-domination, and fraternity as trans-ethnic solidarity and 
inclusion is superior to Taylor’s model as well as Kuru’s passive secularism 
discussed in Chapter I and II. Critical republicanism emphatically denies that the key 
variable in the integration of citizens is their religion and their recognition as such. 
Unlike the communitarian model it takes seriously the problem of internal minority. 
Laborde shows that the separationist and abstentionist dimensions of the laïcité 
model are defensible not simply to protect the freedom of conscience but also the 
equal civic status of all citizens, religious and non-religious. Even though Laborde’s 
model is better than the alternatives, I will make certain revisions in the hopes of 
making it more inclusive. My principal dissent concerns the central ideal that 
informs Laborde’s theory of critical republicanism, that is, “freedom as non-
domination” derived from Philip Pettit’s work on republicanism that understands 
communicative action or voice primarily in terms of resistance to dominating legal 
and social norms. Without devaluing resistance as a meaningful form of political 
action, I will put more emphasis on the integrative dimensions of communication and 
the internal relationship between public and private rights. Accordingly, in contrast 
to her call for politics of non-domination, I will call for politics of friendship, which I 
believe is more resourceful in providing a secular common ground for citizenship 
and in strengthening solidarity. In the light of the politics of friendship, I will 
examine the place of headscarf in public institutions. Unlike Laborde who aims to 
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lift the ban on headscarf only for certain people, mainly students excluding, for 
instance, primary school teachers and government ministers, I will argue that the 
distinction between the receivers and providers of public services that still informs 
her analysis is not tenable, and fails to respect the otherness of the other. I will call 
for a distinction between the religious symbols that the state itself installs in public 
institutions and those that are used personally by those who occupy public positions, 
arguing that the latter are not directly attributable to the state, therefore, do not 
violate the requirement of secular impartiality.  
 
I. CHARLES TAYLOR: THE OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS MODEL OF 
SECULARISM 
In a recent article, entitled “Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of 
Secularism,” Charles Taylor distinguishes between two models of secularism.521 
Both models require some kind of separation of state and Church but differ in the 
way in which they conceive of the kind of neutrality required by a secular state. The 
first one, the laïcité model, is fixated on religion, and has two features. First, it 
defines secularism in terms of institutional arrangements, fetishizing the principle of 
“the separation of church and state.” Second, it removes religion from the public 
space. The second feature of laïcité, in Taylor’s view, follows automatically from the 
first. Taylor is critical of the overemphasis placed on the idea of the separation of 
                                                
521 Taylor, "Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism."The article builds on 
Taylor’s previous article on the modes of secularism, see Taylor, "Modes of Secularism." 
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church and state, and aims to reformulate secularism in terms of neutral 
evenhandedness or equidistance of the state from religious and non-religious 
worldviews alike. Taylor takes his inspiration, on the one hand, from Rajeev 
Bhargava’s notion of “principled distance,” on the other hand, from Rawls’s attempt 
to locate religious and non-religious comprehensive doctrines of the good on the 
same level.  
The idea of principled distance “unpacks the metaphor of separation 
differently.” Bhargava distinguishes between three levels of entanglement between 
the state and religion: ends; institutions; law and policy. The idea of principled 
distance accepts the differentiation of the state from religion at the levels of ends and 
institutions but it does not “make a fetish of it at the level of policy and law.”522 
While it rejects the establishment of religion at the level of the state, it accepts the 
official recognition of religions and establishment policies at the local level. 
Secularism, according to the model of principled distance is “fully compatible with, 
even dictates, a defence of differentiated citizenship.”523 In the absence of such legal 
guarantees, first, the members of minority religions will be discriminated against. 
Second, without certain privileges and immunities minority religions will run the risk 
of extinction. Accordingly, the model of principled distance recognizes community-
specific rights, such as the right of religious groups to establish their own educational 
                                                
522 Bhargava, "Political Secularism.", 468. 
523 Bhargava, "What Is Secularism For?.", 520. Emphasis mine.  
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institutions out of taxes as well as legal plurality in areas of personal and family 
law.524 According to Bhargava, unlike principled distance, abstentionist neutrality 
does not have the conceptual resources at its disposal neither to protect minorities 
against the dominance of the majority religion nor to secure the survival of 
“endangered communities.”525 Below I will argue that the charge that the laïcité 
model of secularism that makes a “fetish” of the differentiation of the state and 
religion at the level of law and policy is discriminatory is not tenable. The abstention 
of the state from interfering in the internal affairs of religion whether to repress or 
promote it is about the prevention of discrimination based on religion and the 
protection of religious liberty and equal civic status of all individuals independent of 
their particular attachments. However, the charge that laïcité cannot guarantee the 
survival of endangered species, which can only be secured at the cost of de-
differentiation, is true. Before that let me discuss the way in which Charles Taylor 
aims to reform the principled distance model of secularism.  
The problem with Bhargava’s model, according to Taylor, is its dismissal of 
non-religious worldviews. Accordingly, he suggest that the kind of neutrality implied 
                                                
524 “Religious groups may demand that the state refrain from their practices but they may 
equally demand that the state interfere in such a way as to give them special assistance so 
that these groups are able to secure what other groups are able routinely get by virtue of their 
social dominance in the political community. It may grant authority to religious officials to 
perform legally binding marriages, to have their own rules or methods of obtaining a 
divorce, its rules about relations between ex-husband and ex-wife, its way of defining a will 
or its laws about post mortem allocation of property, arbitration of civil disputes, and even 
its method of establishment of property rights.” Bhargava, "Political Secularism.", 650. 
525 Bhargava, "What Is Secularism For?.", 540. 
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in the notion of principled distance should be interpreted not simply as a response to 
the diversity of religious worldviews but also to the diversity of non-religious 
worldviews. “The point of state neutrality,” Taylor argues, “is precisely to avoid 
favoring or disfavoring not just religious positions but any basic position, religious or 
nonreligious. We can’t favor Christianity over Islam, but also religion over against 
nonbelief in religion and vice versa.”526  
In contrast to an understanding of secularism that interprets the state as a 
bulwark against religion, Taylor invites us to start with certain primary goods that 
any secular state needs to promote. It is only then possible to formulate the concrete 
arrangements regarding the appropriate entanglement of the state and religion in a 
given context via balancing these goals. In other words, correct answers concerning 
the proper place of religion in the public sphere should be determined by how we can 
maximize our basic goals. Taylor specifies three main goals after the principles of 
French Revolution that any secularist regime must promote: liberty, equality and 
fraternity. The liberty principle requires freedom in the domain of conscience, 
including freedom not to believe. This corresponds to the “free-exercise” clause of 
the First Amendment. The principle of equality requires equality between people of 
different beliefs in the sense that no worldview is privileged by the state. This 
requires the confessional neutrality of state, which is compatible with community 
rights that give political power to local authorities and establishment policies at the 
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local level as in the case of Bhargava. The principle of fraternity, on the other hand, 
requires that “all spiritual families” are given an equal voice in the determination of 
political identity and the regime of rights and privileges. The fraternity principle 
allows every citizen or group to speak the language that is most meaningful to them 
in the process of consensus formation, which, as I will discuss below, reduces 
democratic deliberation into negotiated compromise.527 These three goals together 
require the inclusive and evenhanded treatment of all basic positions, religious and 
non-religious, rather than strict separation of state and religion. Or so Taylor argues. 
Last but not least, Taylor also mentions a fourth goal, “that we try as much as 
possible to maintain relations of harmony and comity between the supporters of 
different religions and Weltanschauungen.”528 However, he immediately drops it 
saying “Maybe this is what really deserves to be called “fraternity,” but I am still 
attached to the neatness of the above schema, with only the three traditional 
goods.”529  As I discuss below, Taylor’s reluctance to include fraternity as solidarity 
between different groups into the main primary goals that a secular state needs to 
promote is not accidental but points to an inherent weakness of his schema, that is, 
its weakness to provide a common ground between different individuals and groups 
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and, thus, to generate a plausible notion of citizenship and solidarity. I will return to 
this issue below. 
Given the picture above, the first question that immediately presents itself to 
those who are familiar with Taylor’s previous work is whether this is really a radical 
reformulation of secularism or a new interpretation of (or a new name for) 
multiculturalism that he has defended with great fervor during the 1990s.530 The 
same communitarian notion of politics of survival or politics of ethical recognition is 
what motivates the “new” definition of secularism. The first difference between 
Taylor’s “radical” secularism and his previous defense of multiculturalism seems to 
be the primary or essential criterion according to which individuals define 
themselves. Earlier it was the culture into which we are born and socialized defined 
who we essentially are, which, in turn, required its preservation from the 
encroachments of the majority in order to “to maintain and cherish distinctiveness 
not just now but forever.”531 Now, it is “spiritual families” say who we are and, 
hence, deserve special treatment. The second difference is the new conceptual 
framework according to which different spiritual families are included in the 
processes of will formation, that is, Rawls’ “overlapping consensus.” 
Taylor is skeptical of the argument raised by Habermas that in the modern 
age neither revealed truths nor the concept of self-instituting absolute sovereignty 
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can form the legitimate basis of democratic political authority. “Habermas seems to 
think that modern secular states can do altogether without some analogous concept 
[to political theology], and this seems to me not quite right,” Taylor argues.532 
Democratic societies, in his view, are bound to remain organized around a “strong 
philosophy of civility” consisting of three norms, that is, human rights, equality, and 
democracy.533 This is a new conception of the political that reserves some public 
theological foundation for democracy and the rule of law. Pace Schmitt, however, 
Taylor does not tie the political to a substantive conception of the people united on 
the basis of a strong commonality along a key dimension (but we must wait to see 
whether Taylor really moves us beyond Schmitt). Rather, he sees it as a correct 
answer to the fact of pluralism. He calls for a “deeper grounding” of constitutional 
essentials, rejecting Habermas’ discourse ethics or any other “free-standing” 
justification of democracy and the rule of law that claims to be universal. What can 
be achieved in the secular age is nothing beyond an overlapping consensus between 
differing founding views or political theologies on a common philosophy of civility. 
We can agree on the principles that govern our relationships but not on the 
underlying reasons. It is impossible to establish a basis of political reasoning that all 
can share as free and equal citizens. There cannot be a single background 
justification on constitutional essentials, including “that centerpiece of secularism, 
                                                
532 Taylor, "Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism.", 46 
533 Ibid. 47. 
   
 
261 
the separation of church and state.”534 “We are condemned to live an overlapping 
consensus,” Taylor states.535 
Taylor’s preference for an overlapping consensus between founding spiritual 
families over a free-standing justification of democracy in terms of popular 
sovereignty and human rights rests on the communitarian idea that morality is 
grounded in a substantive vision of good life. In the previous two chapters I have 
argued against this communitarian vision that rejects the “intersubjectivist” thrust 
inherent in language with reference to Habermas and Derrida. Let me elaborate a bit 
more on this communitarian vision and its implications for Taylor’s overlapping 
consensus model of secularism. “My identity is defined by the commitments and 
identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to 
determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or 
what I endorse or oppose,” claims Taylor.536 Individuals, according to this embedded 
notion of the self, cannot abstract themselves from their deepest commitments. Put 
more bluntly, “you can’t have translations for those [religious or non-religious] kinds 
of references because they are the references that really touch on certain people’s 
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spiritual lives and not others’”537 If the moral claims of a given founding view must 
remain incomprehensible to others; if only those who are identically situated can 
enter into moral argumentation, three interrelated objections suggest themselves.  
First, Taylor needs to explain what motivates different spiritual families to 
converge on a “common philosophy of civility.” The latter is a normative conception 
attached to what Taylor calls the “modern moral order.” In A Secular Age, he traces 
the genealogy of this moral order in the West that culminates in a new “bottom-up” 
view of society, enshrining three principles: the rights and liberties of the members; 
the equality among them; and the principle that rule is based on consent.538 The 
“new” definition of secularism is derived from within this moral order. But the 
genealogy offers nothing more than the hermeneutic clarification of a particular 
tradition from a particular perspective that focuses on Latin Christendom. Since he 
argues that the model is applicable beyond the West,539 Taylor does not seem to be 
able to respond to “the charge leveled by many non-European societies against 
‘secularism,’ that it is an import from ex-Christendom,” the very charge that he is 
trying to dismiss.540 In order to assert the universalist dimension of his conception of 
secularism, Taylor needs to refer to a “common basis for living together,” which is 
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precisely what his communitarian vision does not allow him to do. Self-enclosed 
spiritual families across which any communication beside compromise is impossible 
are constitutive of political order, according to Taylor. The concept of the person as 
believer enjoys priority over the concept of the person as citizen. What is worthy of 
respect, in other words, is basic faith positions (secular or religious) rather than the 
citizen himself or herself. This runs counter against the republican conception of 
“unitary” citizen identity that exceeds particular citizen loyalties without discrediting 
them, an issue that I will return below. Nonetheless, Taylor mentions the political 
necessity of a strong common identity for democratic states. “Democracy obliges us 
to show much more solidarity and much more commitment to one another in our 
joint political project than was demanded by the hierarchical and authoritarian 
societies of yesteryear,” he claims.541 This mutual trust and solidarity across 
communities and the corollary conception of citizenship are precisely what the 
strong contextualism of communitarianism cannot provide. It is either there by a 
lucky happenstance or not. As Rehg argues, “At this point in the argument Taylor 
might attempt to pull the notion of rational conviction back onto the substantive 
ground of a particular totality, arguing that conviction between different groups or 
persons can only obtain insofar as both groups succeed in creating a third 
constitutive language. On Taylor's account, such a language would have to have all 
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the “thick” motivational features associated with each group's initial language.”542 
Given this picture, are we really far from Schmitt? As I have discussed in the 
previous two chapters, it is precisely at this point Habermas as well as Derrida moves 
us a step further by conceiving of an elementary promise in the intersubjectivist 
thrust of language that opens democracy to the other.   
Second, if there is no background consensus on constitutional essentials, even 
in its most minimal sense, how the secular state can balance the three common goals 
(liberty, equality, fraternity) above in a fair way and arrive at the correct institutional 
framework of state religion relations in a given context. Furthermore, as Habermas 
puts it in his reply to Taylor, “without the presumption of such a consensus on 
constitutional essentials, citizens of a pluralist society couldn’t go to the courts and 
appeal to specific rights or make arguments by reference to constitutional clauses in 
the expectation of a getting fair decision.”543 Worse, the confessional neutrality of 
the state, required by the equality principle, imposes only cosmetic duties on the so-
called secular state. For Taylor, the zone of neutrality of a secular state does not 
include citizen deliberation. Nor even deliberation in the legislature. “This zone can 
be described as the official language of the state: the language in which legislation, 
and court judgments must be couched. It is self-evident that a law before Parliament 
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couldn’t contain a justifying clause of the type: “Whereas the Bible tells is that…”544 
This means that the dictates of religion can be turned into law as long as the official 
language is formally, not substantively, neutral. For instance, once deliberations 
takes place, that is, once every spiritual family speak their mind, a law allowing 
Muslim men to restrict the rights of their Muslim wives would be acceptable as long 
as the letter of the law does not contain a justifying clause of the type: “Whereas the 
Qur’an tells us that…” Since the equality principle simply requires equality between 
people of different beliefs, ignoring the important question of the internal other, we 
would be respecting the equality principle in this narrow sense as long as similar 
restrictions are not imposed on non-Muslim women. The principle of equality 
ironically imprisons individuals into the contingent life-contexts into which they are 
born and socialized. Taylor cannot defend himself by referring to the principle of 
liberty, that is free-exercise, for there is no consensus on what that means to begin 
with. Every group interprets it from its own perspective. A religious group can make 
the claim that “any departure from divine command imperils free exercise, because it 
forces the believer to live in an improper world.”545 If and when such a group 
constitutes the majority, all three goals are maximized but we are left with a legal 
system that enforces religious norms.  
 The third objection concerns the public use of reason. Rawls argued for a two-
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stage method of justification for political liberalism.546 At the first stage, individuals 
choose the principles of justice from behind a “veil of ignorance” without 
investigating whether they can be the basis of an overlapping consensus. At the 
second stage the idea of overlapping consensus comes into play and the notion of the 
public use of reason becomes central. The principles selected at the first stage are to 
be justified in the forum of the public use of reason. At this second stage where 
constitutional essentials and basic principles of justice are justified, citizens are 
under a moral (not legal) obligation to offer public reasons. This is the duty of 
civility. In one of his latest writings, Rawls permitted the entry of comprehensive 
doctrines (religious or non-religious) into public debates about constitutional 
essentials and the provided that “in due course, we give properly public reasons to 
support the principles and policies our comprehensive doctrine is said to support.”547 
On the wide view of public reason, he suggested, “citizens of faith who cite the 
Gospel parable of the Good Samaritan do not stop there, but go on to give a public 
justification for this parable's conclusions in terms of political values. In this way 
citizens who hold different doctrines are reassured, and this strengthens the ties of 
civic friendship.”548 Rawls saw this step as necessary in order to establish a common 
basis of political reasoning that all can share as free and equal citizens.  
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Taylor applauds Rawls for giving up on the epistemic distinction between 
secular and religious reasons and putting all comprehensive doctrines, religious and 
secular, on the same plane.549 Yet, Taylor obscures the way in which Rawls 
distinguished between religious and secular reasons on the one hand, and public 
reasons on the other hand. The relevant distinction for Rawls is not between religious 
and secular reasons but the one between public and non-public reasons. Public 
reasons, he thought, can be found in secular and religious worldviews alike. This is 
why when he allowed the entry of comprehensive moral doctrines into public 
deliberations under the “wide view of public reason” he wanted them to be re-
formulated in terms public political values that any citizen can understand 
irrespective of his/her comprehensive doctrine. “We must distinguish public reason 
from what is sometimes referred to as secular reason and secular values. These are 
not the same as public reason. For I define secular reason as reasoning in terms of 
comprehensive nonreligious doctrines. Such doctrines and values are much too broad 
to serve the purposes of public reason. Political values are not moral doctrines, 
however available or accessible these may be to our reason and common sense 
reflection.”550 Taylor, on the other hand, conveniently ignores the important 
distinction Rawls drew between secular and public reasons. As Laborde claims, the 
distinction suggests that “public reasons can be secular without being secularist…it 
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is an implication of his [Rawls’s] conception of public reasons that they will be 
secular: non-religious yet non-comprehensive.”551 Public justification in terms of 
public political values is supposed to provide a common basis of public reasoning 
and strengthen the bond of civic friendship. In Taylor, however, there is no similar 
process of public justification and no conception of friendship. Taylor’s notion of 
overlapping consensus presupposes the intrinsic good of a democratic society that 
allows all “spiritual families” to be self-determining. Every group speaks the 
language that is most meaningful to them. Accordingly, deliberation is understood 
simply as negotiated compromise: “we will have to live with compromises between 
two or more such views…for the indefinite future.”552 Taylor owes us to explain 
what prevents the numerous or the strongest from usurping state power and dictate 
its own set of constitutional essentials. This was one of the principal worries of 
Rawls, that the substance of the principles of justice “would be affected by the 
existing balance of political power between comprehensive doctrines” if they were 
chosen through negotiated compromise between comprehensive worldviews.553 It 
seems that we are not condemned to live an overlapping consensus but a modus 
vivendi at best, a Schmittian dictatorship at worst.  
 Nonetheless, even if Taylor sidesteps the requirement of public justification in 
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terms of public reasons that appeal to political values that can be endorsed, in 
principle, by anyone, he, perhaps unintentionally, shows that political liberalism à la 
Rawls is “inconclusive about the public place of religion.”554 In other words, it 
cannot answer whether the liberal state should be one of separation or of recognition 
and establishment. Cecile Laborde eloquently discusses this issue. She distinguishes 
between four ideal-typical models concerning public place of religion: militant 
separation; full establishment; modest separation; and modest establishment. Militant 
separation and full establishment are mirror opposites. Both protect religious 
freedoms inadequately, albeit for different reasons. Whereas the former promotes 
skepticism or atheism, the latter promotes religious orthodoxy. Modest separation 
and modest establishment, on the other hand, protect religious freedoms adequately, 
while differing on the manner in which the state gets entangled with religion. While 
modest separation rules out official state support of all religions (majority or 
minority), modest establishment allows state aid to religious groups on an equal 
basis.555  
Political liberalism à la Rawls, Laborde argues, rules out the first two forms 
decisively due to the fact that both violate religious freedoms. A political liberal state 
cannot prohibit adherence to religion. Nor can it promote the truth of a religion. 
However, she convincingly claims, the Rawlsian liberal state is compatible with both 
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modest separation and modest establishment. As suggested above, a public reason, 
pace religious or secularist reasons, is one that appeals to public political values, 
which are secular but non-comprehensive. An example would be the case of a 
Catholic opposing to abortion by appealing to the right to life, which is a political 
value that can be endorsed by religious and non religious citizens alike since, 
formulated in this manner, it does not appeal to the truth of Catholic dogma. In a 
similar manner, modest establishment can be justified via an appeal to secular public 
reasons. “A state can support religious activities and practices, not because it 
endorses and affirms the good that they pursue, but in the name of the public values 
of religious freedom and equality between citizens.”556 The latter can be interpreted 
as requiring the state to support all religions evenhandedly provided that justification 
is made in terms of public reasons, which are secular not secularist. A political 
liberal state can be compatible with multi-faith establishment. Likewise, a state of 
modest separation can be justified from the perspective of religious doctrines, say, by 
reference to Matthew 22:21—Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s, and 
unto God the things that are God’s—provided that in the due course proper public 
reasons are given. Accordingly, “There is no direct relationship of entailment 
between the normative reasons allowed in public debate and the public place of 
religion (the institutional framework of state-religion relations). A state can support 
religions without ipso facto affirming their truth; and a state can maintain a ‘wall of 
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separation’ with religions without ipso facto endorsing secularist values,” claims 
Laborde.557 Rawls himself accepted that the principle of separation is open to 
different interpretations, leaving “open the question whether church schools may 
receive public funds, and if so, in what way.”558 
In addition to showing the inconclusive nature of political liberalism with 
respect to the institutional framework of state-religion entanglement, Laborde also 
argues that it is indeterminate about the symbolic place of religion in the public 
sphere. In contrast to coercive establishment policies like state funding of religious 
schools or religious instruction in public schools, which concern Rawlsian 
distributive justice and, hence must be justified in the forum of public reason, 
Laborde specifies a class of non-coercive establishment cases which do not concern 
Rawlsian justice for, according to Rawls, only constitutional essentials and basic 
principles of justice are meant to be justified in the forum of the public use of reason. 
Such cases include the organization of state funerals by the Catholic Church as in 
France or the exhibition of crucifixes in public places as in the case of Quebec’s 
National Assembly.559 These policies are neither coercive, nor do they restrict 
religious freedom of those citizens who do not identify themselves with such 
religious symbols. As such they do not fall under the purview of political liberal 
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justice. Accordingly Laborde claims, “nothing in the orthodox political liberalism 
prevents a religious majority from entrenching its symbols within the state, provided 
members of religions minorities are otherwise treated as free and equal citizens 
(according to principles of justice)…[S]ymbolic establishment is permissible within 
liberal distributive justice, because it does not directly affect it.”560 Republican 
secularism, laïcité, on the other hand, gives a more decisive answer concerning the 
public place of religion, which I will turn next.  
 
II. CECILE LABORDE: CRITICAL REPUBLICAN SECULARISM 
Laborde’s Critical Republicanism marks a pivotal turning point in the 
growing studies on secularism, where the laïque emphasis on the “wall of 
separation” between the state and religion is seen as an intolerable imposition on 
religious citizens as well as on democracy. The critique of laïcité is often, if not 
always, informed by the assumption of the special nature of religion that deserves 
special recognition. Laborde, on the other hand, restores the moral foundations of 
laïcité by re-thinking the three ideals of the French Revolution. She carefully avoids 
making pleas for the recognition of the importance of religion without demoting the 
latter into an archaic relic that needs to be forcibly removed from the public sphere 
by a paternalistic state. “Critical republicans,” she suggests, “do not single out any 
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pre-defined and fixed group as the object of their concerns.”561 The project, as I will 
discuss below, is indeed admirable in its rejection of strong segmented pluralism that 
idealizes group difference in favor of what might be called soft pluralism that 
promises to provide a common secular ground for citizenship where no individual or 
group is dominated or stigmatized. Even if I agree with most of the results and 
reforms she offers, I will make certain revisions in the hopes of bringing her critical 
republicanism more in with the republican intuition, that popular sovereignty and 
human rights share the same root. This republican intuition is already latent in her 
analysis. Therefore, my critique will be a friendly one. My principal dissent concerns 
the central ideal that informs Laborde’s theory of critical republicanism, that is, 
“non-domination” derived from Philip Pettit’s work on republicanism. In contrast to 
her call for politics of non-domination, I will call for politics of friendship, which I 
believe is more resourceful in providing a secular common ground for citizenship 
and in strengthening solidarity. But first let me discuss briefly her marvelous project 
in its current form.  
Laborde develops her theory of critical republicanism through the lens of the 
hijab controversy in France and the 2004 ban on ostensible religious signs in 
schools. She eloquently represents the most plausible versions of the two dominant 
positions in contemporary France with respect to the public place of religion. 
“Official republicanism” justifies the ban on the grounds that it violates all three 
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principles of French republicanism. The headscarf as an “ostentatious religious sign” 
violates the principle of equality as neutrality. As a symbol of the subordination of 
Muslim women, the headscarf violates the principle of liberty as autonomy and 
emancipation from religious oppression. Finally, as a sign of the perceived 
unwillingness of Muslims to integrate into the French nation, it violates the principle 
of fraternity as community. Tolerant republicanism, on the other hand, opposes the 
ban by taking issue with the very idea of laïcité. It “substitutes pragmatic even-
handedness between religious groups, for abstentionist neutrality, and allows for the 
recognition of collective religious identities in the public sphere.”562 Laborde’s 
critical republicanism while opposing the ban on headscarf on students is skeptical of 
the multiculturalist politics of recognition affirmed by tolerant republicans. Rather 
than abandoning the very idea of laïcité, it seeks to revise its three ideals: equality as 
secular impartiality, liberty as non-domination, and fraternity as trans-ethnic 
integration.  
Laborde in her revision of the principle of equality as secular impartiality 
points to the distinction between secularism as the doctrine of institutional separation 
that applies to state institutions and public sphere in general and separation as a 
doctrine of conscience that applies to religious institutions and citizens in general. 
“Secularism,” she argues, “is primarily an institutional doctrine of separation, 
prescribing the extent to which state institutions, and the public sphere more 
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generally, must remain secular so that citizens can freely follow their conscience.”563 
She correctly emphasizes the inextricable relationship between the principle of non-
establishment and freedom of conscience. A secular state is not one that polices or 
combats beliefs but one that neither favors nor disfavors religion as such. 
Accordingly she argues, “At a simplest level, a democratic state is secular in the 
sense that it does not affirm any religious creed, and does not seek to confer special 
benefits or burdens to citizens affirming any religious creed (or none).”564 The 
preservation of the equality between religions requires “equalizing downwards,” that 
is, disestablishment, rather than “equalizing upwards,” that is, multi-faith 
recognition.565 Equality between religions, in other words, involves the refusal of the 
recognition of any. Laborde’s conception of impartial state goes beyond Taylor’s 
neutral state in addressing not simply the arbitrary state problem but also internal 
minority problem. She correctly refers to the problem of Muslim women’s “double 
domination.”566 Strong politics of ethical recognition while lessening the arbitrary 
interference of the state, it intensifies the internal minority problem. As Habermas 
argued long ago, granting cultural (or in this case religious) autonomy for a minority 
will not solve the problem, “new minorities would arise in turn.”567 The argument is 
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not that religious or other identities are not worthy of respect. Rather the state is not 
the suitable agency to artificially protect the so-called endangered ways of life, 
religious or not.  
In addition to guaranteeing the freedom of conscience, the separatist and 
abstentionist dimensions of laïcité is also indispensable for the preservation of the 
equal civic status of religious and non-religious citizens alike.568 This is why, pace 
political liberalism, republicanism rejects even symbolic establishment. Such 
symbolic recognition breaches the religious neutrality of the public sphere and 
dominates non-religious citizens. It implies that “some are not full members of the 
political community, that they cannot enter the public square on equal terms with 
others.”569 Accordingly, rather than idealizing fixed identities, Laborde, rightly, calls 
for the de-ethnicization and disestablishment of dominant cultures and identities so 
that everybody can be included in the public sphere as equal citizens. However, in 
Laborde’s view, “a secular public order cannot claim to be equally suited to religious 
and non-religious peoples, but it is nonetheless the closest we can get to being an 
order that most, if not all, citizens can endorse…A secular state, by eschewing all 
references to God, avoids taking sides between these two conceptions. 
Unquestionably, making no references to God is more problematic for those who 
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believe in God’s existence than it is for who do not. But this is an unavoidable—if 
regrettable—asymmetry”570 I am not in agreement with this statement and I believe 
much of what she discusses in the rest of the book, like the “internal minority 
problem,” also contradicts it. The abstentionist impartiality of the secular state is 
equally, if not more, defensible from the perspective of those who take religion 
seriously. When a state speaks in the name of God or religion, it speaks in the name 
of a single interpretation of God over and against other interpretations. It is worth 
mentioning that the separatist dimension of laïcité aims to protect the internal and 
lawful autonomy of religion, an issue that critics of separation conveniently ignore. 
In other words, it protects the freedom of discussion and interpretation within each 
religion. It secures not only the freedom to say “no” to religion but also the freedom 
to say “yes.” This issue is eloquently discussed by Amy Gutmann in her defense of 
the Establishment clause of the First Amendment. Establishment, she claims, “is 
more likely than not to corrupt religion, to corrupt citizens into professing doctrines 
they do not believe (for social recognition), and to corrupt religious leaders into 
claiming more power for themselves than necessary to fulfill truly religious 
purposes.”571 The asymmetry, then, is not between religious and non-religious 
citizens but between those who accept what Rawls calls “burdens of reason,” and 
those who want to see their identities writ large in their society. A secular public 
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sphere of common citizenship is really unsuitable for the latter group that views 
different ways of life mistaken, but this is not a regrettable asymmetry.  
Laborde interprets the laïcité principle of liberty in terms of Pettit’s 
conception of freedom as non-domination.572 According to this view, “I am free only 
if I am recognized by others as enjoying a status that protects me resiliently against 
arbitrary interference and guarantees my equal status as a citizen living in 
community with others. In a word, I am free as a citizen of a particular state, a state 
that promotes the common good of non-domination.”573  Freedom as non-domination, 
Laborde suggests, does not endorse a particular conception of the good life. It rejects 
the coercive state paternalism involved in the forcible removal of the headscarf from 
its wearer, yet does not leave the individual alone in the face of dominating legal and 
social norms. Laborde sees autonomy promoting education as a necessary means to 
endow individuals with minimal discursive control necessary to combat 
domination.574 With respect to this proposal I would like to make three points. The 
first two concerns a friendly critique of the very concept of freedom as non-
domination, and the last one, which is not a critique, involves Laborde’s notion of 
                                                
572 Laborde Laborde, Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political 
Philosophy., see especially Chapter VII. Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom 
and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)., see especially Chapter II and III.  
573 Laborde, Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy., 2. 
Laborde’s emphasis.  
574 Ibid. 149-169. 
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republican education and its implications for mandatory religious education in 
Turkey.  
First, Laborde continuously refers to the importance of people speaking for 
themselves calling for the inclusion of ‘voiceless’ individuals and groups.575  Yet, the 
value of voice is most of the time, if not always, articulated in terms of resistance to 
dominating norms and institutions. My intention is not to disqualify resistance as a 
meaningful form of political action. Nor do I contest the value of non-dominating 
norms, institutions, or practices. My worry is when democratic voice is articulated 
primarily in terms of resistance, we run the risk of bringing back essentialized 
identities and the corollary conception of politics of self-realization, and of losing 
sight of the integrative function of voice in fostering solidarity across different 
groups. This is by no means Laborde’s intention. Yet, I’m not sure whether freedom 
as non-domination is rich enough to prevent that risk. The politics of non-
domination, first and foremost, involves the progressive ideal of emancipation of the 
self from actual or potential arbitrary interference. It is in a sense too much 
preoccupied with the self, risking of losing sight of the other. It is open to question 
whether it entails the kind of unconditional renunciation of the self-enclosed 
conception of sovereignty, whether that of the state or of the individual. To that 
extent, I am not sure if it can be the ground of a genuine notion of friendship that 
transcends the barriers of civic community. It is too negative in its emphasis on 
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resistance and combat, to that extent it is questionable if it entails a genuine welcome 
to the other. Therefore, I would like to replace the (negative) politics of non-
domination with the (affirmative) politics of friendship.  
The kind of friendship I propose following Derrida transcends the barriers of 
civic community, extending hospitality to “no-matter-who.” This is, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, an impossible plea. It is not something that can be turned into 
law. To the extent that it is neither strictly political nor juridical, it is open to 
question whether it corresponds to the third principle of laïcité, that is, fraternity. 
Perhaps rather than constituting a third separate principle on its own, it is the “holy 
spirit” that brings together equality and liberty. Furthermore, it is perhaps better to 
talk about friendship than fraternity due to the latter’s implicit or explicit reference to 
the figure of the brother or brotherliness, usually united in the battlefield, excluding 
the feminine or the otherness of the other, even in a symbolic sense.576 Friendship 
begins with respecting the radical otherness of the other, in contrast to the notion of 
fraternity that risks bringing back notions like resemblance, similarity, homogeneity, 
thereby, ruining the figure of the friend. Laborde for the most part avoids the 
communitarian connotations of the notion of fraternity, for instance, in her call to 
expand out sense of ‘we.’577 Nonetheless, perhaps there are still traces of the 
classical version of republican fraternity that is obsessed with homogeneity. For 
                                                
576 The term fraternity is what Derrida question throughout Derrida, The Politics of 
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instance, she refuses to extend the right to wear headscarf to primary school teachers 
and elected representatives. “In a critical republican view, such prohibitions can 
never be general in form, and should be a function of the importance of the public 
function and of the vulnerability of the users of the service. Thus, government 
ministers but not tax inspectors, primary school teachers but not university lecturers, 
may be subjected to an obligation of religious restraint while on duty.”578 In 
discussing the secular impartiality of the state and public institutions, perhaps it is 
better to differentiate between religious symbols that the state itself installs (like 
crucifixes or suras from the Quran installed in classrooms, courts, parliaments and 
the like) and those that are utilized by individuals who perform public services.579 I 
am not sure whether the latter is directly attributable to the state. What is attributable 
to the state is the actions of those who exercise public authority, not their 
appearance. If appearance does matter, then imposing identical uniforms on all state 
officials would be the most impartial solution. Absent indoctrination or 
discrimination on the part of those who choose to wear headscarf, there does not 
seem to be any plausible ground for any restriction on anyone. Laborde’s proviso 
seems to run against the republican emphasis on equal civic status as well as respect 
to the other.  
                                                
578 Ibid. 87. 
579 The Federal Constitutional Court in Germany in its deliberations about the proper place 
of religious symbols in the public sphere referred to this distinction. See, Matthias 
Mahlmann, "Religious Tolerance, Pluralist Society and the Neutrality of the State: The 
Federal Constitutional Court’'S Decision in the Headscarf Case," German Law Journal 4, 
no. 11 (2003). 
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Even though I presume there are no grounds justifying the ban on the 
headscarf on anyone, including elected representatives, a caveat is in order 
concerning how the ban should be lifted in Turkey. A segment of the population in 
Turkey, the so-called secularists, fears that abolishing the ban would lead to social 
pressures on unveiled women at best or open the road to new legal regulations 
imposing the headscarf at worst. The AKP, on its part, has not done anything to 
address those fears. As Borovali suggests, the AKP policies at the local level 
restricting the alcohol use as well as the attempts to criminalize adultery only served 
to increase those fears.580 There needs to be a public exchange concerning the very 
objectives of lifting the ban, which I believe, would, in turn, strengthen (or better 
form) the bonds of friendship between the two opposing groups.581 It needs to be 
clarified that the right to wear the headscarf does not (or should not) come with a 
corollary duty to wear it. Therefore, as Benhabib suggests, “It is not only the right to 
wear the headscarf which must be defended but also the right of girls and women not 
to wear the headscarf – and not to observe mandatory fasting during Ramadan, and 
so on – that must be asserted. But neither the ruling AKP nor the oppositional CHP 
(Republican People’s Party) are deep democrats in this sense. It is altogether possible 
that had the Turkish Constitutional Court decided to accept the new legislation 
                                                
580 Murat Borovali, "Islamic Headscarves and Slippery Slopes," Cardozo Law Review 30, no. 
6 (2009)., 2603. 
581 See also Ali Carkoglu, "Public Attitudes Towards the Turban Ban in Turkey," Utrecht 
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[lifting the ban] as constitutional, the AKP would have seen a green light to ban the 
public drinking of alcohol, to impose further restrictions on the dress habits of non-
observant Turkish girls, and to demand that everyone fast during Ramadan.”582 In the 
absence of a public exchange that addresses these well-founded fears, simply lifting 
the ban would only serve to further polarize the society along the lines of friends and 
enemies. 
My second objection, directly related to the first, is the instrumental value 
attributed to democracy. Laborde, like Pettit, understands democratic participation 
mostly as a means to combat domination. As Rostboll suggests, “From the 
perspective of nondomination, then, the focus is not the formation of common 
interest or the democratic genesis of law but rather protecting citizens against laws 
based on sectarian interests.”583  This runs against the basic republican insight that 
human rights and democracy are co-original. The state is not an institution external 
to our discursive practices. Nor are the people the passive recipients of law. It is 
essential to the republican tradition that those subject to decisions must be able to see 
themselves as also the authors of those decisions. And this is only possible once we 
see communicative action not primarily as a negative means to combat domination 
                                                
582 Seyla Benhabib, "The Return of Political Theology: The Scarf Affair in Comparative 
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but as a positive means to form common goals, introduce new issues and obligations 
to the public forum, and foster friendship. To be fair, Laborde does refer to 
deliberative democracy and the active involvement of citizens in lawmaking as a 
supplement to Pettit’s conception of contestatory democracy, but largely in a cursory 
fashion.584 Throughout the book politics in general and democratic voice in 
particular usually refer to contestation, reducing the democratic principle of 
legitimation into an inferior position. My intention is to bring the constructive 
function of discursive participation and the relationship between public and private 
rights more to the center.  
My third and final point, which is not a critique, concerns republican 
education. Critical republicanism, as suggested above, takes seriously the internal 
minority problem, ignored by advocates of the politics of ethical recognition like 
Taylor. Additionally, it seeks to address phenomena of restrictive socialization and 
the adaptive preferences under oppressive conditions, ignored by Pettit’s narrowly 
defined notion of domination as a subjectively experienced harm.585 This is why 
Laborde emphasizes the importance education in fostering autonomy-related skills in 
order to bring children to a minimum level of independence necessary for republican 
citizenship. Such skills include “practical reason, moral courage, critical skills, 
awareness of the ‘burdens of reason’, exposure to a diversity of ways of life, 
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163. 
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understanding of the full range of one’s rights.”586 What is necessary, from the 
perspective of critical republicanism, is not the actual exercise of autonomous choice 
but the availability of autonomy related skills, with which individuals can, if they 
wish so, ward off actual or potential domination. This proposal is, of course, utterly 
unacceptable, for instance, from the perspective of Talal Asad. In his view, the 
republican public school is essentially an ideological institution aiming to cultivate a 
contradictory individual, “one who is morally sovereign and yet obedient to the laws 
of the secular Republic, flexible and tolerant yet fiercely principled.”587 I will not 
further criticize Asad’s one-sided analyses but simply point out to the potential that 
mandatory public schooling can indeed suppress diversity. As we have seen in 
Chapter II, public education in Turkey does have the purpose of cultivating obedient 
selves to the nation. However, this does not mean that the very notion of public 
schooling is flawed. Individuals do not choose the communities into which they are 
born. Nor children are “solely creatures of their religious community. They are also 
potential citizens and individuals in their own right.”588 Throughout this dissertation, 
I pointed out to the conceptual and normative necessity of dividing and dispersing 
sovereignty. The same principle can be used in defense of a kind of republican 
education that divides sovereignty over children’s education between the state and 
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parents. Neither of them can (or should) claim exclusive authority. While parents 
have the right to transmit their values to their children, the state is responsible to 
expose children to different ways of life, cultivate friendship, and teach them their 
basic constitutional and civic rights. Political liberals and republicans are in 
agreement on this point: “the realm of public schooling is a democratic government's 
single most powerful and legitimate means of teaching respect for reasonable 
political disagreement.”589 This does not mean that private religious schools should 
be outlawed. Rather they should be “tightly regulated and forced to balance religious 
instruction with non-religious and other-religious perspectives.”590 Such regulation 
cannot be simply dismissed as paternalistic intervention on the part of the state for, 
as mentioned above, communities cannot enjoy exclusive authority over children.  
Another related important question concerns the place of religious instruction 
in public schools. The kind of secular impartiality I defended following Laborde 
requires public schools to be agnostic towards the truth of religions. They should 
neither favor, nor disfavor religion. As we have seen, this requirement has been 
largely violated in Turkey, where religious education is deeply proselytizing. 
However, public schools can (or perhaps should) expose students to knowledge 
about different religions. In Gutmann’s view, “Such knowledge is politically relevant 
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not because government should regulate religious belief (it should not) but rather 
because citizens need to think about why religious belief should not be regulated.591  
Another question is what counts as a religious proposition. Kent Greenwalt gives us 
a helpful list in this regard: “Claims about the existence, nature, and actions of God 
or gods are religious. Claims about life after death are religious. Claims about the 
ultimate significance of physical reality and of human life are religious.”592 Public 
schools cannot or should not give positive or negative answers to these questions. 
These questions should be removed from the curriculum and their answers should be 
left to parents.  
To sum up, in contrast to the critics of the separationist laïcité model of 
secularism, following Laborde I argue that laïcité, understood properly, is not an 
optional extra for democracy but its very condition of possibility. It is necessary to 
erect a strict wall of separation between religion and politics at the church-state level, 
rejecting symbolic, material or political recognition of religion by the state; and a 
more permeable wall of separation at the level of political interactions among 
citizens when they are engaged in public debate about coercive laws and policies. 
The wall between religion and politics when it comes to the political interactions 
among citizens is more permeable for the discursive will of the people is formed in 
actual dialogues where each participant brings his/her life-history to discussion with 
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an aim to reach mutual understanding. The decision making process about those 
norms that regulate our living-together takes place between the question of “what is 
good for everyone?” (the moral point of view) and the question of “what is good for 
me?” (the ethical point of view). As Habermas suggests, “questions of justice [what 
is good for everyone] can be judged impartially only if equal consideration is given 
to the worldviews and self-interpretations of all participants.”593 In order to be able 
to actualize this constitutional democratic regime, it is necessary to see the religious 
point of view as one among the others, without idealizing its cognitive or moral 
value as Habermas does in his late writings. I suggest that when laïcité understood in 
this sense is the only model of secularism that can truly protect the free-exercise of 
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386. 




Charles Taylor in A Secular Age distinguishes between three different but 
interrelated senses of secularity. The first sense concerns the increasing 
differentiation of religion from various spheres of activity and its constitution in its 
own separate sphere. The common institutions and practices, most importantly the 
state, is emancipated from the tutelage of the Church. This is, as I discussed in 
Chapter III, what Max Weber meant by the process of rationalization where each 
sphere (politics, economy, science, morality and the like) develops its own 
rationality. The second sense concerns the decline of religion, “the falling off of 
religious belief and practice, in people turning away from God, and no longer going 
to the Church.”594 The third sense of secularity concerns the conditions of belief, “a 
move away from a society where belief in God is unchallenged and indeed, 
unproblematic, to one in which its is understood to be one option among others, and 
frequently not the easiest one to embrace.”595 
With respect to the case of Turkey I am interested in the first and third senses 
of secularity, for the second sense, that is, the decline of religion, as Jose Casanova 
suggests, is not longer a defensible proposition of the secularization thesis, the 
United States being a striking example.596 The first sense of secularity, that is, the 
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differentiation of secular and religious spheres has always been problematic in 
Turkey. In Chapter II, I traced the genealogy of the relationship among the spheres 
of the political, the religious, and the scientific throughout the republican era. We 
have seen a shift from the primacy of the political and the scientific over the 
religious to the primacy of the religious over all other spheres, a shift from political 
theology to theological politics, or from what I call nationalist secularism to Islamic 
secularism.  
In Weber’s narrative of modernity, after the disintegration of the meaning-
giving unity of salvation religions, the political sphere enters into direct competition 
with religious ethics in the creation of community and meaning. War-making gives 
rise to a new national consciousness, creating a new sacrificial community and 
solving the meaning of death. The specialization of the political in its own newly 
found sphere, to put differently, gives rise to a new political theology. Carl Schmitt’s 
conception of the political as the primary sphere over all others is also informed by 
this new existentialist consciousness of nationalism. The friend-enemy distinction 
arguably emancipates us from the meaninglessness of modern existence. The 
political sphere absorbs the function of religion in dispensing salvation. As I 
discussed in Chapter II, the differentiation of the political and the religious à la 
Weber and the primacy of the political à la Schmitt do not mean that religion cannot 
play an important role in nation-making or in distinguishing between the friend and 
the enemy. The Turkish case is indeed an interesting example where religion is not 
only controlled but also abused in order to secure political legitimacy, societal 
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integration, and willingness to sacrifice for the nation. When we recall that since 
1984 Turkey has been witnessing a civil war between the state and the PKK (the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party) insurgents, where almost 7000 soldiers and police officers 
lost their lives, the discourse on martyrdom gains an important function in the 
mobilization of citizens to take up the arms and face the “enemy.”597 A state that 
promises heaven to diseased soldiers can hardly be deemed secular.  
With respect to the third sense of secularity, that is, the conditions of belief, 
Turkey has not been fully secular as well. As I discussed in Chapter II, belief in 
Islam has never been optional for Turkish citizens. During the early republican era 
non-Muslims were disenfranchised. The project of making a religiously homogenous 
citizenry has been pursued in education policies as well. The state has continuously 
offered proselytizing religious education where no boundary is set between being 
Turkish and Muslim. Even today, the ID cards that the state issues has a mandatory 
category indicating the holder’s religion.  
I fail to concur with Talal Asad that what needs to be blamed for in the case 
of Turkey is secularism.598 What seems to be at stake is a certain political theology 
that distorts, thus, annihilates the democratic principle of self-determination by 
                                                
597 It is documented that a total of 6538 soldiers and police officers lost their lives between 
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conflating the demos with ethnos.599 This substantialist notion of the people 
transforms the ideal of self-government under law into collective self-realization or 
self-affirmation, as Habermas argued long ago. This model, which devalues 
plurality, is necessarily belligerent and sacrificial. It cannot construct the friend 
component of democracy unless it identifies a common enemy (internal or external). 
“The possibility, the meaning and the phenomenon of friendship would never appear 
unless the figure of the enemy had already called them up in advance,” Derrida 
suggests in his critique of Schmitt.600 Citizens can only be integrated in the 
battlefield or in martyr funerals. This model is inherently in tension with human 
rights and cannot give expression to a stable legal order. It is no accident that Turkey 
in its nearly hundred year old history has witnessed a single party dictatorship (1923-
1950), three direct military coups d’état (1960, 1971, 1980) followed by periods of 
direct military rule, two military soft coups d’état (1997, 2007), a civil war (1984-
present), a spatially limited state of exception regime (1987-2002) and the closure of 
twenty-seven political parties by the Constitutional Court. My objective in this 
dissertation was to find out a kind of “living-together” compatible with plurality.  
The missing component in the Turkish/Schmittian model that understands the 
principle of popular sovereignty as the existential self-realization of a nation in its 
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particularity is the friend.601 If we can bring the friend component of democracy back 
into the concept of the political, we can re-think the principle of self-determination 
as a process of self-legislation under law that involves everyone equally and not only 
those who are “substantively equal.” Then, we can displace the sacrificial logic of 
the absolutist conception of sovereignty and envision solidarity among strangers who 
grant one another equal right to co-existence. Both Habermas and Derrida emphasize 
the social nature of human beings. In their views, the notion of “self” is meaningless 
without the other. This is why they do not find an opposition between autonomy and 
dependency, which enables them to envision a friendly living-together. Habermas 
explains this eloquently in an interview: 
I have a conceptual motive and a fundamental intuition. . . . The motivating 
thought concerns the reconciliation of a modernity which has fallen apart, the 
idea that without surrendering the differentiation that modernity has made 
possible in the cultural, the social and economic spheres, one can find forms 
of living together in which autonomy and dependency can truly enter into a 
non-antagonistic relation, that one can walk tall in a collectivity that does not 
have the dubious quality of backward-looking substantial forms of 
community. The intuition springs from the sphere of relations with others; it 
aims at experiences of undisturbed intersubjectivity. Wherever these ideas 
appear, . . . they are always ideas of felicitous interaction, of reciprocity and 
distance, of separation and of successful, unspoiled nearness, of vulnerability 
and complementary caution. All of these images of protection, openness and 
compassion, of submission and resistance, rise out of a horizon of experience, 
of what Brecht would have termed ‘friendly living together’. This kind of 
friendliness does not exclude conflict, rather it implies those human forms 
through which one can survive conflicts.602 
                                                
601 See Cohen and Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory., 231-241. 
602 Cited in Rehg, Insight and Solidarity: A Study in the Discourse Ethics of Jurgen 
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otherness of the other, for the radical singularity of the other. I think, from that point of view, 





Once we displace the opposition between the self and the other on the one hand, 
autonomy and dependency on the other, we can envision the “we” component of 
democracy as an internally differentiated notion beyond sameness and homogeneity. 
Hence, we can transform the principle of popular sovereignty underlying democracy 
as self-government under law, within which a minimum of friendship is already 
inscribed.  
Turkey, despite the common perception, has never been secular. A shift to a 
more liberal and democratic society requires the kind of secularism discussed in the 
previous chapter, not its abandonment. What is necessary is to abandon the friend-
enemy conception of sovereignty with its inherently sacrificial logic. Turkey, next to 
its complicated relation to Islam, has also a long history of constitutionalism that 
goes back to the Ottoman era.603 We can channel our efforts in this direction and 
                                                                                                                                     
separation, dissociation is not an obstacle to society, to community, but the 
condition…Dissociation, separation, is the condition of my relation to the other. I can 
address the Other only to the extent that there is a separation, a dissociation, so that I cannot 
replace the other and vice versa. That is what some French-speaking philosophers such as 
Blanchot and Levinas call the "rapport sans rapport," the relationless relation. The structure 
of my relation to the other is of a "relation without relation." It is a relation in which the 
other remains absolutely transcendent. I cannot reach the other. I cannot know the other from 
the inside and so on. That is not an obstacle but the condition of love, of friendship, and of 
war, too, a condition of the relation to the other. So, dissociation is the condition of 
community, the condition of any unity as such.” Derrida, "The Villanova Roundtable: A 
Conversation with Jacques Derrida.", 14-15.  
603 See Tanör, Osmanli-Türk Anayasal Gelismeleri : (1789-1980). 
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open up democracy to the other. The dissertation aimed to make a contribution in 
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